LOOKING FORWARD

A Treatise on the Status of Woman and the Origin and Growth of the Family and the State

BY PHILIP RAPPAPORT

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History without political science has no fruit:
Political science without history has no root.
—*Sir John Richard Seeley*

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

FOREWORD.

This book is written from the standpoint of historic materialism. The theory of historic materialism is young and, so far as I am aware, no economist, sociologist or historian, using the English language, has made any serious attempt toward its application in his investigations. What has been written upon the subjects treated in this book with reference to that theory is scattered in scientific and philosophical books and periodicals, mostly known only to men of learning, and I know of no book in the English language investigating those subjects on the basis of historic materialism popularly enough, so as to be adapted to the needs of the general public.

Carlyle would never have called political economy the dismal science, if it had had advanced already to the study of the evolution of economics, of the lines on which it proceeded and does proceed from the beginning of human society up to our own time, and the connection between the economic structure of society and social and political institutions. Instead of that, political economists considered the continued existence of the present economic system with, perhaps, some slight modifications, a matter per se and studied only the inter-relations of causes and effects within the system. Thus, political economy degenerated into a mere science of trade, able to serve only the working out of rules and systems of private economy for individual use.

That was a dismal science, indeed. It was unable to kindle a ray of hope, to warm a single soul. A political economy which was unable to develop a higher ideal than buying cheap and selling dear could not possibly awaken response or enthusiasm in any human heart, and could produce nothing but mute resignation among the suffering masses and utter disregard of their woes among

those whom the chances of fate had placed on the sunny side of life.

To-day we know better. Although political economy as officially taught at colleges and universities is still impregnated with the same spirit of hopelessness, yet those who are free to speak teach us that economic systems share the fate of everything on earth. They come and go; they live and die. Some day in the future there will hardly be a remnant left of our economic institutions. With the knowledge of the past the human mind busies itself with the creation of goals to strife for, of ideals to fight for. What matters it whether the goal will be realized exactly as it had been contrived by thought and longing? What matters it whether the social edifice of the future will correspond exactly to the ideal created by reasoning intellect and lofty imagination? There is hope, there is expectation, there is life, there is enthusiasm, there is struggle and there is the certainty of a better future.

It is the object of this book to enable the reader to form his own judgment of future possibilities and probabilities from historical knowledge. I will attempt to show that what is has come to be, not because it was willed by man, but as the necessary and logical sequence of what *was,* and that the future will be the result of the same process of evolution. The parts which man plays in this process and his activities are not capricious and self-willed, but spring with necessity from motives which result from conditions.

I have some hope that a better knowledge of this truth will serve to remove many prejudices and be productive of more patience with and tolerance of the opinions of others.

THE AUTHOR.

'Tis a foe invisible
The which I fear — a fearful enemy,
Which in the human heart opposes me,
By its coward fear alone made fearful to me.
Not that, which full of life, instinct with power,
Makes known its present being; that is not
The true, the perilously formidable.
Oh no! it is the common, the quite common,
The thing of an eternal yesterday.
What ever was, and evermore returns,
Sterling to-morrow, for to-day 't was sterling!
For of the wholly common is man made,
And custom is his nurse. Woe then to them
Who lay irreverent hands upon his old
House furniture, the dear inheritance
From his forefathers! For time consecrates;
And what is gray with age becomes religious.
Be in possession, and thou hast the right,
And sacred will the many guard it for thee.

(SCHILLER, "The Death of Wallenstein.")

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I.

INTRODUCTION.

The State and the family are social institutions, and as such, of course, have their history. Likewise, the status of woman in society has its history. Having a history, in this instance means to have been different at different times, to have undergone changes. Neither the social status of woman, nor the family, nor the form of social organization have always been what they are now. We have what we call the woman movement for the betterment of the condition of women, socially, economically and politically. The numerous divorces, of which we hear so frequent complaints, prove at least one thing, namely, that the family itself offers no guaranty of happiness; and the many cases of abandonment, infidelity and cruel treatment show that the family, as an institution, leaves room for improvement. The existence of what is generally called the social evil is also partly evidence of the imperfection of the family. The imperfections of our government are so frequently mentioned in speeches and newspapers that their existence needs no proof.

The status of woman and the imperfections of our family life, as well as our political life, offer problems for solution. For the purpose of understanding problems and finding means to solve them, it is necessary to

know the history and the course of development of the status or the institutions which present the problem, unless we are sure that in the history and in the evolution of society no other forces prevail but mere chance or the casual caprice of man. If, on the contrary, we are of the opinion that evolution is governed by certain principles, or certain influences, be they of a natural or social character, it is clear that no presumptions as to the future can be correct, which are not based upon the knowledge of those principles or influences. If we do not know them, we must try to find them. Whatever men do, we cannot but believe that in their actions they are guided by some reasons and that these reasons are in some way related to the conditions surrounding them. We must know how the State and the family came to be what they are, and how the status of woman came to be what it is, if we want to avoid error in our conclusions as to the possibility and the direction of changes in the future. Religious orthodoxy may believe that everything is the effect of God's will, but science and philosophy cannot rest at that, or they must go out of business. For, there is surely no reason whatsoever, why, if everything in the past went according to God's will, it should not do so in the future. And if so, of what use can it be to trouble ourselves with social problems?

We have societies for this reform and that reform, societies composed of men, and such composed of women, they publish programs and pass resolutions, but they all seem to act under the belief that social institutions can be reformed or altered at the will of well-meaning reformers without regard to their history and the course of their development. The historical sense

is not well developed in Americans; probably because the country is young and has not much of a history, compared with the older countries of the world. Although there is hardly a subject more adapted to broaden the mind, than history, yet our public schools confine themselves mostly to national history and impart only very meagre instruction, if any at all, in the history of the world.

Yet, it should not be forgotten that the history of the old world is, to some extent, also the history of our own country, that the first white settlers on this continent were not a newly created race, but brought the views, the customs and the usages of the old world with them, that civilized life on this continent was only a continuation of the life upon the other hemisphere, and that civilization did not commence from a new starting-point.

But even the history of our own country is taught without spirit and philosophy, the spirit of patriotism, perhaps, excepted. But this spirit alone, unaccompanied by other thoughts and sentiments, is more apt to drown intellectual understanding than to impart it. History is taught as if it were nothing but a chronology of events, springing from the heroism or the wisdom of certain individuals. Sociologists and modern historians, however, take a different view, and search for the forces behind the human will. "We shall thus be led," says Buckle in his history of the civilization of England, "to one vast question, which indeed lies at the root of the whole subject, and is simply this: Are the actions of men, and therefore of societies, governed by fixed laws, or are they the result either of chance or of supernatural interference?" "Fortunately," he also says, ".....the

believer in the posibility of a science of history is not called upon to hold either the doctrine of predestined events, or that of freedom of the will; and the only positions which.....I shall expect him to concede are the following: That when we perform an action, we perform it in consequence of some motive or motives; that those motives are the results of some antecedents, and that, therefore, if we were acquainted with all the laws of their movements, we could with unerring certainty predict the whole of their immediate results. This, unless I am greatly mistaken, is the view which must be held by every man whose mind is unbiased by system and who forms his opinions according to the evidence actually before him. If, for example, I am intimately acquainted with the character of any person, I can frequently tell how he will act under some given circumstances. Should I fail in this prediction, I must ascribe my error not to the arbitrary and capricious freedom of his will, nor to any supernatural prearrangement, for of neither of these things have we the slightest proof, but I must be content to suppose either that I had been misinformed as to some of the circumstances in which he was placed, or else that I had not sufficiently studied the ordinary operations of his mind. If, however, I were capable of correct reasoning, and if, at the same time, I had a complete knowledge both of his disposition and of all the events by which he was surrounded, I should be able to foresee the line of conduct which, in consequence of those events, he would adopt."

Entering then into the problem of ascertaining the method of discovering the laws upon which human action is based, Buckle concludes that their existence is proven by the regularity of recurrence, and then turns

to statistics to prove the regularity. He then proceeds to say in reference to what those laws are: "If we inquire what those physical agents are by which the human race is most powerfully influenced, we shall find that they may be classed under four heads, namely climate, food, soil and the general aspects of nature; by which last I mean those appearances which, though presented chiefly to the sight, have, through the medium of that or other senses, directed the association of ideas, and hence in different countries have given rise to different habits of national thought."

Here we have the first scientific attempt to write history on the theory of materialism, that is upon the theory that the ideas are not the original motive power in history, but that thoughts and ideas are themselves an effect and not a primitive cause. According to Buckle they are the product of natural surroundings; it is nature and natural characteristics which influence thought and mould the action of man. Buckle writes history on the theory that the human mind is not the free agency which it was thought to be before, but that it is directed by external forces. So far the most modern sociologists agree with him, but as to what these forces are, they do not agree with him. For, while it would be quite possible to explain upon this theory the differences between the characteristics, customs and institutions of different countries, the theory must prove insufficient for the explanation of the changes in one and the same country, where natural surroundings always remain the same. The theory of modern historic materialism is, that the mode and manner of providing the means of subsistence, food, shelter, clothing and so forth, in other words, that the mode of

production is the directive force in the history of man, the most powerful force in creating and shaping social institutions. Great as the influence of nature is on primitive man, yet in the course of civilization, social influence gradually grew to greater weight and importance, and man is much more actuated by motives of society than of nature. At the same time, subsistence always remained a matter of prime necessity. But the manner of providing subsistence changed, and the economic structure of society became the substructure upon which all human institutions, moral or physical, were built. All moral, political or social questions resolve themselves in the end into economic questions.

It is frequently said in opposition to this theory that it denies the force of moral ideas, but this is not true. The power and influence of moral ideas, after they have sprung into existence, is not denied at all, but the theory changes the relative position of conditions and ideas as to their being primarily cause and effect. It maintains that, in the order of things, concrete matter existed prior to the abstract idea, and that, notwithstanding the force of moral ideas, there is a force of economic development in society working independent of moral ideas, and creating conditions, the influence of which is strong enough to alter, create and destroy moral ideas.

The abstract idea of good and bad could never have appeared without the previous existence of concrete facts or conditions, creating pain or pleasure, and the conception of right and wrong must necessarily depend on what these facts and conditions are.

If one were to write a history of the origin and development of moral ideas, he would, probably, find comparative philology of great assistance to him. He

would, perhaps, be struck in the outset with some surprise at the fact that so many languages have one and the same word for expressing the abstract idea of good and designating concrete things. So in English: good and goods, in German: gut, das Gut, die Gueter, in Latin: bonus, bonum, bona, in Greek: agathos, to agathon, to agatha.

In an article on this subject in "Die Neue Zeit," the French writer, Paul Lafargue, points to the Greek word nomos, meaning law. Josephus expresses astonishment that the word has never been used in that sense in the Homeric poems. In those times it meant pasture, later on it had the meaning of domicile, and still later of custom and law, denoting in its evolution different stages of civilization and economic development.

It may contribute toward a better understanding of the idea of historic materialism, if I demonstrate it by some illustrations. Among the ancient Hebrews the taking of interest was immoral, the Pentateuch forbade it. To-day the taking of interest is so little averse to our moral sentiment, that courts allow interest on every debt after a reasonable time, although no interest is contracted for. Orthodoxy considers the Pentateuch as a divinely inspired book. How is it then that our moral sense does not object to what the Pentateuch declares to be immoral? When the Mosaic law was given, there was neither industrialism, nor commercialism, nor capitalism. The system of wages and profit was unknown and money or things were borrowed only in cases of actual need and for purposes of consumption. To-day, most loans are business-loans, and in business money is a source of profit. The profit-making quality of money has wiped out all moral scruples against the taking of interest. In

order to quiet the religious conscience translators have used the word usury where the original speaks of interest.

It now remains for me to test the theory and to see whether it proves true in the evolution of the State, the family and the status of woman. For this purpose I will, in as few words as I can, always confining myself to what is necessary to support and prove the theory, describe the development of social organization together with the family and the status of woman, beginning in prehistoric times, when our forefathers still lived in a state of savagery, and following it up to our own time and civilization. I shall endeavor to show the influence and effect of economic conditions on the progressive changes in the structure of society and social institutions, as well as the influence of moral ideas, as they have sprung from the economic conditions. Much of the knowledge which I possess, regarding these things, I owe to the study of Lewis H. Morgan's ethnological researches, the results of which are published in his book "Ancient Society."

Most certainly, our knowledge of pre-historic institutions, and even of many institutions within historic periods, rests on theory only. For, those living at any certain time presume a general understanding of their institutions and never think of explaining them sufficiently for the understanding of posterity. Therefore, what we know of the Grecian and Roman gens is as much a hypothesis as what we know of pre-historic group families. But we are not without very strong evidence. It consists of customs and usages prevailing at the beginning of the historic period, and continuing even up to the present time; further in ancient myths and legends

which are always the reflex of actual life, and although untrue, are based upon actual facts, beliefs or customs. Human phantasy is not able to invent what has not been perceived before by the senses. It may exaggerate or minimize actual form and action, it may idealize them or may be better pleased by the grotesque, but it cannot invent something absolutely new. In the description of their gods men have never reached beyond the human form, and ancient mythologies are nothing but the reflex of human life.

Another source of evidence are the customs and institutions of the aborigines of America, Asia, Africa and Australia. Even the most civilized peoples of our times have, ages ago, been in the same condition as these are now. As equal causes produce equal effects, our institutions in those past ages were in all probability similar to the institutions of the still existing savages and barbarians. The latter's life is a mirror in which we see the reflex of our own life in the past.

For the purposes of convenience and easy reference, I shall follow Morgan also in dividing the time prior to civilization into the two periods of savagery and barbarism, and each of these two periods into three sub-periods, namely the lower, the middle and the upper status.

The lower status of savagery commenced with the infancy of the human race and ended with the acquisition of a fish subsistence and a knowledge of the use of fire. Men subsisted upon fruits and nuts. Articulate speech commenced in this period. Each subsequent status commencing where the previous one ends, it becomes only necessary to state where the others ended.

The middle status of savagery ended with the invention of the bow and arrow. The Australians and the

greater part of the Polynesians, when discovered, were in this status.

The upper status of savagery ended with the invention of the art of pottery. In this status were a number of Indian tribes in the far North-West of the United States, when those tribes were discovered.

The lower status of barbarism ends, in the Eastern hemisphere, with the domestication of animals, and in the Western with the cultivation of maize and the use of the adobe brick. The Indian tribes East of the Missouri river were in this status.

The middle status of barbarism ended with the invention of the smelting of iron. To it belonged the village Indians of New Mexico, Mexico, Central America and Peru; in Europe the ancient Britons etc.

The upper status of barbarism ended with the invention of a phonetic alphabet and the use of writing in letters or hieroglyphics. To it belonged the Grecian tribes of the Homeric age, the Italian tribes shortly before the founding of Rome, the Germanic tribes of the times of Cesar, etc.

The upper status of barbarism is followed by the period of civilization.

Our ancestors passed through all these stages and were in the upper status of barbarism when they first became known to history. Their experience prior to that has been lost, and became discoverable only in the institutions and customs which existed at the time when the light of history first shone upon them. Customs and institutions, as a rule, outlive their usefulness and necessity, but enable us to suppose, with considerable certainty, what the conditions were that made them useful or necessary. The prehistoric period of the Grecian,

Roman, and German tribes ends, and their historic period begins in the middle status of barbarism. The light of history falls back upon times from three to five thousand years behind us. The length of the life of the human race prior to that is beyond the possibility of measurement, and can only be conjectured by geologists.

How far back social organization dates, we do not know; it must already have commenced in the lowest stage of savagery. For, even among the aborigines of Australia and Polynesia who have not advanced beyond the middle status of savagery, there exists a very complex system of social organization and family relations, more complete than most civilized people dream of, and which can only be the product of development, running through immense lengths of time. I use the term social organization in contradistinction to political organization, the former resting on personal relations, the latter on territory. The first is earlier in the order of time, for no political organization, no state government was possible before a tribe had settled down upon a definite territory and commenced village life, and even after that the social organization lasted for a long time, until political organization was invented. In fact, the political organization or state founded upon territory, is a very late invention in the course of human progress; among European nations it is not older than about twenty-five hundred years. It was, in Europe, first established in Greece toward the end of the fifth or the beginning of the sixth century before Christ by the legislation known as that of Cleisthenes, who divided Attica into one hundred demoi, a kind of town or township. The town or township, that is, a certain area of territory, is the unit of the state, but the unit of social organization was the gens, which was

a congregation of individuals. The gens was the unit of the Roman social organization until the Romans formed a political organization. Of course, it must not be supposed that all peoples and tribes upon earth called the unit of their organization gens. All of them had different names; some perhaps had no name at all for it; but it was everywhere the same, or nearly the same, in character and function, and the name gens is used by me for all of them. The Roman gens existed within the historic period, and even the greatest and most learned historians never understood clearly its nature until Morgan, who made his researches among the American Indians, showed the analogies between their social organization and that of the ancient Grecians and Romans. The gens rests upon the principle of kinship and had its beginning in family relations. Like all human institutions, it has run through a long course of evolution, but, for the purposes of this book, I need not farther dwell upon this point.

The gens (pl. gentes) was, as already mentioned, an organization resting on personal relations. A number of gentes formed a phratry, as the Grecians, or a curia, as the Romans called it; and a number of phratries formed the tribe. Sometimes the tribes attained to the formation of a nation or a confederacy as the Hebrews, the Grecians, the Romans, the Iroquois Indians, etc., in other cases they never came to that.

It is quite difficult for us to conceive of and comprehend an organization based upon personal relations only, and having no relation whatever to the territory inhabited, because it is entirely unsuitable to the modern system of industry, trade and commerce, and particularly so, to the modern system of private ownership in land. But

it was suitable to the conditions prevailing in ancient times, or is suitable to the conditions prevailing among peoples who have not yet reached our stage of civilization.

The Athenian nation consisted of four tribes, each tribe had three phratries and each phratry thirty gentes, so that the Athenian nation consisted of three hundred and sixty gentes. The number of individuals in a gens varied, but each Athenian had his name inscribed in the rolls of a gens. The members of a gens had a common name, which was the name of a supposed common ancestor. (Among the Indians and other savages or barbarians the name was or is generally that of an animal; the figure of it, or any other figure representing the supposed ancestor, was or is usually used as a symbol or totem.)

The other characteristics of the gens were that its members had a common place of worship, a common place of burial, and usually utilized the land in common. They practiced common religious rites, they possessed mutual rights of succession to the property of deceased members, they were under reciprocal obligations of help and defense, had arrangements for the redress of wrong, frequently by the way of blood-revenge, and elected their chiefs.

The members of a gens considered themselves as blood-relatives, although they were not always actually such, wherefore marriage within the gens was forbidden. In the beginning of this form of organization the children belonged to the gens of the mother, and descent was in the female line. The reasons for this as well as for the change, I will state in connection with the history of the family. But while this system of maternal

descent lasted, the position of the woman was probably a superior one, and there prevailed among many tribes what I. I. Bachofen calls a system of *"Mutterrecht"* (mother-right) a gynecocracy. The change took place on account of the development of property, and afterward the children belonged to the father's gens, and descent was in the male line.

From what we are able to learn of the functions of the phratry, it is almost impossible to say what they were. It seems, however, that they were not of a governmental nature but rather of a religious and military character. They probably manifested themselves at the burial of the dead, at public games, at religious festivals and at councils of the people where the grouping of chiefs and people would be by phratries rather than by gentes. There is also some evidence that they were of military importance.

The gentes, the phratries and the tribes had their chiefs and leaders, upon whom devolved military as well as priestly duties. They often assembled in council, but the final decision rested with the general assembly of the people.

This form of government existed among the Grecians and Romans up to and within the historic period. There is plenty of evidence that it existed among the ancient Teutons. The Irish sept and the Scottish clan were, in all probability, originally gentes. The fact that in China villages can be found in which all the inhabitants bear the same family name is probably proof that the same organization prevailed in ancient times among the Chinese; the Hebrew mishpaka (family) was probably a gens, and the beth ab (father's house) a phratry. In Numbers, Chap. 3, v. 14-20, relating the counting of the

children of Levi we find among 22,300 male persons not more than eight family names. The same kind of organization still exists among the aborigines of America; there is ample proof that it existed among the Aztecs and Incas; it exists among the aborigines of Australia, and undoubtedly this form of government appeared and disappeared among all peoples with the growing into and the growing out of certain stages of civilization.

As to the causes which led to the transformation of the gentile organization into the political organization, we can learn them best from the history of Athens, because the final change took place within the historic period, as already remarked. Studying the legislation of Theseus and Solon, we find that the economic conditions, then existing, had fully outgrown the old organization. Private ownership in land had gradually become established, trade and commerce had developed and grown, the ancient communistic customs had more or less disappeared, the influx of strangers created a class of inhabitants that stood outside the social organization and, consequently, had no part whatever in the government, some of the people became rich, others remained poor, and with this the economic class made its appearance. The old organization gradually became incompatible with the new conditions. The real cause of the resulting evils, however, was not discovered until the nation had experimented through hundreds of years with all sorts of reform. (This fact will give us food for reflection when we compare the situation with the economic situation of our time.) The existence of economic classes first found expression in the legislation of Theseus. By this the people were divided into three classes, irrespective of the gentes, namely the Eupatridae, or well born; the Geo-

mori, or husbandmen, and the Demiurgi or artisans. The principal offices were assigned to the first class. The classification recognized property and the aristocratic element. If in modern legislation, especially under republican institutions, class-distinctions are not recognized, such is not evidence of their non-existence, but of the strength of economic influences, which is great enough not to need such recognition for its support and maintenance.

After the legislation of Theseus came that of Draco, then that of Solon, and then that of Cleisthenes, who created a government based on territory and property in place of the one based upon personal relations. The territory of the nation was divided into one hundred districts called demoi, with local governments. The class-distinctions in the general government were retained. It was the first European state-government. Simple as the organization of the state appears to us, the idea did not occur to the Athenian people before they had wrestled with the subject through several centuries. Is it not probable that, at some future time, the historian will express his astonishment at the difficulties which we encountered in solving problems which will appear quite simple then?

After the creation of the Athenian state, the old gentile organization, of course, ran along with the new organization for some time. But being deprived of all actual functions, it became more and more meaningless and gradually died out, leaving its traces, however, in many customs, usages and institutions.

Turning now to the growth and development of the family, I shall again follow Morgan whose researches seem to me to be deeper and whose conclusions to be

riper than those of any other ethnologist, Lubbock and McLellan included. From the historical standpoint, and principally that of evolution, the latter's theory of exogamy and endogamy seems to me quite unsatisfactory.

Morgan says: "The stages of the growth of the family are embodied in systems of consanguinity and affinity, and in usages relating to marriage, by means of which, collectively, the family can be definitely traced through several successive forms." The monogamian family, that is the present form, prevailing among all civilized nations, is the fifth in the succession of a number of forms. It is founded upon the marriage of one man with one woman, with an exclusive cohabitation, the latter constituting the essential element of the institution.

The preceding four forms of the family are as follows:

First: The consanguine family.

It was founded upon the intermarriage of brothers and sisters in a group. Evidence still remains in the oldest of existing systems of consanguinity, the Malayan, tending to show that this, the first form of the family, was anciently as universal as this system of consanguinity which it created.

Second: The Punaluan family.

Its name is derived from the Hawaian relationship of Punalua, (emphasis on the second syllable). It was founded upon the intermarriage of several brothers to each other's wives in a group; and of several sisters to each other's husbands in a group. But the term brother as here used, included the first, second, third and even more remote male cousins, all of whom were considered brothers to each other, as we consider own brothers; and the term sister included the first, second, third and even

more remote female cousins, all of whom were sisters to each other, the same as own sisters. This form of the family supervened upon the consanguine. It created the Turanian system of consanguinity. Both this and the previous form belong to the period of savagery.

Third. The Syndiasmian family.

The term is from the Greek word meaning to pair. It was founded upon the pairing of a male with a female under the form of marriage, but without an exclusive cohabitation. It was the germ of the monogamian family. Divorce or separation was at the option of both, husband and wife. This form of the family failed to create a system of consanguinity.

Fourth: The patriarchal family.

It was founded upon the marriage of one man to several wives. It was the family of the Hebrew pastoral tribes, the chiefs and principal men of which practiced polygamy. Undoubtedly it prevailed also among other Semitic tribes than the Hebrew. It exercised but little influence upon human affairs for want of universality. It is found exclusively among pastoral peoples.

Morgan spent most of his life among the Iroquois Indians, into one of whose tribes he caused himself to be adopted, studying their customs and institutions. He found among them a system of consanguinity and affinity entirely inconsistent with the form of their family. The latter was the Syndiasmian, and in reference to relationships arising out of it, there could be no doubt who was father, mother, son, daughter, brother or sister. Yet, the Iroquois Indian not only calls his own children his sons and daughters, but also those of his brothers, and the children of his brothers call him father. The children of his sisters, however, he calls his nephews and nieces,

and they call him uncle. The Iroquois woman calls the children of her sisters her sons and daughters, just as her own, and they call her mother; but the children of her brother are her nephews and nieces, and they call her aunt. Furthermore, the children of brothers call each other brothers and sisters, as do the children of sisters, but the children of a brother call the children of his sister cousins, and likewise do the children of a sister call the children of her brother cousins. And they do not only call each other so, but treat each other according to this expressed relationship, and build their entire system of consanguinity and affinity upon it.

The same system of consanguinity and affinity and its inconsistency with the prevailing form of the family exists among all the Indians and among many tribes in the East Indies and in Hindostan, and partially it exists among the African and Australian tribes.

Now, the form of the family which was still existing during the first part of the nineteenth century among the Kanakas, the original inhabitants of Hawaii, would create exactly the system of consanguinity existing among the Indians, it would create exactly such fathers, mothers, brothers and sisters. But, remarkable to say, the system of consanguinity prevailing among the Kanakas was different from that described and also inconsistent with *their* form of family. Among the Hawaiians the children of a man call the children of his brothers *and* of his sisters their brothers and sisters, that is to say the relationship which we call that of cousins, does not exist, but they are all brothers and sisters. Equally unknown, of course, is the relationship of uncle and aunt, nephew and niece. This system of consanguinity, called the Malayan system, is found, generally, in Polynesia, but

nowhere exists a form of family which corresponds to it. It must, therefore, be concluded that it is the product of a form of the family which has become extinct. We are enabled, however, to construe this form of the family out of the system of consanguinity which we find, but which does not harmonize with any of the families existing.

The reason why systems of consanguinity are untrue to the forms of the family together with which they exist, is to be found in the fact that the form of the family advances faster of necessity than systems of consanguinity which follow to record the family relationships. And it must not be supposed that the types of the family mentioned are separated from each other by sharply defined lines; on the contrary, the first passes into the second, the second into the third, and so forth. One has successively sprung from the other, and they represent collectively the growth of the idea of the family.

. Three of the forms mentioned, the consanguine, the punaluan and the monogamian family were radical, because they were sufficiently general and influential to create three distinct systems of consanguinity, all of which still exist in living forms. The remaining two, the syndiasmian and the patriarchal were intermediate, and not sufficiently, influential upon human affairs to create a new, or modify essentially the then existing system of consanguinity.

It will now be in order to describe these different forms of the family.

1. The consanguine family.

It is the first and most ancient form of the institution and has ceased to exist even among the lowest tribes of savages. Its existence is proven, however, by the Ma-

layan system of consanguinity and affinity which has outlived for innumerable centuries the marriage customs in which it originated, and which remains to attest the fact that such a family existed when the system was formed. It exists among the Hawaiians and other Polynesian tribes. Under this system there are five categories of blood-relationship, into which all blood-relatives, near or remote, are classified. Speaking as a Hawaiian, the children of my brother are my children also, their children also my grandchildren; it is the same with my sister's children. In addressing the wives of my brothers, I call them also my wives. My father's brother is my father, my grandfather's brother also my grandfather. All the children of my father's brothers and sisters are my brothers and sisters and so forth. Uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces, cousins are unknown.

This system of relationship is found not only in Hawaii, but also among the Maoris of New Zealand, among the Samoans and on many islands in the Pacific ocean. It does not correspond with the form of family prevailing among them now.

The fact that as a Hawaiian I call my brother's wives also my wives, and that, speaking as a female, I call my sister's husbands also my husbands, that the children of all my brothers and sisters are called by me my children, and so forth, proves the existence of a family in which this relationship existed, not only in name, but in fact, and that it must have been a family, consisting of a number of natural brothers and sisters, married in a group, so that all the brothers together were the husbands of all the sisters together. This is the only imaginable form of the family that could produce the Malayan system of

relationship. (I will show later on, that Morgan is probably mistaken as to that.)

The consanguine family was the first organized form of society, and necessarily an improvement upon the previous unorganized state, whatever that may have been.

2. The Punaluan family.

This family has existed in Europe, Asia, and America within the historical period, and in Polynesia within the last century. Morgan says: With a wide prevalence in the tribes of mankind in the status of savagery, it remained in some instances among tribes who had advanced into the lower status of barbarism, and in one case, that of the Britons, among tribes who had attained the middle status.

The transition from the consanguine family into the Punaluan family was produced by the gradual exclusion of own brothers and sisters from the marriage relation, the evils of which could not forever escape human observation.

Under the Hawaiian system of consanguinity a man calls his wife's sisters his wives, not only her own sisters, but also her collateral sisters, that is the daughters of her mother's sisters and her cousins in remoter degrees. But the husband of his wife's sister he calls punalua, i. e., his intimate friend or companion. This word has been used by Morgan to give a name to this form of family. The husbands of the several sisters of his wife he calls also punalua. They were jointly intermarried in the group. These husbands were, probably, not brothers, if they were, the blood relationship would naturally have prevailed over the affineal, but their wives were sisters own and collateral. In this case the sister-

hood of the wives was the basis upon which the group was formed, and their husbands stood to each other in the relationship of punalua. In the other group which rests upon the brotherhood of the husbands a woman calls her husband's brother her husband. All the brothers of her husband, own as well as collateral, that are sons of his father's brothers or cousins in second, third or remoter degree, were also her husbands. But the wife of her husband's brother she calls punalua, and the several wives of her husband's brothers stand to her in the same relationship of punalua. These wives were, probably, not sisters of each other, for the reason stated in the other case, although exceptions doubtless existed under both branches. All these wives stood to each other in the relationship of punalua.

The punaluan family was a group family like the consanguine. While the consanguine family consisted altogether of brothers and sisters, in the punaluan family a number of brothers were in the beginning married to a number of sisters, not their own, in a group, and later on, only one part of the family, either the male or the female part, consisted either of brothers or sisters.

Even if we had not discovered this family in actual existence in the last century, proof of its former prevalence would be the Turanian system of consanguinity and affinity, just as the Malayan system of relationship is proof of the existence of the consanguine family.

Traces of the punaluan custom remained here and there, down to the middle period of barbarism, in exceptional cases in European, Asiatic and American tribes. The most remarkable illustration is given by Cesar in stating the marriage customs of the ancient Britons. He observed that by tens and twelves husbands possessed

their wives in common, and especially brothers with brothers, and parents with their children. As to the latter he was certainly mistaken.

The most positive proof of the existence of this form of the family is the Turanian system of consanguinity and affinity which prevails in about seventy American Indian tribes, in South India among the Hindoos, in a part of North India, also partially in Australia; traces of it have been found in part of Africa, but the system of the African tribes approaches nearer the Malayan; it certainly was universal among the North American aborigines and has been traced sufficiently among those of South America to render probable its equally universal prevalence among them.

It recognizes all the relationships under the Aryan, that is the modern system, besides an additional number unnoticed by the latter. No other system of consanguinity, found among men, approaches it in elaborateness of discrimination or in the extent of special characteristics. It recognizes relationships for which modern languages have no names, it distinguishes between brothers and sisters as to their age. So for instance, the relationship between me and my older brother bears a different name from that between me and my younger brother. For many relationships which we can only designate descriptively, it has special names, as for my mother's mother's sister's great-great-granddaughter, or my fathers' fathers' fathers' sister's daughter's daughter. It is called Turanian after the part of Asia called Turan. The wonder is how savages and barbarians could work out and use such an elaborate system with such a rich nomenclature. It is certainly bewildering and confusing

to us. Its existence is proof of the punaluan family because no other family could produce the system.

But while the punaluan family went out of existence, the system of relationship continued to last, and its terms were used and still are used among nations and tribes among which the subsequent family prevails, namely the Syndiasmian.

3. The Syndiasmian family.

When the American aborigines were discovered, that portion of them who were in the lower status of barbarism had attained to the syndiasmian or pairing family. This family was special and peculiar. Several of them were usually found in one house, the so-called long houses, forming a communal household, in which the principle of communism in living was practiced. In many instances these households were presided over by the mother (perhaps under the system which Bachofen calls motherright). Morgan is of the opinion that the fact of the conjunction of several such families in a common household is of itself an admission that the family was too feeble an organization to face alone the hardships of life. Nevertheless it was founded upon marriage between single pairs, and possessed some of the characteristics of the monogamian family. The woman was now something more than the principal wife of the husband, she was his companion, the preparer of his food, and the mother of children whom he now began with some assurance to regard as his own.

Marriage, however, was not founded upon sentiment but upon convenience and necessity. It was left, in effect, to the mothers to arrange the marriages of their children, and they were negotiated generally without the knowledge of the parties to be married, and without asking

their previous consent. The relation, however, continued during the pleasure of the parties and no longer. It is for this reason that it is properly distinguished as the pairing family. The husband could put away his wife at pleasure and take another without offense, and the woman enjoyed the equal right of leaving her husband and accepting another, wherein the usages of her tribe were not infringed. But a public sentiment gradually formed and grew into strength against such separations. When alienation arose between a married pair, and their separation became imminent, the kindred of each attempted a reconciliation of the parties, in which they were often successful; but if they were unable to remove the difficulty, their separation was approved. The wife then left the home of her husband, taking with her their children, who were regarded as exclusively her own, and her personal effects, upon which her husband had no claim; or, where the wife's kindred predominated in the communal household, which was usually the case, the husband left the home of his wife. Thus, the continuance of the marriage relation remained at the option of the parties. Such were the usages of the Iroquois and many other Indian tribes. Among the village Indians in the middle status of barbarism the facts were not essentially different, so far as they can be said to be known. A comparison of the usages of the American aborigines with respect to marriage and divorce shows an existing similarity sufficiently strong to imply original identity of usages. Usages similar to those prevailing among the Iroquois and other Northern tribes are reported by Spanish writers as having prevailed among the Aztecs and the Peruvians.

In all probability the Syndiasmian family sprang

from the Punaluan simply in this way that although the latter was founded upon group marriage, yet single pairs did for mere individual reasons prefer each other, so that a man had a principal wife among a number of wives, and a woman a principal husband among a number of husbands, and the tendency in the punaluan family, from the first, was in the direction of the syndiasmian.

Two forms of the family had appeared before the syndiasmian, and created two great systems of consanguinity, or rather two distinct forms of the same system, but this third family neither produced a new system nor sensibly modified the old. The syndiasmian family continued for an unknown period of time enveloped in a system of consanguinity, false, in the main, to existing relationships, and which it had no power to break. This was reserved for monogamy, the coming power, able to dissolve the fabric.

The syndiasmian family had no distinct system of consanguinity to prove its existence, like its predecessors; but such proof is unnecessary, because it has existed over large portions of the earth within the historical period, and still exists in numerous barbarous tribes. Among the American aborigines in the lower status of barbarism, it was the prevailing form of the family at the epoch of their discovery. Among the village Indians in the middle status, it was undoubtedly the prevailing form, although the information given by the Spanish writers is vague and general. The communal character of their joint tenement houses is of itself strong evidence that the family had not passed out of the syndiasmian form. It had neither the individuality nor the exclusiveness which monogamy implies.

Having now become acquainted with three forms of the family which existed prior to the monogamous family, two things are principally to be noted in reference to the same.

First, that these forms existed prior to civilization, and upon a stage in the progress of culture when there was little property, at least no private property to speak of, and the property idea was unknown or in its infancy. Especially is this the case as to the consanguine and the punaluan family.

Second, in the group family, of the relation between parent and child, only that between mother and child can be definitely known, but not that between father and child. Nobody can know with certainty who, among many fathers, his own father is, nor can one of the husbands of a number of wives, point out his own children. The mother's brother, the maternal uncle, was the nearest relative after the mother herself. We have many proofs for this. For instance: Chapter 24 of Genesis tells us the romance of Isaac and Rebecca. Verse 53 reads as follows: And the servant brought forth jewels of silver, and jewels of gold, and raiment, and gave them to Rebecca, he also gave to her brothers, and to her mother precious things. Nothing is said of the father, of whom we hear nothing but his name. The brothers and the mother gave her away, and received presents for her.

Or another instance: Tacitus, speaking of the ancient Teutons, said: The mother-brother considers his nephew like his son, some even consider the blood-relation between the mother's brother and his nephew holier and more binding than that between father and son, so

that when hostages were demanded, the sister's son was considered to give a greater guaranty than the own son.

Although at the time of Isaac the Hebrews had, already, attained to the patriarchal family, and the Germans at the time of Tacitus to the syndiasmian, if not the monogamous family, yet these customs prove the earlier existence of the group family. They had remained after the reasons for them had ceased to exist.

The reason which caused the growth of the monogamous family out of the syndiasmian, is, according to Morgan, as follows: of the two sexes, the male, being the physically stronger, most generally procured the necessities of life. As civilization advanced and the accumulation of property became possible, the property idea arose and spread. Whether the property consisted of animals or stacks of grain or anything else, as it was accumulated by the males or fathers, it was quite natural that in course of time they desired that their property should go to their own children. This was not possible in the group family, it was scarcely possible in the syndiasmian. To accomplish this end a form of the family became necessary which enabled a father to distinguish his own children from those of other men. The problem was solved by the creation of the monogamian family.

"It is impossible," says Morgan, "to overestimate the influence of property in the civilization of mankind. It was the power that brought the Aryan and Semitic nations out of barbarism into civilization. The growth of the idea of property in the human mind commenced in feebleness, and ended in becoming its master passion. Governments and laws are instituted with primary reference to its creation, protection and enjoyment. It in-

troduced human slavery as an instrument in its production, and after the experience of several thousand years, it caused the abolition of slavery upon the discovery that a freeman was a better property-making machine. The cruelty inherent in the heart of man, which civilization has softened without eradicating, still betrays the savage origin of mankind, and in no way more pointedly than in the practice of human slavery through all the centuries of recorded history. With the establishment of the inheritance of property in the children of its owner came the first possibility of a strict monogamian family. Gradually, though slowly, this form of marriage, with an exclusive cohabitation, became the rule, but it was not until civilization had commenced, that it became permanently established."

As finally constituted, this family secured the paternity of children, substituted the individual ownership of real as well as personal property for joint ownership, and an exclusive inheritance by children in the place of agnatic inheritance. It was a slow growth, planting its roots far back in the period of savagery, a final result, toward which the experience of the ages steadily tended. Although essentially modern, it was the product of a vast and varied experience.

Before proceeding farther in the consideration of the monogamian family, I wish to say a few words concerning the patriarchal family. I have not more than mentioned it so far. Our principal knowledge of this family comes from the Bible. It prevailed principally among the ancient Hebrews, but no doubt also among other Semitic tribes. It created no system of relationship and had no general existence. It belongs to the upper period of barbarism and remained for a time after the com-

mencement of civilization. The chiefs, and perhaps others, lived in polygamy, but this was not the special characteristic of it. It was the organization of a number of persons, bond and free, into a family under paternal power, for the purpose of holding lands, and for the care of flocks and herds. The chief had authority over its members and its property. Those held to servitude, and those employed as servants lived in the marriage relation. It was the incorporation of numbers in servile and dependent relation, before that time unknown, rather than polygamy, that stamped the patriarchal family with attributes of an original organization. The nations, among whom it was prevalent, had, as far as we know, led at a time, a nomadic life, and it was, probably, produced by the peculiarities and the necessities growing out of such a life.

Returning to the monogamian family, we must not presume that it was from its beginning the same that it is now. It was growing into its present state by degrees. Among the Grecians in the Homeric age, as well as later on in the historic period, we find that chastity was required of the wife only, and that the position of the wife in the household as well as in public life was very inferior, so much so that hetaerism was, if not approved, at least not censured and not considered a violation of matrimonial rights. Marriage among the Greeks was not grounded upon sentiment but upon necessity and duty. These considerations are those which governed the Iroquois and the Aztecs; in fact they originated in barbarism, and reveal the anterior barbarous condition of the ancestors of the Grecian tribes. From first to last among the Greeks there was a principle of egotism or studied selfishness at work among the males, tending

to lessen the appreciation of women, scarcely found among savages. It reveals itself in their plan of domestic life which, in the higher ranks, secluded the wife for the purpose of enforcing an exclusive cohabitation, without admitting the reciprocal obligation on the part of her husband. It implies the existence of an antecedent conjugal system of the Turanian type, against which it was designed to guard.

All of this has reference to the Athenians. Among the Spartans, however, who were far behind the Athenians in culture and refinement, the position of women and the purity of family life were far better than in Athens. Which, to say the least, proves that culture and refinement alone are not a sufficient agency for the elevation of the status of woman and family life.

In Rome, the condition of women was more favorable, but their subordination the same. Marriage placed the wife in the power of her husband. The husband treated his wife as his daughter, and not as his equal. He had the power of correction, and of life and death in case of adultery. Divorce, from the earliest period, was at the option of the parties, a characteristic of the Syndiasmian family, and transmitted, probably from that source.

Of the domestic life of the ancient Teutons we know comparatively little. When they first came into contact with the Romans they were in the upper status of barbarism, approaching civilization. Tacitus remarks that they almost alone among barbarians contented themselves with a single wife. This points to monogamy. The remark that women lived fenced up with chastity, and the custom of giving a present in the nature of a purchasing gift to the bride, and the severe punishment

of wives for unchastity permits the conclusion that the wife was to a degree the property of the husband. However, as I said, our knowledge of the married life of the ancient Germans is too limited to allow any definite conclusions.

Altogether, we may assume that the monogamian family grew in degrees to its present status and that, for a long time, it retained customs prevailing under the syndiasmian form.

I have so far followed Morgan, frequently using his own words, but I do not agree with all of his hypotheses. I do not believe that it was solely the desire of establishing fathership with certainty, for the purpose of inheritance, which led to the growth of the monogamian family, because, although connected with property, it would be too much of a sentimental reason which, alone, could hardly have had such a far reaching influence among barbarians. I also do not believe that his description of the group family gives us a true and perfect picture of these ancient forms of the family. Mr. Morgan believes that the organization of gentes was, probably, preceded by an organization into marriage classes, such as the Australians have, that the object of this organization was the prevention of cohabitation between near blood-relatives, and that this object was under the gentile organization accomplished by the prohibition of marriage within the gens. However, the Australian marriage classes exist alongside of the gentes (frequently called by writers totem-groups), and of the Australian age-classes Morgan seems to have had no knowledge whatever. Among the still existing savage peoples, the Australians take the lowest rank in point of civilization, and their different tribes differ even in degrees. Their

customs are, therefore, of great interest and importance in the study of the development of the human race and its institutions.

Their marriage-classes were known to Morgan, but incompletely. To acquaint the reader with them, I will describe the social organization of one of the most advanced tribes, the Kamilaroi. They are divided into six gentes or totem-groups, their names being Duli, Muriira, Mute, Dinoun, Bilba, Nurai, all being names of animals. The first three form a larger group, called Dilbi, believed to have a common female ancestor and to stand to each other in blood-relationship. The same is the case with the other three gentes, except that the name of the larger group is Kupathin. They are not allowed to marry within their own gens, and formerly they were not even allowed to marry within their large group, or phratry.

Irrespective of this organization they are divided into four marriage-classes, each of which has a male and a female division; these classes are:

	Male.	Female.
1.	Ippai.	Ippata.
2.	Murri,	Mata.
3.	Kumbo,	Buta.
4.	Kubbi,	Kubbota.

Each Kamilaroi belongs to one of these classes and is allowed to marry only one of a definite other class. An Ippai can marry only a Kubbota, a Kumbo only a Mata, a Murri only a Buta, and a Kubbi only an Ippata.

The children receive names different from that of the mother. The father's name is not considered at all. The rule is as fellows:

The children of an Ippata are always:

	Male.	Female.
	Kumbo.	Buta.
Those of a Mata always,	Kubbi,	Kubbota.
Those of a Buta,	Ippai,	Ippata.
Those of a Kubbota,	Murri,	Mata.

Consequently the male division of a class and the female division of it stand to each other in the relation of brothers and sisters.

The object of this organization was evidently to exclude own brothers and sisters from marriage. But in order to prevent marriage between ancestors and lineal descendants, the Australians are divided into age-classes, a division of which Morgan, as I said, seems to have known nothing. The number of classes, according to Heinrich Cunow in "Die Verwandtschafts-Organisationen der Australneger" is three and no one is allowed to marry out of his or her own age-class. All those belonging to one age-class call each other brothers and sisters, although only few of them are such; but from this fact it appears to the unknowing as if marriage between brothers and sisters were the rule, although this is strictly prevented by the institution of the marriage-class and the prohibition to marry within the gens. From birth to the period of puberty the Australian belongs to the first class, that of children. When puberty arrives, and after having gone through certain ceremonies, the Australian becomes a "young man," or a "young woman" and belongs to the second class, the name of which signifies young man or young woman. They can now marry, and belong to this class until the oldest of their children enters it, and then they become "old men," or "old women"; that is what the name of the third class

signifies. The name of his age-class is borne by the Australian beside the name of his gens and that of his marriage-class, so that an Australian has three names, each one standing in some relation to the marriage rights. His age, according to the number of years he has lived, is unknown to the Australian.

The designations of relationship are taken from the division into age-classes, and as the members of each class call each other brothers and sisters, and marriage being allowed only within the age-class, the same system of consanguinity and affinity must be produced which was found existing in Hawaii and from which Morgan constructed the consanguine family, namely the Malayan system of relationship. It may be that the consanguine family nevertheless existed prior to the division into age-classes, but then its existence would not be proven by the Malayan system of relationship, but merely by the conjecture that any inhibition proves the previous existence of that which is inhibited. Of course, there is a possibility that the age-classes are peculiar to the Australians and existed nowhere else, but that is something which we do not know, and which, probably, will never be known.

Although marriages between members of different age-classes are strictly forbidden, yet it may happen that a man and a woman, each belonging to another age-class stand to each other in the relation of husband and wife. For instance, if a wife, having born children, dies, and her husband marries another. As soon as the oldest of his children enters his, the second class, he in turn enters the third, but his second wife, having no child old enough to enter the second class, does not with her husband enter the third class, but remains in

the second. Now, all the members of a class always call all those of the class immediately above father and mother, and they in turn call those of the class below sons and daughters. All the members of the first class call all the members of the third grandfathers or grandmothers, and the latter in turn call the others grandsons or granddaughters.

In the case just mentioned, the husband would belong to the class of grandfathers, but the wife to the class of mothers, and so it may happen that one not acquainted with their institutions, may believe that marriage is possible between parent and child. Perhaps, the ancient Britons had a similar institution, and it was a case of this kind which caused Caesar to say of them that parents married their own children.

The study of the customs and usages of savages is a matter of exceeding difficulty, and so it happened that when missionaries first came into contact with savages or barbarians, they were appalled by what they thought to be the sum of human degradation. They were shocked by what they saw in reference to the relation of the sexes, because they did not understand it. Yet, those people acted according to *their* moral sense and observed *their* customs and usages perhaps more faithfully than we observe ours. Unfaithfulness of a husband or wife among the Australians is a small private affair, but if cohabitation should be had between a man and a woman, belonging to a gens within which marriage is forbidden or between a man and a woman belonging to different classes, between which marriage is forbidden, they would be, if, perhaps, not killed, at least mercilessly banished from their horde, which would be sure death. In their own minds these people are quite

as respectable and modest as we are in ours. Their institutions were not understood by the strangers who only saw chaos and immorality where everything was strictly regulated and regulations were strictly observed.

In "the evolution of woman," the author Eliza Gamble, says: "The following fact, however, in regard to these races has been observed: the more primitive they are, or the less they have come in contact with civilization, the more strictly do they observe the rules which have been established for the government of the sexual relations."

"The men who, with Captain Cook, first visited the Sandwich Islands, reported the natives as modest and chaste in their habits; but later, after coming in contact with the influence of civilization, modesty and chastity among them were virtues almost entirely unknown."

Indeed, there is abundant evidence that wherever primitive races came in touch with civilization, they were ruined physically and morally.

But to return to the age-classes of the Australians and considering Morgan's assertion that the uncertainty of paternity produced the change in the form of family, it becomes clear that Morgan's hypothesis is of doubtful value. For in the case of the Australians the knowledge of paternity is a part of their system. How could a man be transferred from the second class into the third at the time of the puberty of his oldest child, unless he knew his child? Shall we presume that the institutions of the Australians are peculiar to them, and are we compelled to abandon the theory that like causes produce like effects and that the same degree of civilization always and everywhere produced similar institutions? Besides, marriage among the Australians and

Polynesians is generally in single pairs, although they stand upon such a low degree of civilization that even if we presume the earlier existence of the consanguine group-marriage by mere reasoning from inhibitions, the changes can not possibly have been produced by the desire of passing property down to own children, for they have not yet attained to the accumulation of property of any kind or quantity.

True, their family is not yet monogamous, and although knowledge of paternity is a part of their system, yet, paternity is not infrequently uncertain. For (and this may be a relic of a former group marriage) the older brother very often permits cohabitation of his younger brothers with his wife, for which he acquires the right in case his younger brothers should marry, to cohabit with their wives, and I presume that even in such case he considers the children of his wife his own children. Yet, as a general rule, fathers know their own children, and it is quite doubtful whether uncertainty of paternity was ever sufficiently general that it could have produced a new form of the family. The Dieyerie tribe has a form of marriage which comes quite near the Punaluan family, only that what the Hawaiian called Punalua, the Dieyerie calls Pirauru. It seems to be practically a marriage in groups, making certainty of paternity impossible, but it may be that also this form of marriage is not yet perfectly understood.

The reasons for such far-reaching changes, as that of descent in paternal line for descent in maternal line and for eliminating that status of woman which gave her whole power in the communal household and immense influence in the government of the tribe, so much so that ethnologists express the opinion that at a time

a system of gynecocracy was of general prevalence, as well as the reason for the gradual establishment of monogamy, must have been principally of an economic nature. The sentimental reason sprang up afterwards and added force to the economic reason, particularly in maintaining the new institution. We shall learn more about this, as we proceed.

The errors into which Mr. Morgan has probably fallen, need not concern us any further. They are not sufficient to overthrow his general theories, and it is not the object of this book to solve ethnological problems. It is sufficient for our purposes to know that, even in the earliest stages of civilization, there was neither chaos nor anarchy in the social or sexual relations of man, but that, on the contrary, they were, at all times, regulated by system, order and law. Nor do Mr. Morgan's errors detract from his merits as a pathfinder. As yet it has never happened that a scientific truth was perfectly and completely evolved by its first discoverer. What I intended to demonstrate, what is of importance for us to know, and what I wish further to show, is:

First, that human society is a living organism.

Second, that its beginning dates back perhaps, hundreds of thousands of years, into the dim ages of lowest savagery.

Third, that the different institutions of human society are interdependent on each other, have either grown together, or stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect, and that none of them can be fully understood without knowing them all.

Fourth, that human institutions cannot in their nature be permanent, that they were from their begin-

ning, and still are, subject to a continous process of evolution, changing their forms and modes of procedure, and even going and coming, according to the necessities of the human race.

Fifth, that, because the prime necessity of animated beings is and ever must have been, the means to support physical life, and because the first mental efforts of man must have been directed toward gaining the necessaries of life from physical nature, and considering the term necessaries of life as changing its import with growing civilization, the efforts of gaining the means of subsistence became the power, controlling the human intellect.

Gradually and slowly the human intellect gained a knowledge of nature and its forces, which, of course, had an earlier existence than he. Man, never living singly, and by nature endowed with social instincts, learned the advantages of organization. He used both toward the betterment of his condition. This grew better, as the procurement of the necessaries of life became easier. He shaped his organizations and his rules of conduct with a view toward his economic welfare, and the manner of producing and acquiring the necessaries of life, using the word in its broadest significance, became the causa causans, the fountain cause, of all human action and all human institutions.

II.

The Status of Woman.

The orthodox Hebrews have an ancient prayer in which men thank God for not having created them women, and the women thank him for having them created according to his pleasure. This prayer is significant of the status of woman since the beginning of civilization, up to a comparatively short time ago. There was, perhaps, no time in the history of the human race, in which the condition of women was more inferior, more degraded than in the beginning of the Christian era. According to the doctrines of the fathers of the Church, the woman was an unclean creature, the temptress who brought sin into this world, from whom it was considered good and holy to keep away. Did they not find proof of it in the holy scriptures? Was not man first tempted by woman? Did not God himself command that man shall be the lord of woman? If there are any books in existence, the authors of which held women more in contempt than the authors of the biblical scriptures and the writings of the fathers of the Church, I do not know of them. I may say without fear of contradiction, that most of what is said about women in these ancient books is revolting to our sense of justice, decency and morality. I shall not indulge much in quoting, because it is all too indelicate, and leave it to the reader to inform himself. If nature and social conditions had not been stronger forces than the zelotism of

the fathers of the Church, such a thing as the family would not exist to-day among Christian nations. "Marriage," said Hieronymus, "is always vicious, wherefore nothing can be done but to excuse it and to sanctify it." According to the views of those men, nothing could please God more than celibacy and sexual abstinence, which according to our modern view would be a gross insult to nature. I am sure that I make no mistake, if I state that at no time and nowhere, even among savages and barbarians, the position of women was, compared with that of men, more inferior than in the Roman empire about twenty centuries ago. Rights they had none and the woman was under tutelage all her life. She was born as the property of her father, and became by marriage the property of her husband. The Roman law, however, became the model law for all continental Europe. The common law of England which, generally, followed its own course, independent of the Roman law, was, nevertheless, not much more favorable to women.

According to the common law, husband and wife become by marriage one person in law. "That is," says Blackstone in his commentaries, "the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband, under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything." In other words, husband and wife became one person, but that one person was the husband. "But though," says Blackstone further, "our law in general considers man and wife as one person, yet, there are some instances in which she is separately considered, as inferior to him, and acting by his compulsion. And therefore all deeds executed,

and acts done by her, during her coverture, are void." That is to say that, in the state of marriage, the woman had almost no existence at all, so far as rights were concerned. Yet, for other purposes, she had a well defined existence. For, as we further read in Blackstone, the husband, by the old law, might give his wife moderate correction. "As he is to answer for her misbehavior, the law thought it reasonable to intrust him with this power of restraining her by domestic chastisement, in the same moderation that a man is allowed to correct his apprentices or children, for whom the master or parent is also liable in some cases to answer." The ground upon which this right of correction rested, is certainly interesting, for the responsibility of the husband for the misbehavior of the wife is no other but a pecuniary one. After stating that under the civil law the husband had the right to whip his wife, Blackstone continues: "But with us, in the politer reign of Charles the Second, this power of correction began to be doubted; and a wife may now have security of the peace against her husband; or, in return, a husband against his wife. Yet, the lower rank of people, who were always fond of the old common law, still claim and exert their ancient privilege, and the courts of law will still permit a husband to restrain a wife of her liberty, in case of any gross misbehavior."

Far up into the period of civilization the husband had the privilege of committing adultery at pleasure, and the right to kill his adulterous wife. More than that the savage and barbarian could not do either. But the savage hardly ever did it, while it is questionable whether, even to this day, a French or an American

jury ever punished a husband for killing his wife when he caught her in adultery.

Very far up into the period of civilization, in Greece and Rome, the father gave his daughter away in marriage, whether she consented or not. What more could the savage do in this respect? But it never was, nor is it customary among savages for parents to compel their daughters to marry contrary to their will.

It may be stated, as a matter of fact, that with the beginning of civilization, the condition of women grew worse, and that woman was not as free and independent as in the period of savagery. Her condition began to improve only very late in the period of civilization.

It is, by the way, quite significant that most of our modern languages have no word to designate the human species and for this purpose use the word by which the male is designated. "Man" may mean the human species or a male person; one has to gather its sense from the context. So it is with the French "homme," or the Italian "uomo," so it is in many other languages. Even in German, which language has a separate word for the designation of the species, its gender is masculine. The word "Mensch" can never be used in the feminine. If used, however, in the neuter gender, it is a vulgar expression, meaning a lewd woman.

Not unfrequently it is attempted to prove the inferior position of women in ancient times, or even in our times among savages and barbarians, by the fact that the father sold or sells his daughter to her husband. The father was, or is paid in cattle or other things, or in service. An instance of the latter is to be found in the Pentateuch in the story of Jacob, Rachel and Leah. Before, here, discussing this point any farther, I deem it

proper to call attention to the still prevailing custom, but more prevailing in Europe than in this country, of giving the daughter a dowry, which in most cases becomes the property of the husband. I find it difficult to determine whether this is not as much a purchase of the husband, as the giving of something to the father of the bride is the purchase of the daughter. The only material difference which I can see is, that in the one case the valuable object of the transaction is the man, while in the other it is the woman. And this is really significant of the social position of woman; for we will find, as a matter of fact, that where the father receives something for his daughter, the woman is considered to have an economic value, to be practically useful to the household, and, in consequence thereof, has a superior position within the same.

Bachofen, as stated before, showed from history, legends, myths, customs and usages that there must have been once a period of gynecocracy or matriarchate. A description of the conditions prevailing among the most advanced Indian tribes on the North American continent a hundred years ago, and later still, furnishes a picture of what the matriarchate probably was among other barbarians.

The Hurons and Iroquois lived in so-called long-houses. Such a house was inhabited by from eight to twenty single families, who all of them claimed to be the descendants of the same female ancestor. The oldest woman in the house directed its affairs. Using the word lodge for one of the large families, consisting of a number of single families, from ten to fifteen lodges formed a totem-group or gens, and from eight to twelve of these groups formed the tribe. So we are informed

by Father Gabriel Sagard Theodat in his book "Le grand voyage du pays des Hurons," published in 1632. J. W. Powell in his "Wyandot Government," First annual report of the Bureau of Ethnology, informs us as follows: The land belonged to the tribe. The council of chiefs divided the land between the gentes or totem-groups according to the numbers of individuals in them. Each totem-group then divided its allotment between the lodges. From time to time, among the Hurons every two years, a redivision took place. The fields were fenced in and the parcels of the several lodges were designated by some kind of marks.

It should be noted here that the division of the land among the ancient Hebrews must have been quite similar. In Numbers 26 v. 51-56 we read: "These were the number of the children of Israel, six hundred thousand and a thousand seven hundred and thirty. Unto these the land shall be divided for an inheritance according to the number of names." (We have noticed already the smallness of the number of names.) "To many thou shalt give the more inheritance, and to few thou shalt give the less inheritance, to every one shall his inheritance be according to those that were numbered of him." This clearly proves a division of the land between bodies of men according to their numerical strength. But the Hebrews had at that time already established descent in the male line.

Quite a similar arrangement is reported to us as having prevailed among the Germans at the beginning of the Christian era. At that time they, also, had already substituted descent in the male line for descent in the female line.

But to return to the Hurons: the work on the fields

was performed exclusively by women, the men assisted only in clearing land. In consequence thereof only the women possessed the right of usufruction. The women directed the use of the land and its products. They also directed the affairs of the household, raised the children and made the clothing and the household utensils. The men provided the class of food obtainable by fishing and hunting, built canoes, manufactured their weapons and hunting utensils and fought their battles.

Marriages were always arranged by the mothers or the female chiefs of the household. The husband did not move into the house of his wife nor she into his. He continued to live in the household of his mother and staid only temporarily with his wife. If he wished to remain in her favor he had to give her regularly a share of the fruits of his hunting expeditions. If the two could not agree, they were always at liberty to separate. So we are told by J. F. Lafitau in his "Moeurs des sauvages ameriquains." The husband had no claim on the property of his wife or on his children. They belonged to the family of the mother. As her property was generally of a kind for which a man had no use, it went after her death to her daughters or sisters. If a man died, his property did not go to his own sons, but to the sons of his sister; if there were none, then to his brothers.

Under such conditions, the women having complete control over the fruits of their labor and the necessaries of life, and also having complete power in the household, they exercised superior influence on tribal affairs. Among the Iroquois they took part in the general councils; they were, as Lafitau reports, the real authority, the soul of the council; they dictated peace or war, ar-

ranged marriages, had control over the children and determined the manner of descent. Among the Wyandots they had the power of appointing the chiefs. Their council of chiefs consisted of forty-four women and eleven men, each of their eleven totem-groups being represented by four women and one man.

This was the most developed matriarchate of which ethnological researches give us knowledge, although similar institutions prevailed among other American tribes and, also, among the Malayans. However, among the latter, it is customary that the new husband moves into the family of his wife; it seldom occurs that the wife goes with her husband to his kindred.

According to Rev. Ashur Wright this custom seems to have prevailed also among some of the Indian tribes. Wright, for many years a missionary among the Senecas wrote, in 1873, to Morgan in reference to their family system, when occupying the old long-houses, as follows: "It is possible that some one clan predominated, the women taking in husbands, however, from the other clans; and sometimes for a novelty, some of their sons bringing in their young wives, until they felt brave enough to leave their mothers. Usually, the female portion ruled the house, and were doubtless clannish enough about it. The stores were in common; but woe to the luckless husband or lover who was too shiftless to do his share of the providing. No matter, how many children, or whatever goods he might have in the house, he might at any time be ordered to pick up his blanket and budge; and after such orders it would not be healthful for him to attempt to disobey. The house would be too hot for him, and unless saved by the intercession of some aunt or grandmother, he must retreat to his own

clan; or, as was often done, go and start a new matrimonial alliance in some other. The women were the great power among the clans, as everywhere else. They did not hesitate, when occasion required, "to knock off the horn," as it was technically called, from the head of a chief, and send him back to the ranks of the warriors. The original nomination of the chiefs also always rested with them."

In William Alexander's History of Women I find the following: "At what period or by whom the laws of the Egyptians were first promulgated, is uncertain, but if what has been asserted by some ancient authors be true, that the men, in their marriage contracts, promised obedience to their wives, (Mr. Alexander had it, probably, from "Egypt," Diodorus, Book I), we may suppose that the women had no inconsiderable share in legislation, otherwise they could hardly have obtained so singular a privilege. But singular as this privilege may appear, it is yet exceeded by the power of wives in the Marian Islands; there a wife is absolutely mistress in the house, not the smallest article of which can the husband dispose of without her permission; and if he proves ill humored, obstinate or irregular in his conduct, the wife either corrects, or leaves him altogether, carrying all her movables, property and children along with her. Should a husband surprise his wife in adultery, he may kill her gallant, but by no means must use her ill. But should a wife detect her husband in the same crime, they may condemn him to what punishment she pleases, and to execute her vengeance, she assembles all the women in the neighborhood, who, armed with lances, march to the house of the culprit, destroy his grains" etc.

In the island of Formosa daughters are regarded

more highly than sons, because as soon as a woman is married, contrary to the customs of other countries, she brings her husband home with her to her father's house, and he becomes one of the family, so that parents derive support and family-strength from the marriage of a daughter.

From the Grecians it is known that in the earlier ages women were alowed to vote in the public assemblies, a privilege which was afterwards taken from them.

The Gauls admitted the women to their councils, when peace or war was to be debated; and such differences as arose between them and their allies were terminated by female negotiation; as a confirmation of this we find it stipulated in their treaty with Hannibal, that should the Gauls have any complant against the Carthagenians, the matter should be settled by the Carthagenian general; but should the Carthagenians have any complaint against the Gauls, it should be referred to the Gallic women.

A confirmation of what Alexander says in reference to the women of the Marian Islands can be found in Le Freycinet's "Voyage autour du monde."

From J. Kubary "The social institutions of the Pelewans" we learn that on the Pelew Islands the most and hardest labor on the fields is performed by the women, that each clan has two chiefs, a male and a female one, and that the village-government is in the hands of all the chiefs. In case of marriage the husband moves into the family of his wife.

Like the women in the Pelew Islands, those in the Marian Islands perform most of the field labor.

The same custom prevails among many New Zealanders. Upon the other hand, on the Viti Islands, accord-

ing to Williams and Culvert in "Fiji and the Fijians," all the field-work is done by the men, and the position of the women is very low; they are cruelly treated by their husbands and are absolutely their property.

On the Tonga Islands women do not participate in field labor at all; they have no rights whatever, being only little better treated than those on the Viti Islands. According to W. Mariner in "Account of the natives of the Tonga Islands" husbands cast off their wives at their pleasure, and if a chief dies, some of his wives are choked to death.

According to R. H. Codrington in "Social regulation in Melanesia" the women of the Solomon Islands perform most of the agricultural labor, and Rev. G. Turner in his "Samoa a hundred years ago and long before" tells us that the women are treated better than is usual in heathenish tribes.

Livingstone in his "Missionary travels and researches in Southern Africa" speaks of the Bolonda, a negro tribe living on the Zambesi river. They pursue agriculture. Women take part in councils. When they marry, the husband must remove to the village of the wife. When they separate, the children remain with the mother. The wife must provide the husband with food. If he offends his wife, she punishes him by giving him nothing to eat, and no other woman gives him anything.

What fools these heathens and savages are! They actually do respect labor, while we, Christians and civilized men, bombastically profess the respectability of labor, but respect those least who perform the most and hardest labor, and bow deepest before those who do not work at all.

A full understanding of the customs and social institutions of savages and barbarians shows how wrong the prevailing opinions in reference to them are. "As strength and power are in savage life," reasons Mr. Alexander in his aforementioned book, "the only means of attaining to power and distinction, so weakness and timidity are the certain paths to slavery and oppression. On this account we shall almost constantly find women among savages condemned to every species of servile or rather of slavish drudgery, and shall as constantly find them emerging from this state in the same proportion as we find the men emerging from ignorance and brutality; the rank therefore and condition, in which we find women in one country, mark out to us with the greatest precision the exact point in the scale of civil society to which the people of such country have attained; and were their history entirely silent on every other subject, and only mentioned the manner in which they treated their women, we would from thence be enabled to form a tolerable judgment of the barbarity, or culture of their manners." He further says: "In savage life ..... women have hardly any mental qualifications; nursed in dirt and slovenliness, with but little ornament, and still less art in arranging it; burned with the sun and bedaubed with grease, they excite disgust rather than desire; hence they are not so much the objects of love as of animal appetite; are seldom admitted to any distinguishing rank, and as seldom exempted from any distinguishing slavery ..... They .... the women are by him (the man) destined to perform every mean and servile office, a fate which constantly attends the weak, where power and not reason dictates the law."

Speaking of the influence of women among the

Hurons, Iroquois and other Indians, he says: "This inconsistency of behavior, more or less takes place in all nations, and is an incontestable proof that manners and customs are everywhere more the offspring of chance than of systematic arrangement."

The superficiality of this reasoning is astounding, especially as coming from the author of such an interesting book as Mr. Alexander's, and I made these quotations only, because they are typical of the way people generally judge of these things. We shall soon learn, however, that manners and customs are not the offspring of chance, that, on the contrary, there is system everywhere, and that the manner of providing the necessaries of life has more to do with the status of woman, than her physical appearance and the ignorance and brutality of men. If, among savages, women have to perform hard labor, such labor is an economic necessity. If in the wanderings of an Australian horde the women carry the babies and the belongings, they do it, because the men cannot do these things and hunt for food at the same time. If among Arabian and other tribes the custom of infanticide prevailed, it was on account of a lack of food. But it is certainly the height of absurdity to measure the beauty of savage women with the eye of civilized man, and to assume that the savage man does the same, and that he does it with the aesthetic sentiment of civilization. Presumably savage women would not bedaub themselves with grease without the knowledge of thereby pleasing their male companions.

I might considerably increase the number of illustrations of the status of woman prior to the period of civilization, but I deem the foregoing sufficient, and will, in addition, only quote from Tacitus' Germania in refer-

ence to the ancient Germans: "When they are not in war, they spend their time hunting, oftener doing nothing but eat and sleep. The care of house and hearth and of the fields was left to the women, the aged, that is, the weakest of the family."....."A dowry is not brought by the wife to the husband, but by the husband to the wife" ..... "The fields are taken by the communities according to the number of the tillers" ..... "In them (noble virgins) they see something holy and prophetic, and for this reason do not refuse their advice, and leave their words not unobserved."

No trace of matriarchal institutions appears among tribes that had not yet attained to the tilling of the soil, were not domiciled and not sufficiently advanced to accumulate some property. None of it can be found among pastoral nations. The Australians who roam through the bush in hordes and oftener suffer hunger than have an overplus of food, treat their women kindly, but always finding it difficult to obtain a suitable wife within the horde on account of the many inhibitions spoken of before, steal or exchange women for the purpose of marriage, and the wife almost invariably follows the husband into his horde.

Matriarchal institutions seem to have had their beginning toward the end of the lower status of barbarism and to disappear sometime in the middle status, perhaps late in that status, leaving traces of their existence behind. It is, of course, not to be presumed, that they disappeared suddenly; the transformation was certainly slow and gradual. Their duration in years we do not know, it may have been hundreds or thousands. Our historical knowledge does not go behind the upper status of barbarism, and those tribes, of whom we gained

knowledge by the discovery of new continents did not farther develop their institutions independently and free from contact with civilization.

The economic conditions under which matriarchal institutions prevailed were these: Permanent domicile of the tribe, cultivation of the soil to some extent, solely, or principally, by women, and the practice of hunting by men, also the manufacture of household utensils by women exclusively, and the possibility of accumulating some property.

Wherever the women materially assisted in the production of the necessaries of life, as on the Pelew Island, the Marian Islands etc. or among the Hurons, they were well treated and enjoyed a superior position; but wherever they contributed nothing material toward the necessary labor for subsistence, as on the Viti or the Tonga Islands, their position was quite inferior and they were not unfrequently brutally treated.

With domiciliation or localization and the cultivation of the soil the possibility of a more rapid increase of population was given; with the gradual extension of agriculture and raising of domesticated animals, hunting as a pursuit for obtaining food and other necessaries became more and more unnecessary; with the improvement of tools and the growth of skill the quantity of manufactured things increased, and exchange of them between different groups or tribes sprang up. In course of time the making provision for the support of the family became the exclusive business of the males, while the women were limited to household work. Contemporaneously with the limitation of the sphere of their activity and their value as producers of the necessaries of life, their power and influence waned. It was altogether

an economic process; there were no sentimental reasons for it. Certainly, sentiment changed, but the change of sentiment was the consequence of the change of economic conditions. Sentiment is never an original cause, it is always created by conditions; but after its creation it may become a powerful factor in movements toward a transformation of conditions that have become oppressive. The Mosaic law commanded the return of the pawn, for money borrowed, on the evening of the day on which it was given. The moneylender of to-day, even if he be an orthodox Hebrew, would ridicule the idea. We live under different economic conditions and our sentiments correspond with these conditions. Christ drove the money-changers from the temple; in our days the banker is one of the most honored and respected personages. Has moral sentiment declined with civilization, or was moral conception of a higher grade two and three thousand years ago, than it is now? I am rather inclined to believe that if department stores, industrial corporations and stock-exchanges were older than the Hebrew law, the latter would have been different from what is was, and the money-changers would have had the front seats in the temple.

Up to modern times the economic conditions not only remained unfavorable to women but grew so even more. Century after century passed, but women remained without power and influence, at least among the classes who shaped legislation and institutions, because the economic conditions were such that woman was not an economic factor in production.

With the growth of property, the institution of slavery sprang up. Slavery is not possible where the power of production is so small that the worker cannot produce

more than what is necessary for his own sustenance. Perhaps it sounds paradoxical, but it is nevertheless true, that slavery, as well as the subjugation of woman, was the result of advancing civilization, in so far, at least, as this advance consisted in the growth of the power of production. I am firmly of the opinion that if conditions had not arisen under which the free laborer became a better producer than the slave, slavery would still be an existing institution, and moral feeling and sentiment would sustain it. It would be difficult to prove, if possible at all, that the ancient Grecians were inferior to us in humane sentiment and moral consciousness, at least in the classic age, yet they maintained the institution of slavery. It was defended even by Aristotle, simply because it was, or was believed to be, an economic necessity. At the same time they had little respect for women and much less for their wives. I do not know of any time and any place, when and where slavery was co-existent with a superior position of women. They were objects of physical admiration, or objects of sensual or even soulful admiration, and as such have wielded great influence in isolated cases by cabals and intrigues, or by the power of their charms, or that of genuine affection; their beauty and graces have been permitted to adorn the home, but they have not exercised any general power or influence as an integral part of the nation or the community. Socially and politically woman was held inferior to man.

Surely, there was between this period and that of the matriarchate no difference in reference to the attraction of the sexes toward each other. It is, at least, not to be presumed that women had deteriorated in physical appearance or intellectual impression, nor that there was

any change in the forces of nature which could have caused such a difference. It also can hardly be maintained that the introduction of slavery, or the abrogation of institutions which gave woman power and influence are in themselves proof of higher culture and greater refinement. Where then is the difference between the period of matriarchate and the later period in which slavery prevailed, and the power and influence of women were gone? It is in this, that in the one period woman was economically independent of man, in the other she depended on him for support and maintenance. Where, in the former period, she was not quite independent, the man, at least, depended as much on her as she on him.

And, economically dependent she remained during all the following centuries. Slavery disappeared and was superseded by feudalism with its institution of serfdom. It was, in a sense, only a modification of slavery. Economically it had the same effect on women as slavery had. Household-drudgery extended to weaving and spinning, to making soap and brewing beer, and producing numerous other things which the house-wife of the present day simply orders by telephone. Most of the work was done by the wives and daughters of the serfs, and no work, the fruits of which belong to another, makes the worker economically independent. Nor could the work of the serfs make women of the upper classes economically independent, because they did not own the serfs and were not an economic necessity. Women were adored in knightly, romantic fashion, minstrels sang their praise, and the baron and the lord bowed deeply in reverence to the lady. But all the sometimes grotesque gallantry and chivalry only served to demonstrate the sentiment that it was the duty of the strong

to protect the weak. It was the politeness of the superior toward the inferior, permeated by gross sensuality. The wife was under coverture, as the law called it, and her rights were few, her disabilities many. The poets sang of fidelity to the lady in love, but the lady in love was quite frequently some other woman than the wife.

Feudalism was in form and spirit a military institution. Such institutions are very apt to produce chivalry and cavalierdom, but do not contribute toward the independence and dignity of women; nor can militarism grant to women an extensive sphere of influence.

The economic arrangements and the mode of production in feudal times were these: the peasant serf delivered to the landlord the largest part of the products of the lord's soil and his own toil, and these were prepared and shaped for consumption in the home. While the serfs were not themselves the property of the lord, they were, so to say, a fixture belonging to the land, and their labor force, as well as that of their families, practically belonged to the lord, who reaped the fruits of their labor. For all practical purposes they lived in a condition of slavery.

It seems almost needless to state that the women in those times, even those of the upper classes, received very little education, and learned almost nothing, except, perhaps, the execution of needle-work. Spending almost their whole life within the household, which they supervised in a manner pleasing to their lords, it was neither thought useful nor necessary for them to know anything which had no relation to the household or the rearing of children.

That the life of the peasant woman was one of incessant toil and servitude may go as self-understood.

The laws of inheritance were decidedly against woman, for in most cases the estate went to the first-born son. But the worst of all of it was the power of the lord to dispose of his infant in marriage. "This," says Blackstone, "seems to have been one of the greatest hardships of ancient tenures. There were indeed substantial reasons why the lord should have the restraint and control of the ward's marriage, especially of his female ward; because of their tender years, and the danger of such female ward's intermarrying with the lord's enemy; but no tolerable pretense could be assigned why the lord should have the sale or value of the marriage." Speaking then of the origin of that right and of the provisions of the charter of Henry the First in respect to it, he continues: "But this, among other beneficial parts of that charter, being disregarded, and guardians still continuing to dispose of their wards (the father being in law the guardian of his child) in a very arbitrary, unequal manner, it was provided, etc."

With few exceptions, principally among the many petty reigning houses, such was in general the condition of women in feudal times. If it was bad in the upper classes, it was even worse among the lower. For the nobleman directed the marriages among his peasant serfs and selected husbands and wives for them according to his pleasure. The daughters of the peasants were the easy, because powerless prey of his lordship's lust, and there is ample proof that the "jus primae noctis" was not a myth. Blackstone does not mention it, but his description of the legal status of the serfs is sufficient to create the conviction that the right existed in England as well as on the continent. "These villeins (the word means those holding land by tenure of villen-

age) belong principally to lords of manors, were..... either annexed to the manor or lord, or.....to the person of the lord and transferable by deed from one owner to the other. They could not leave their lord without his permission, but if they ran away, or were purloined from him, might be claimed and recovered by action, like beasts or chattels. They held.... small portions of land by way of sustaining themselves and families, but it was at the mere will of the lord.... and it was upon villein services..... and their services were not only base, but uncertain, both as to time and quantity.... A villein could acquire no property in land or goods, but if he purchased either, the lord might enter upon them, oust the villein, and seize them to his own use.... In many places also a fine was payable to the lord, if the villein presumed to marry his daughter to anyone without leave from the lord, (this was probably a later substitution for the peculiar right mentioned above. The Author.) The lord might also bring an action against the husband for damages in thus purloining his property. For the children of villeins were also in the same state of bondage with their parents."

Fortunately all human institutions are only transient, and feudalism was no exception. In England serfdom and villenage were practically done away with at the end of the fourteenth century. The suffering of the people caused the risings of Wat Tyler and Flannoc, and though the people suffered defeat in the peasant's war, yet the worst evils were abolished in immediate consequence thereof. But it must not be forgotten that the economic conditions, gradually, had also changed considerably. Cities had grown up and acquired much wealth, power and independence; payment in money

had been very extensively substituted for payment in kind or service; the landless peasants had, many of them, become wage laborers; in the cities the trades increased; commerce began to flourish and tradesmen and artisans became a power. The fear of competition then devised the craft guilds.

The guild system bore the characteristics of feudal times. Class-privileges and power on one side, compulsory service on the other. The idea of free labor, the right of every one to work for his own subsistence had not yet entered the human mind. The prevailing idea of a proper social order was that of class-government. Labor and service were not conceived as separable. In the beginning the craft-guilds may not have been more than organizations for mutual protection against the aggressions of the lords and barons, and it may also be that for some time the intention of guarding the interests of the public against poor and unsatisfactory work was more than a mere pretense, but the guilds had not been in existence very long when they developed into powerful institutions with legal rights and privileges, creating class-monopolies. They placed checks and restrictions everywhere. The artisan commenced his career as an apprentice, the time of apprenticeship lasting from seven to eight years. During this time he was not much better than a slave. When he became a journeyman, he was far from being a freeman. His civil rights were so few that he could not even marry, unless his bride was the widow of a master. He was a member of his master's household; but to become a master himself was a matter of great difficulty, except for masters' sons. He was lucky, if the "masterpiece," intended to bear evidence of his mastership, was ap-

proved by the jealous masters. To guard against competition the guilds fixed the number of masters allowed in a city, and the maximum number of apprentices who were allowed to learn the trade. Besides that, the fees and costs which the journeyman entering mastership was required to pay, and the expenses connected with the ceremonial initiation were so numerous and large that they frequently proved an insurmountable obstacle.

There was tyranny everywhere. Quite characteristic of the times was a law of Venice which forbade artisans to practice their art or craft in foreign countries, so as to preserve the secrets thereof and the home monopoly. If one went abroad, he was ordered to return; if he disobeyed, his nearest relatives were cast into prison; and if this did not bring him home, an assassin was sent after him, and his relatives were liberated after his death.

It must not be supposed that these guilds had smooth sailing all the time. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries it was several times attempted in Germany by imperial legislation to destroy them, because the feudal powers became jealous of them and feared them. And, later on, dissatisfaction among the journeymen began to grow, and they organized themselves openly or secretly for the purpose of resisting the masters, but no social or political power was strong enough to harm them. No outside force was powerful enough to destroy them. Their death came from foes that grew within. They themselves created the conditions which undermined their existence, and their death was at no time nearer than when they and the merchants' guilds had reached their highest stage of development and

power. They were destroyed by the force of economic conditions which they themselves had brought forth. When they had reached their climax the process of self-destruction commenced. It was the same process which we witness now in regard to the competitive system, which is slowly giving way to combination and association. The institution of the guilds became, as I will show, an obstacle to its own original purposes and injurious to the very class which had created it.

There is abundant evidence that, in their earlier period, women were in the crafts as employers as well as employees, but it is not difficult to understand that the fear of competition drove them out. Thereafter no women were to be found in the guilds with the exception of that of the prostitutes. For, frequently in the middle ages the necessity of prostitution was recognized, the prostitutes were protected by law and organized by ordinance and law.

In Japan, which emerged from feudalism only half a century ago, houses of prostitution are to this day maintained by the government.

Women were not allowed to enter the trades. They were not accepted as apprentices, and without going through the prescribed course of apprenticeship and journeymanship, they could not become masters and could not establish a business of their own. Thus, a woman, unless rich by inheritance, had not a shadow of economic independence. Hardly any other avenue of life was open to unmarried women, except that of a house servant, and they were driven by the thousands into vagabondage and prostitution. Perhaps there was no time in the history of Europe when vagabondage and prostitution had grown to such enormous propor-

tions as in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. At fairs or upon occasions where many men assembled, these female vagabonds appeared by the hundreds or thousands. The historian tells us that the council of Constance, where the pope and the emperor, numerous princes, dukes, counts and electors of the German empire, as well as a large number of cardinals, bishops and other prelates had assembled, accompanied by their large retinues, witnessed the presence of not less than fifteen hundred of these women in the city.

This was at a time when feudalism and serfdom in Germany were still in full force. The German peasants' war came more than a hundred years later than the English, but the power of the cities had already assumed large proportions and the numerous guilds controlled the economic life therein. The cities, in England, as well as on the continent, by trade and commerce, amassed great wealth, and from that time dates the rise of that class which now, in economic parlance is designated by the French word bourgeoisie.

Contemporaneous with the splendor of the cities was the misery and degradation of the country people; in England after the war of the races, in Germany after the thirty years' war. Vagabondage of men and women increased to incredible proportions. In Germany it was forced upon the populace by the almost complete devastation of the country, in England by the discharge of the many retainers of the impoverished nobility. Nothing can give a better idea of the fearful extent of vagabondage than the severity and cruelty with which it was attempted to suppress it.

By an act of parliament it was laid down in 1547 as law in England that every able-bodied loiterer should

be branded with a hot iron and handed over as a slave to the person who denounced him. The slave might be kept on bread and water, and refused meat or good nourishment of any kind; he might be compelled to undertake the most filthy task by means of flogging or other torture. If he ran away for a fortnight, he was condemned to perpetual slavery and to be branded with the letter S on his cheek and on his forehead; if he ran away again, death as a felon was his doom. His master could sell him, bequeath him, or let him like a horse or a mule. Death was the punishment of slaves who "contrived aught against their masters." When one of the vagabonds was caught in the roads by the public officers, he was branded with the letter V on his chest, and brought back to his birth-place, where he must work in chains on the public road. If a vagrant gave a false birth-place, he became a slave of the municipality, and was branded again. His children became the apprentices of the first-comer who wanted them, the lads to the age of twenty-four, the girls up to the age of twenty. If these poor creatures took to flight they then became slaves to their masters, who might put them in irons, whip them, put rings around their necks, and the like.

If we were to judge the condition of the people in those times from the romantic rubbish written of them, we would be forced to believe that their lot was one of exalted happiness and serenity, and that life was a continuous love-feast. The truth, however, is, that these conditions produced debauchery and immorality to an almost incredible degree. Even prior to this period of vagabondage the manners of the upper classes were such that they would shock our sense of decency and

propriety. It was nothing to women of the better classes to sit down in the company of half drunken men and listen complacently to the vilest stories and jests. Undoubtedly there was much of the romantic in their life, if for no other reason, than that the women, having many servants, had not much else to do, and did not know what else to do, than to indulge in love-affairs. Their education was scanty, their horizon narrow. But romanticism has ever been the companion of an inferior social position of women. Sensuous adoration took the place of true respect. The greater the inequality of rights and position, the more romanticism in the relation between the sexes. There is a want of common interest in matters outside of personal relations. But what sort of morals romanticism is apt to produce, how it may lower the dignity of man, and inevitably must lower the dignity of woman, we may judge, when we learn that a prince of Liechtenstein drank the water with which his lady-love had washed herself; cities maintained houses of prostitution, and conducted visiting noblemen of high rank to them as their guests. When king Wladislaw of Bohemia visited Vienna in 1452, the city authorities sent for his reception a deputation of prostitutes, clad in nothing but a dress of thin gauze; and worse than that, emperor Charles the Fifth was, on the occasion of his visit in Bruges, received by a deputation of citizens' daughters, wearing nothing but nature's costume. The latter event has been memorialized by the great painter Hans Makart in one of his celebrated paintings.

Such was the state of morality in a time when women had neither social nor political rights. It is quite well for those who fear from the entrance of

women into business pursuits and political life the loss of their femininity, to know this and ask themselves whether women were in those times more truly feminine than in ours with less romanticism, but with more good practical sense. Upon the other hand, we may well ask ourselves, whether such a state of things had been possible, if women had an opportunity of making themselves useful in some way in the economic affairs of society, striving toward economic independence, having an influence in shaping the economic structure of society, and taking an interest in the life of the nation. Such, however, was impossible under the feudal system, as well as under the guild system. And I want to say right here, that speaking of economic independence of women as a powerful liberating factor, I do not mean such independence in isolated cases, but as a general condition, although it is not altogether without influence, even if appearing sporadically. As is was, the women of the lower classes were, in the country, slaves of the field, in the cities, slaves of the large household, which included beside the family, the journeymen and apprentices; the women of the upper classes were, at least in earlier times, slaves of the household, and both were subject to the superior will of their lords and masters. The only semblance of freedom existed among the prostitutes.

Time passed on and the guilds died. In respect to death the fate of human institutions does not differ from the fate of man himself. Powerful as the guilds were, and indispensable as they were considered in their days for the existence of human society, society nevertheless exists to-day without them. The ruling classes always believed their institutions to be indispensable for

the welfare of mankind; they believe so to-day. Yet subsequent history never failed to show the fallacy of such belief. Is it to be doubted that future history will do the same?

The guild system was a system of restraints, but these restraints, in course of time, became obnoxious to the very class that had created them for its own protection. For never was human ingenuity able to devise social or economic institutions that did not from their very beginning conceal within themselves the elements of their own destruction. There could be no evolution if it were not so. Every economic system will collapse or topple over upon reaching the climax of its development, but long before reaching that point, the signs of its coming death will become visible, not to everybody, perhaps, but to the cool and prudent observer.

The guild-system served its purpose to protect and enrich certain classes quite well. But when the power of production increased in consequence of the inventive genius of man, and when commerce also increased, especially after the discovery of the Western continent and the finding of the ocean-passage to India towards the end of the fifteenth century, and when the accumulated wealth was gradually turned into capital, that is, turned from a source of enjoyment into an instrument of profit-making, which was greatly facilitated by the growth and extension of money-economy, the restrictive system failed to serve its purpose. It became a hindrance to the use of capital and the increased power of production. Capital needs elbow-room. It is inimical to every restriction in its use. It needs room for the expansion of its uses. So it came that the classes *against* whom restriction was directed, were hardly more instrumental in its overthrow

than the class *for* whom it was instituted, and who had grown rich under it. The accumulation of wealth had reached a point where restriction became a barrier to further increase and accumulation. Having reached the climax of its development, where it was no longer able to serve its original purposes, where in fact it became an obstacle to the objects for which it had been created, its death was inadvertible. The era of free trade and competition appeared. (The expression free trade is not to be understood as meaning absence of tariff-duties, but absence of restrictions of trade.)

It must not be understood that all the restraints were removed at once. It was done gradually, one after the other, during and after a long continued class-struggle. In France the last feudal rights and guild-restraints were abolished during the great revolution, and in Germany after the revolution of 1848. There was plenty of feudalism in our country prior to the revolution and the declaration of independence, and even some time afterwards. We had not only negro-slavery, but it was also possible to keep white persons in bondage as debtors, apprentices, or under some sort of contract. In Pennsylvania white persons were sold like slaves, for terms at least. Here are two samples of advertisements that recently came under my notice:

"To be sold. A likely Servant Woman having three years and a half to serve. She is a good spinner." — (Pennsylvania Gazette, June 1742.)

"To be sold. A Dutch apprentice lad who has five years and three months to serve; he has been brought up to the Taylor's business. Can work well."—(Pennsylvania Staatsbote, Dec. 13, 1773.)

With the growth of industrialism, however, labor

was freed, for, as I remarked before, experience had taught that the free laborer was a better property producing machine than the man held in bondage.

And now commenced the stupendous growth of capital and its career of industrial and commercial expansion and exploitation of human labor. It was immensely aided in this career by the discovery of natural forces, not known hitherto, such as that of steam and electricity, and the invention of machinery, through which the power of production increased astoundingly. From now on the economic history of the new world does not differ materially from that of the old. The new era took over from the old the large mass of landless and propertyless people, and material for the exploitation of labor existed in abundance. The laborers being free, they were also left to compete with each other. This resulted in two kinds of competition, that between employer and employer, and that between laborer and laborer, both kinds of competition tending to increase wealth on one side and poverty on the other. And although I am ready to admit that during this period the condition of the laborers improved and that they became able to satisfy needs and tastes which could not be satisfied by the laborers of former periods, yet it remains true that in proportion to the increase of the power of production and the stupendous growth of wealth, they became actually poorer.

A good deal of the improvement in the condition of the working-classes consists in the possibility of procuring things which, from a modern standpoint, may seem quite necessary for the support and enjoyment of life, but are not absolutely so. They are things of luxury or comfort which one does not miss, if one does not know

of them. But as far as food and wearing apparel are concerned, the workmen of five centuries ago seem to have been as well, if not better, off than those of to-day. This is amply proven by the sumptuary laws of those times. In Saxony it was ordained in 1482 that mechanics and mowers must be content with receiving beside their wages in money, twice a day, at noon and in the evening, four "speisen" (kinds of food): soup, two kinds of meat and one kind of vegetables, and on fast days five "speisen": soup, two kinds of fish and two kinds of vegetables.

In England, parliament passed in 1463 a statute by which agricultural laborers were not allowed to use materials for clothing, which cost more than two shillings a yard, nor were they to have a pair of stockings which cost more than fourteen pence; silver girdles were also prohibited. A wife was ordered not to give more than a shilling for a head dress. Twenty years later laborers were allowed to have stockings which cost eighteen pence a pair and a wife might spend one shilling and eight pence for a head dress. Considering the value of money in those times, these prices were enormously high.

Undoubtedly, the workingmen enjoy to-day the comfort of things that then did not even exist, and which, therefore, even the wealthiest did not have, but the fact that, for instance, emperor Nero could not with all his power procure a gas-stove or a petroleum-lamp, does not make the laborer of the twentieth century a whit happier. It must also not be overlooked that dissatisfaction in one class of people is not so much produced by the latter's own condition, as by comparison between its condition and that of another class. The poorest American workman has in his most humble dwelling far more

comfort than the Eskimo in his snow-hut, but, of the two, the Eskimo is, probably, the more happy and contented.

The new industrial system, the characteristic of which is the massing together of hundreds and thousands for production under centralized direction in the most economical manner, with division of labor and the aid of all technical facilities which the ingenuity of man could devise, not for the immediate purpose of consumption, but for the purpose of commerce, had wonderful effects, and produced an economic class, which gradually acquired all the power and influence formerly possessed by the landowing class. It changed the character of whole nations, made England, which formerly had been a purely agricultural country, a purely industrial country, and is now completing the same process in Germany. It is due to the vastness of the country that the same effect was only partially produced in the United States, but in the New England states agriculture is nearly extinguished. It built railroads and steamships, reducing distance to almost nothing, thereby facilitating the shifting of population for industrial purposes; it has tarnished the escutcheons of nobility and robbed titles of their awe; it has democratized the world politically, without, however, being able to abolish social distinctions; it has produced an enormous mass of wealth, such as the world has never seen before, and made one class produce it for the other without the use of physical force or compulsory service, merely by the operation of economic conditions. Originally destined to break down monopoly created by the force of law, it soon created monopoly by mere economic force. By the same force of conditions only, without the use of any legal or phys-

ical restraints, it closed to certain classes the higher avenues of life just as effectually, as they were formerly closed to them by mediaeval laws and institutions, thus achieving by technical freedom and equality a result, in many respects similar to the results of feudalism and the guild-restraints. But while under these latter systems the social and political status of everyone was clearly defined by tradition, custom and law, and the course of life laid out by strict regulations in every walk of life with such precision, that everyone could, with a degree of certainty, foresee and map out his future, the new system brought into all classes of society a high degree of uncertainty of the prospects of the future, so that in course of time it became impregnated with the character of speculation. One of the most marked effects which it had, was that on the life and status of women. Through all the centuries of slavery, feudalism and (may I use the word?) guildism, the women were no economic factor. These systems of production left no room for women in the economics of the time. Women took no part in the production of the necessaries of life, except as help-mates in the most uninfluential and the most dependent classes, which were not free agencies, but were tools or instruments of labor. Through these thousands of years women had few, if any, civil or property rights; through these thousands of years their condition was more or less one of tutelage. Hypocritical sentimentalism and gallantry subjected them frequently to cruel and brutal laws under the pretense of protecting their weakness. The natural influence of sex-difference made men display in the presence of women a deference and courtesy which disappeared in their absence. Upon the other hand, long continued usage had

made women content with receiving homage and flattery, and left them without aspirations and pretensions in public affairs and the political life of the nations. False sentimentalism and sickly romanticism believe even to this day that this is the proper position of women, that their beauty and graces inspire men to — I would say acts of bravery and valor, if mediaeval customs still prevailed, but they having become extinct, I must say according to the customs of our own times — money-making with the hope of carrying away the fairest of the fair as wife, whose principal duty shall thereafter be to caress away from her husband's brow the wrinkles put there by business cares, and make his home comfortable. Undoubtedly this is a poetic and idyllic thought. But alas, life is no idyl and reality is stronger than fancy.

And now behold! The competitive system, or as it is also called, the capitalistic system, no sooner is firmly established, than it draws woman into the whirl of economic life. All the fences and hedges which surrounded the individual's life are torn down. All the carefully laid pathways for each individual's economic life are obliterated, the regulation and protection which the social and economic fabric had thrown around the individual and had given his course certainty and steadiness, vanished, and every person was set free and thrown upon his or her own resources. But the wealth remained in the hands of those who had accumulated it before, and now possessed the greatest freedom in its uses. The others, men and women alike, were left to their wits and possibilities to get along as well as they could. Men and women alike had from now on to seek a livelihood, unaided by institutions of law, except such for the protection of property and contract rights. There still ex-

isted many laws, customs and prejudices which were a hindrance not only to women in the use of their economic force, but also to men in the economic use of women. What, therefore, was more natural and logical than the commencement of the movement for the emancipation of women? The new economic system conjured up that movement. And as natural and logical as was its creation, so natural and logical was its success. It would have been impossible for the industrial system to make the extensive use of women that it was destined to make without giving them full property rights. Slowly and grudgingly as they were given they had to be given, because the new system of production demanded it. It was not a voluntary concession, although it had the appearance of it. It was not the chivalry of the male sex, nor the men's advanced views of equality, nor a higher sense of justice that gave to women all the rights of person and property. Neither was it done from a more exalted conception of right; nor was it the continued clamor of women for their rights which brought about this change in their position. The new system of production needed women who were free in the use of their persons and their property; it could not get along without them. It had been discovered that the free male laborer was a better property producing machine than the unfree. Why should this not hold true in reference to women? Political rights were not necessary for making them good producers; personal and property rights sufficed for that purpose; therefore political rights were and still are withheld from women, except where they are granted for local reasons, as for instance for the purpose of temperance legislation, or where the lower economic class has

already gained much political power, as in Australia. Freedom of contract, however, had become under the new economic system an economic necessity, for without it, the unhampered exploitation of female labor would have been impossible.

Customs and social habits change slowly. Habit and prejudice, therefore, still block the way of women toward establishing themselves in business of their own, but many of them devoted themselves to art and literature and teaching. They strove for better education, and I say, without fear of contradiction, that the average American woman is to-day better educated than the average American man. But the nineteenth century witnessed an influx of women in remarkable and still growing numbers in industrial and commercial pursuits as wage-earners. They entered the office as stenographers, typewriters, bookkeepers and clerks, the store as clerks and saleswomen, the factory as laborers. The number of factory women reaches into the millions. In England women have worked and, I believe, still work even in coal mines. In the United States they are generally employed in lighter work, such as cotton-spinning, making paper-boxes and principally in the garment industries. But they are also found in places where one would not expect to find them. So, for instance, I found several hundred of them at work in one of the largest machine shops in the country, where they were spinning thread around copper wire. Wherever the hand-work is light, or wherever the machine works automatically, needing only attendance, we find women of all ages in employment. In bakeries and in laundries they sometimes perform very hard work. They do even the nasty and loathsome work of assorting rags. They

work in the company of men, frequently work ten hours a day and more, and do night work as well as day work. There are industries, for instance the cotton industry, where the number of women far exceeds that of the men.

As a general rule they receive only small wages, seldom enough to support them sufficiently and decently. They receive from two dollars a week upward to six, seven or eight dollars, and only seldom reach ten dollars or over. It is needless to say that the moral effect of all this is bad, very bad. Not less so is the physical effect on women. An exhaustive investigation of the relation of hard physical work to the health of women wage-earners was made by the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor statistics. It is shown there that the reproductive organs in particular are injured by the strain of their labor and that their physical ability to perform the maternal functions is greatly impaired. It is even recommended, as a result of that investigation, that immature girls should be prevented by law from working in factories, stores, business institutions of all descriptions, and that the law should have jurisdiction over the labor of all women.

Of a very serious nature also is the economic effect. Woman's labor, being so much cheaper than man's labor, replaces the latter in thousands of instances, and frequently leaves to the men no other choice but to abandon the particular branch of employment or be satisfied with smaller wages. In consequence thereof female wage-labor has the general tendency to force down the wages of men and the standard of living in the laboring class. Hence the opposition of labor organizations to the employment of women. But the opposition is fruitless. The prevailing economic system, or rather the sys-

tem of production, is stronger than this opposition. I am of the opinion that, in consonance with the present mode of production, the use of female labor will increase with the growth of industry and the increase of the facility of production. There is no other force, at present, to counteract its effect on wages than the efforts of labor organizations toward increase of wages and the elevation of the standard of living of the working class. I believe also, however, that in course of time, and as a consequence of continued efforts of women to better the condition of their sex, the police power of the State will be more extensively used toward the improvement of the sanitary condition of factories and the prohibition of the employment of female labor at periods and in kinds of work peculiarly injurious to the sex. I regret to be compelled to say that, in this respect, the laws in this great republic are far behind those of some of the European monarchies.

After woman had been drawn into the whirl of economic life as wage-earner, having been forced to take up the struggle of existence for herself, it was natural and unavoidable that she would enter the struggle for superior position, for that is one of the forms of the economic struggle of our time. Her energy and force once employed in the economics of the time, there was no reason for her, after having discovered their value, to use them only in inferior positions. The consciousness of her force and ability having been awakened in her, why should she not strive for all the accomplishments necessary for the higher positions and become lawyer, doctor, or anything better than a mere wage-earner? Has anybody a right to complain? Had not competition been proclaimed to be the life of trade? Did the theory hold

good only as to industry, commerce and common labor, and not as to the professions? Had doctors and lawyers a right to complain of competition while workingmen had not? From the moment that exploitation of female labor force was begun, the modern woman-movement was destined to appear. It owes its birth to our economic system, and no prejudice and no scorn will prove strong enough to hinder it in its onward course. Henceforward it will be a very important factor in the evolution of social institutions.

The "new woman" will not any longer be an object of ridicule, but of respect; she will soon not be "new" any more; and I am sure the time will come, or rather return, when the voice of women will neither remain unheard, nor unheeded in matters of public concern.

Bad as the moral, physical and economic effect of woman-labor in offices, stores and factories is at present, I believe that it is merely a phenomenon peculiar to all transitions. The birth of a new time is always attended with pain and suffering. The adjustment of social institutions and regulations of life to new economic conditions is necessarily a slow process, and changes which are beneficial to mankind are, in the beginning, very often injurious to single classes. Liberation was not an immediate unmixed blessing to the slave who needed time to learn the use of freedom. The introduction of machinery, one of the greatest blessings to mankind, caused much misery and suffering by throwing thousands out of employment. I am sure a time will come when all the evils of female labor will have disappeared, and when it will be of general benefit to individual and social life. It will not always be in the

form of cheap employment, it will not always be in the form of wage-labor. I am sure, that in the selection of woman's work, full regard will be had to her physical and mental characteristics. I think it will gradually, though in all probability very slowly, assume a form which, together with other causes, will bring about the economic freedom of women, and along with this, perfect social and political equality of the sexes.

I have endeavored to show in this chapter that economic institutions are not less subject to change than other human institutions; that along with the evolution of economic institutions, the status of woman also underwent changes, and that it always stood in close relation to her participation in the economics of the time. The condition of women improved, their power and influence increased or decreased in proportion to their being a factor in the process of the production of the necessaries of life, in being an economic factor in the life of the nation. Hence I conclude that the woman question is an economic question and that sentiments of right and justice play only a secondary role in the solution of the problem, such sentiments being themselves the product of economic conditions.

I am frank enough to state that I do not see how under the present economic organization of the world the economic independence, necessary for the full emancipation of women, may become possible. For to repeat, if I speak of the economic independence of women, I do not mean independence in isolated cases, but independence as a general condition. I do not mean the possibility for some women of becoming independently rich in some way, or receiving good wages in competition with other women or in competition with men. Wage-

labor can never create general independence. I do mean the absolute certainty of, and positive right to, a sufficient livelihood and reasonable comfort for every married or unmarried woman performing a reasonable amount of useful work, be it either physical or intellectual, adapted to her nature. Great and far reaching changes will have to come before this independence will be possible, changes in the economic structure of society, changes in the form of government. Of what nature these changes will be in all their details I am, of course, unable to say. I think, however, it is true, as is frequently asserted, that society is passing from a condition of individualism into a condition of socialism. I think it is also true that the creation and the growth of trusts prove it and indicate the advent of new economic arrangements based on the principle of association. They certainly are directed against competition and, perhaps, evidence the fact that the system of competition has reached its climax and is slowly dying. Personally I am inclined to believe so. But while there can be no doubt of its death at some time, because to deny that would be a denial of all evolution of progress in the past and in the future, and while we may predict with a degree of certainty the general principle on which the social structure of the future will be erected, we cannot possibly at this time describe all its forms in detail.

Economic independence as I mean it, has, it is needless to assert, not yet been reached even by men. But it is a fact, that women generally depend on men for their support, and that this dependence is considered to be quite within the natural order of things, whereas cases in which men depend on women for their support

are rare, and are considered without the natural order of things. This is the cause of many inferiorities in woman's life and position in spite of all legal, personal and property rights given to her. But of this I shall speak in other chapters of this book.

III.

The Family.

Monogamy is in present times generally prevalent in the entire civilized world. The monogamian family gradually and slowly grew out of the Syndiasmian. It is based upon exclusive cohabitation between one man and one woman, theoretically for life. According to Morgan's hypothesis, it owes its existence to the wish of establishing paternity with certainty for purposes of inheritance. As I said before, I do not fully agree with this hypothesis, although the motive of establishing fathership with certainty may have been very powerful toward maintaining monogamy after its establishment and with the continued growth of property. From my studies, I conclude that there must have been a more direct economic reason for it, although it cannot be denied that there was, probably, always a close relationship between marriage and inheritance. So, for instance, we find in the Pentateuch (Numbers, ch. 36), that the members of the tribe of Joseph objected to the marriage of the daughters of Zelaphahad out of the tribe, because, as they said: "Then shall the inheritance be taken from the inheritance of our fathers, and shall be put to the inheritance of the tribe, whereunto they are received"; and that by the decision of the Lord, they were not allowed to marry out of the tribe. But we find that the objection was purely economic, and that there was not a bit of sentimentality about it. Those who objected did

so in their own interest, not only in that of their progeny.

At that time monogamy was not yet known, and land was held in common within the tribe. The common ownership of land secured to every member of the tribe at least a subsistence. With the establishment of private ownership in land, however, and especially after the tribal relation had ceased to be a part of the government; and after the state, based upon territory and private property had been established, existence became uncertain and sometimes precarious. Every man had to look out, and establish an existence, for himself; the larger the family, the more difficult it became to support it. It seems to me that for the majority of people, a system producing only small families became a necessity after the establishment of private ownership in land. We must not forget that until late in the period of civilization, land was the only "real" property, and agriculture the principal and most general pursuit for producing the necessities of life. The establishment of the monogamous family came, in all probability, shortly after the establishment of private ownership in land. In the absence of those ties that made the members of a tribe more or less one large family and with the dissolution of the nation into a number of self-supporting individuals, I cannot imagine a form of family that would better fit a system of private ownership of land and its mode of using it, than the monogamian. The monogamian family, under such circumstances, became an economic necessity.

History leaves us in ignorance as to the time of the introduction of private ownership in land as well as of the monogamous family. The ancient Germans are the

only people among whom the monogamian family seems to have existed prior to the introduction of private ownership in land. But our knowledge of their family life is very limited, and considering that in the Syndiasmian family people lived also in single pairs, it is by no means certain that at the time of Tacitus the monogamous family was already generally established among them.

Theology may look at monogamy as a moral precept only, but theology and science see with different eyes. It is true that the moral sentiment of the modern world is strongly against bigamous or polygamous marriages, but neither the Old nor the New Testament forbids them, and the modern prevailing sentiment upon this point must, therefore, have sprung from another source than the scriptures. Moral views spring from the fitness of things, from usefulness or necessity. Usefulness, necessity and fitness, however, are relative terms and are subject to change with time and conditions. Necessarily, therefore, the moral views of mankind change correspondingly.

There never could be and there cannot be a standard of moral principles suitable to all times and conditions. Moral principles are always conservative, using the word in its strictest sense. Their function is to conserve that which is. The most tyrannical powers and the most vicious institutions have been justified on moral grounds. What sustains an existing order of things is moral, what threatens destruction to it is immoral. The ruling classes have always monopolized the dictation of moral precepts. Because of the controlling influence of economic interests over human institutions, relations which do not fit the economic structure of society offend

the moral sense of the time, although no general consciousness of that influence exists.

Existing economic conditions and moral principles must, on account of the everlasting evolution of the former, become disharmonious from time to time. Then follows a slow revolution of moral sentiment, a process of adjustment.

Economic fitness and usefulness have gradually made the moral sense of the modern world look at the monogamous family as the only one permissible in conscience.

Considering, however, the fact that all human institutions are subject to evolution, have we a right to assume that the family is an exception? I am not inclined to indulge in speculation upon this delicate subject, but I can see no reason whatever why I should believe that changes in the economic forms of society will leave the form of the family forever unaffected. One thing, however, I do not fear to say, and that is, that I am not inclined to believe that a form of the family alongside of which such a fearful institution as that of prostitution is possible, can be the highest form of the family which the human race is able to evolve.

We hear it frequently said that the family is the basis of the state. This idea is brought forth, principally, in arguments for more stringent divorce laws. However, it is not true, neither in theory nor in fact. Both, family and state rest upon entirely different principles; the organization of the state rests on territory, that of the family on personal relations. While really the relation of cause and effect does not exist at all between the two, yet if one wishes to establish some such sort of relation, then the state is rather the basis of the family. The state prescribes the forms under which families may

be legally established, the state determines the legitimacy or illegitimacy of offspring, and the state establishes laws of inheritance. It has the power to change the laws and precepts upon these matters without affecting its own existence and general powers. Upon the other hand, the family has not the least power over the state. In a certain sense the family is the creature of the state, in so far as the latter gives legal force to the prevailing moral sentiment, but in no sense whatever is it the basis of the state. The theory is probably an inheritance from the times when the family was considered an institution necessary for the production of soldiers for the king, and the raising of many children, especially boys, an act of patriotism. It is not the habit of modern mothers to display that kind of patriotism.

I either misunderstand the signs altogether, or else the economic conditions of our time have a destructive influence on the family.

I have a friend who lives in one of the large Eastern cities. He has an extensive manufacturing business, is a very careful business man and in very comfortable circumstances. He has three sons and three daughters, all unmarried with the exception of one daughter. The other two girls have, since some time, been of marriageable age. The oldest son, more than thirty years old, travels for his father's business; the second has chosen a profession, and holds a position with a salary of four thousand dollars a year. On the occasion of a visit I asked him why he did not marry. "My dear uncle," (my friend's children call me uncle), he said, "with four thousand dollars a year, I am unable to support a family." The answer was a sufficient explanation, not only why he, but also why the others, the girls included,

were not yet married. I know men who would certainly not have let the opportunity escape to fire a volley of good advice and sentimental teaching upon the young man, and to exhaust all their eloquence and wisdom to show him the folly of his position. I, however, kept silent. Of what use would it have been to speak? He belonged to a set among whom four thousand a year was not considered sufficient to support a family, according to their standard of living, of course, and as even in that set incomes of over four thousand dollars a year are not exceedingly numerous, especially in younger years, marriages are delayed until late in life, where there is no preference for bachelorhood till death. Once in a while a man or a woman, carried away by great affection, has sufficient strength of character to marry out of his or her set or class, but these cases are comparatively rare.

Such sets are to be found in every community. The only difference between the sets and the communities is in the limit of income below which marriage is considered impossible. A certain bank in Chicago has set for its employees the limit at one thousand dollars. I recently read in the newspapers that that bank advised its employees that those with a salary of less than one thousand dollars would not be allowed to marry without the consent of the bank officials and keep their positions. It was evidently thought that one thousand dollars was the least with which a bank employee can support a family and remain honest. Nothing was said of an increase of their salaries to a thousand dollars, where it was less, in case they intended to marry.

In Bebel's "Woman in the Past, Present and Future," I find a table of statistics, giving the number of mar-

riages among ten thousand of population in different countries and years, the latter running from 1873 to 1886, both included. The table gives the following figures for the countries here named for each year during that period:

Holland	171,	168,	167,	165,	162,	155,	153,	150,
	146,	143,	142,	144,	139,	139.		
Switzerland	152,	166,	179,	162,	157,	147,	138,	137,
	136,	135,	136,	136,	138,	137.		
Austria	188,	181,	171,	165,	150,	152,	155,	152,
	160,	164,	157,	157,	152,	155.		
France	178,	167,	164,	158,	150,	151,	152,	149,
	150,	149,	150,	153,	149,	149.		
Italy	159,	153,	168,	163,	154,	142,	150,	140,
	162,	157,	161,	164,	158,	158.		
Belgium	156,	152,	145,	142,	149,	135,	136,	141,
	142,	140,	136,	136,	136,	134.		
England	176,	170,	167,	166,	157,	152,	144,	149,
	141,	155,	154,	151,	144,	141.		
Scotland	155,	152,	148,	150,	144,	134,	128,	132,
	139,	140,	140,	135,	129,	124.		
Ireland	96,	92,	91,	99,	93,	95,	87,	78,
	85,	86,	85,	91,	86,	84.		
Denmark	162,	164,	170,	171,	161,	148,	147,	152,
	156,	154,	154,	156,	141,	142.		
Norway	145,	153,	157,	154,	151,	146,	135,	133,
	128,	134,	132,	137,	133,	131.		
Sweden	146,	145,	140,	141,	137,	129,	126,	126,
	124,	127,	128,	131,	133,	....		
Hungary	226,	214,	218,	198,	182,	187,	205,	182,
	198,	203,	205,	201,	....	....		

In the German empire the number of marriages for each one thousand of population was 8.5 in the decade from 1861-1870; from 1871 to 1880 it was 8.6, and from 1881 to 1888 only 7.8.

There is not one among the countries mentioned

where the figures do not show a decided tendency toward a decrease in the number of marriages.

American statistics on this subject are very scanty. Mr. Carroll D. Wright informed me that the national bureau of labor has not published any report upon the subject of marriage and divorce since 1889, the report published in that year covering twenty years of statistics of marriage and divorce in the United States. Having to make comparison with population, there were only available to me the figures of the two census years, 1870 and 1880. The report mentions only Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Ohio, Rhode Island and Vermont as giving reliable figures in reference to marriage, so that I am able to make up only the following table of statistics:

States.	Population.		Marriages.	
	1870	1880	1870	1880
Connecticut	537,454	622,700	4,971	4,745
Dist. of Columbia.	131,700	177,624	1,500	1,623
Massachusetts ...	1,457,351	1,738,085	14,721	15,538
Ohio	2,665,260	3,198,062	22,459	27,805
Rhode Island.....	217,353	276,531	2,362	2,769
Vermont	330,551	332,286	2,928	2,607

These figures show a slight increase only for Ohio, from 8.43 marriages for each one thousand of population to 8.69; Connecticut and Vermont, although showing an increase of population, had not only a relative, but even a positive decrease in marriages, the first from 4,971 to 4,745, the latter from 2,928 to 2,607. The relative decrease in the District of Columbia was from 11.39 for each one thousand of population to 9.14; in Massachusetts from 10.11 to 8.94, and in Rhode Island from 10.87 to 10.05.

Meagre as these figures are, they are, however, sufficient to show that in the United States the same tendency toward a decrease in the number of marriages prevails as in Europe. There is no reason to presume that statistics extending over a longer period of time or a larger number of states would bring forth a different result. At the same time these figures are very instructive to those who complain so much about hasty marriages; for they show that the number of marriages in the United States is considerably smaller than in any European country, Germany and Ireland excepted, where the ratio is about the same as in the United States. It is to be observed that the foregoing table of statistics for European countries gives the number of marriages for ten thousand of population, while for Germany and the United States the numbers are for each one thousand.

There is everywhere a tendency toward a steady decrease in the number of marriages, and, so far as I am able to observe, human nature not having changed, to what else can it be ascribed than to our economic conditions, to the uncertainty and precariousness of existence? The latter assumes different aspects in different classes of society, but in principle and effect it is the same in almost all of them. And although some people call many of the considerations which keep men from marrying folly, they are, on the contrary, frequently enough the result of a high degree of conscientiousness, the feeling of a duty to accumulate enough in a comparatively short time so as to provide for old age and an assured income for wife and children in case of death, lest they be thrown upon their own resources and compelled to give up the mode of life to which they are accustomed.

The most favorably situated in respect to marriage are, as it seems to me, the skilled workingmen. Although there are periods of prosperity and of enforced idleness, periods of high wages and low wages, yet there is sufficient regularity in their economic condition to secure them an average income with which they can live and support a family according to the standard prevailing in their class. If they remain in good health and live long enough, they may be able to accumulate a small competence for their widows. Beyond that their hopes do not go. There is no beyond that for them. In case of an early death of the husband, the widow will, if she should not marry again, support herself by her own work. She knows that such misfortune may befall her, but she takes the risk, not from choice, but from necessity. In most cases she would have to support herself by her own work anyway, if she remained unmarried. So, the risk which the women of the working classes take is not very great. I doubt not that statistics, if we had any, would show that among the working people the number of marriages, although varying with temporary conditions, does not decrease within long periods.

The class most unfavorably situated in reference to marriage is that of office employes, the class among whom the young man with a salary of twelve or fifteen dollars a week deems it necessary to wear a dress suit at social functions. There are thousands and thousands of young clerks whose weekly salary is less than twelve dollars; I doubt that the average salary among office workers, leaving even women out of consideration, is much above fifteen dollars; it may be even below that. It is well known that these salaries, during the last twenty or more years, have steadily declined. But they

are salaries, and it makes all the difference in the world whether a man receives a salary or wages. Salary implies social position and social pretensions, of which the man receiving wages knows little or nothing. Social pretensions are expensive. An income sufficient to support comfortably a workingman's family is frequently insufficient to support a single man of the class receiving salaries. And so it comes that in certain classes of society one will find a large number of pretty, charming, well educated women, who would make excellent wives and excellent mothers, slowly but surely approaching the age at which the world cruelly calls them old maids, suppressing painfully all natural instincts, desires and affections, and at last, in sheer desperation, marrying either an unloved man, or burying all hopes for, and aspirations to, the happiness to which woman is by nature destined, and to which, from a standpoint of pure moral justice, she is entitled.

What physiological and psychological effect this has on woman, how terribly injurious this condition is to the female organism, how dangerous it is to individual and social health, the physician, the psychiatrist and the sociologist are able to tell. Men have advantages which I need not discuss. Reliable statistics show that of all the insane and suicides, the overwhelming number are unmarried. Bavarian statistics of 1858 show among the insane eighty-one per cent unmarried, seventeen per cent married, and two per cent unknown. In Saxony there were in 1856 among a million of unmarried men one thousand suicides, among a million of married men only five hundred; among a million of unmarried women two hundred and sixteen, among a million of married women only one hundred and twenty-five.

There are no American statistics in reference to insanity and suicide which give any valuable information. The census of 1880 states the number of male insanes to have been in that year 44,391, of female insanes 47,568. This is all I can gather from United States statistics.

Physicians, lawyers and other professional men mostly marry very late in life. The reasons are entirely of an economic nature. The peculiar mode of production and distribution of our times, and the economic organization resulting therefrom, have produced the peculiar phenomenon that all pursuits and vocations seem to be overcrowded, and that in everyone of them one finds "too many." This goes so far that every country seems to suffer from overpopulation. Nowhere is this felt more than in the professions. It seems as if the earth was getting too small, especially for the many doctors, lawyers and others in the learned professions. Unless circumstances are exceptionally favorable to them, they have to spend the best years of life in their efforts to gain a firm foothold and a sure, sufficient income, sufficient according to the standard of living prevailing in their class.

Perhaps, it would be in order now to deliver a sermon on democratic simplicity, and hurl anathemas on vanity, luxury, pleasure-seeking and so forth. But of what use would it be? Since when has it been possible to avert the logical effects of conditions and institutions, combined with those of human nature, by preaching? I suppose that many a sermon has been preached against luxury, the preacher wearing a diamond pin in his scarf, without reflecting for a moment that nobody would wear diamonds if there were no people unable to wear them. For there is no more real beauty in a genuine diamond

than there is in a good imitation. Economic conditions like ours which produce classes that are so far distant from each other as the millionaire is from the common laborer, with all those between them, must of necessity produce different standards of living, different degrees of education, different tastes, different manners and different rules of politeness. These differences existing, it is neither more nor less than human nature that every one desires the contact and society of those who are situated like him, and inclines toward displaying with some degree of ostentation his superior social position. The most democratically inclined cannot deny the difference in the intellectual and moral atmospheres of different classes of society. In many cases, therefore, exclusion from one's own class for financial reasons may practically mean exclusion from all social intercourse, because one would not feel happy in the society of another class. It is, therefore, false to call it folly to cling to the attributes of one's class. We are not the creatures of nature merely, but also of social conditions and surroundings, and we are what both have made of us. Be that good or bad, wise or foolish, it is what it is, and it cannot be changed without going back to the original source of all of it; that is, the mode of production of the necessaries of life, and the consequent mode of their distribution resulting in a certain economic organization of society.

The reader will have noticed that the forces of family deterioration, described so far, have not a directly destructive influence, but affect the family indirectly by preventing marriage. However, there are circumstances arising from our economic conditions which injuriously affect the family in the most direct way. Most potently is it done by the substitution of woman and child labor

for the labor of men. The astonishing proportion to which woman labor has grown is shown by the census of 1900. According to this, the number of persons in the United States employed in gainful occupations was 29,285,922, of which 23,956,115 were of the male and 5,329,807 of the female sex. I purposely avoid to say men and women, because the numbers given include persons of ten years of age and over. It is a sad commentary on our economic institutions, that it was found necessary to include persons of so young an age. The ever growing desire (call it economic necessity, if you choose, it will not alter its pernicious effect) for cheap labor tears not only boys and girls from the bosom of the family, but also married women and mothers. Visit one of the so-called she-towns in New England, where the men find no employment and tend to household duties while wives and daughters go to work in the cotton mill, and you will learn the effect of thus tearing apart the members of the family. What can possibly remain of the happiness of family life if wives, mothers and children have to eke out their existence in factory labor, if they leave the home (and what kind of a home can it be?) early in the morning, return late in the evening, tired and worn out, covered with the dirt and dust of the factory, and then, perhaps, start with the preparation of the evening meal?

I have no desire to become sentimental or pathetic, but I cannot suppress the thought that our economic institutions, in many instances, have the effect of wiping out all the moral effects of civilization, turn our hearts into stone and make us barbarians. Neither the savages of Africa nor those of Australia make their children work for the support of life. To find the institu-

tion of child labor one must go to Christian countries, where the people boast of their wealth, culture and refinement.

For "Studies in Historical and Political Science," published by Johns Hopkins University, William Franklin Willoughby, associated, I believe, for a time with the United States labor bureau, wrote a series of articles under the general title of "State Activities in Relation to Labor in the United States." In one of these articles he says that the number of children working in the cotton mills of Alabama, Georgia and South Carolina is estimated to be about twenty thousand. Many of them work for ten cents a day, and he knew of babies who earned five or six cents. The hours are either from six o'clock in the morning until six o'clock in the evening, or from six o'clock in the evening until six o'clock in the morning. In Alabama he found a child of seven years who had worked forty nights in succession, and a nine-year-old child, who had done night work for eleven months. In South Carolina he met a five-year-old child, working twelve hours every night. He met many children doing night work who were unable to tell their age, but from their appearance could not be older than nine, or, at the utmost, ten years. Many of the children are, in consequence of the noise of the machinery, half deaf. A physician told him that ten per cent of the children employed in the mills die of consumption before they reach the age of seventeen. The same physician (he lived in a manufacturing town in Georgia) told him that during his ten years of practice there, he had amputated fingers from more than a hundred children, as the result of accidents. He found many children without thumbs, some without any fin-

gers, some even without hands. The mill is generally freed from responsibility for accidents by contract with the parents or guardians.

And the nation does not blush for shame, and we send missionaries to the heathens to teach them Christianity!

"The Woman Who Toils" is the title of a book recently published by Mrs. Bessie and Miss Mary Van Vorst. The authoresses belong to what we, sometimes, hear called the aristocratic class. They went into the cotton mills of Massachusetts and South Carolina as working women and worked and lived with the factory women; they then told the world their experience. Speaking of Columbia, South Carolina, Miss Van Vorst says that the agents of the company go to the mountains and hire the girls, holding out great promises to them. The girls, poor as they are, come bareheaded and barefooted, but robust and healthy and carrying their whole possessions with them in small bundles. (They are white girls, just as the children, spoken of above, are white.) They are housed in the factory village, which is avoided by the inhabitants of the city like pestilence. The houses contain from four to six rooms, and are filthy and damp. There are three or more beds in each room, on the bare walls hang the clothes of the women living in these rooms. Most of the beds are occupied by two persons. Breakfast consists of a small piece of pork and one kind of fatted vegetable. The working day lasts thirteen hours. Miss Van Vorst was immediately employed, and instructed in her work by a sixteen-year-old girl. She found that all the girls were chewing snuff, from the oldest down to the youngest. The air in the mill is almost white from the many particles of

cotton flying about. The girls expectorate constantly, their lungs become diseased and they frequently carry away consumption. Most of them can neither read nor write. Only the very youngest of them are lively and display signs of health. The others show nothing but mute resignation.

When Miss Van Vorst, after working hours, returned to her boarding house, supper was ready. It was spread on an uncovered board resting on wooden bearers. The seats, also, were nothing but rough boards. There were three large dishes on the "table." One was filled with fish, meat and bones, all mixed up in an ill-smelling sauce; the other with salt pork, and the third with corn. The conversation turned about a fight which had taken place between two jealous women.

The girl with whom Miss Van Vorst slept said she could not go to bed early, because she was too tired to sleep. When sick, she would stay at home a day, but then came the foreman and bothered her so long that she would rather go to work than be further harrassed by him. The girl seemed to be entirely worn out.

In the bed next to hers slept a working woman with her child. She was sick, but said that when she first came to the factory she was quite well. But those factories! She thought the factory had killed her. "Did you see the water we have to drink? It is nothing but poison; you can see all kinds of color in it." The doctor, she said, would not come to her any more; he could not help her.

Miss Van Vorst heard a pretty girl ask for work. The foreman answered that there was always work for such a handsome girl, and then he placed her so that he could keep an eye on her.

Some of the older women take their breakfast along with them to the factory, and sit down on the dirty floor to eat it before work begins. All of them look dirty, are unkempt, smell badly and look haggard and weary.

The women rise early; at five o'clock the factory whistle sounds, they eat their breakfast and at six o'clock they march to the factory. When they come home after thirteen hours' work, they are almost too tired to eat and throw themselves on their miserable beds.

This sort of life leaves them only one pleasure. It is not difficult to imagine of what kind it is, because they are, after all, made of flesh and blood. Some enter into what they call a factory marriage. It requires no kind of legal ceremony. After a time the girl finds herself a mother, forsaken by the man whom she called husband. And if the child lives, it will in time also work in the cotton mill. The mother? But it is unnecessary to speak of her. In the city they look down contemptuously upon those women, and accuse them of leading immoral lives.

In Alexander's "The History of Women" I read the following: "It is the characteristic of men in every civilized nation to treat the weaker sex with lenity and indulgence; to this they are prompted, not only by the softer sensations instilled by nature, but also by that additional humanity, and those finer feelings which are commonly the result of knowledge, and which raise the mind above what is mean, and inspire it only with what is generous and noble. Hence, whenever we find a people treating their women with propriety, we may without any further knowledge of their history, conclude that their minds are not uncultivated. When we find

them cultivated, we may conclude that they treat their women with propriety."

If Mr. Alexander had not written his excellent book more than a hundred years ago, I would infer that he intended to write a satire on American culture. He cites Abraham, who bid Sarah, his wife, to bake bread and prepare a meal for his visiting angels, and cites Rebecca, who drew water from the well for Isaac's servants, to show that in patriarchal times women had to perform low services. I am inclined to believe that the working women of South Carolina, and undoubtedly of some other American states, would not in the least object to a return of patriarchal times.

Certainly, in the families of the well-to-do the lot of the women has grown much easier in modern times, compared with patriarchal times. But it is the very same factory which destroys the lives of poor women, that provides the more fortunate housewife with all those things that give her ease and comfort, and spare her the drudgery of the household, as it was when there were no canneries, no cotton mills, no garment factories, no laundries and no telephones.

Although I apprehend that the lot of the women working in the Eastern sweatshops is not much superior to that of the women working in the Southern cotton mills; and although, one may be sure, the lot of the New England factory woman is anything but enviable, yet I will not say more on this subject, because it is unnecessary for my purposes.

While the modern household allows women much time and freedom for other work besides, while modern economics give women employment in many callings. and the laws put nothing in her way to hinder her in

providing for herself, yet custom and prejudice are greatly against her. The female lawyer and the female doctor are still scarce; churches, as a rule, refuse to ordain women for the ministry, and she must be indeed a courageous woman, who ventures to do any business outside of the office or store. Yet, we are still in the period of competition, and to hunt up the buyer, or the man to be insured, is one of the most important parts of business. Considering that women are still barred from many vocations, considering the small remuneration which women receive for their work, is it any wonder that many of them see in marriage only a haven of rest and marry without choice or love? And who, under the circumstances, has the courage to blame a woman for marrying for support only? Under the stress of economic conditions a great moral wrong is committed. Families are founded, born in deception and destined to be destroyed from within. The want of love on the part of the wife is soon felt by the husband, and even if both should be strong and honest enough to maintain connubial fidelity, and successfully resist natural impulses and temptations, torture and misery will nevertheless be in most cases their inevitable lot. Numerous, however, are the instances where the power of resistance is small, and what the consequences then are, is told by the records of our divorce and criminal courts. Once in a while the tragedy ends with suicide, now and then even with murder.

Marriages of convenience, especially where the convenience is on the side of the male parties to them, are, fortunately, not as numerous in our country as they are in Europe; but there is a decided tendency toward their

increase, and we have our share of fortune and title hunters.

In spite of all poetry and romantic literature, conjugal happiness needs for its continued existence not only a material economic basis, which will assure the absence of financial cares and sorrows, always apt to produce estrangement and quarrels, but also from its beginning freedom of choice on both sides, freedom from any kind of economic pressure or influence. Without this, the family can never be what it should be, a continued source of bliss and happiness.

The present form of the family sprang into existence, and became gradually the generally prevailing form, at a time when property commenced its career of mastership over man. Its transformation will certainly take place in some future time, which will mark the beginning of the mastership of man over property. This change of mastership will necessarily produce new moral conceptions, a new code of ethics. Just as the present form of the family corresponds to the moral conscience of our time, so will the future form of the family correspond to the moral conscience of a future period. What that form will be, it is impossible to foresee. We are unable to see with the eyes of future generations.

The monogamian family was born at or about a time when land ceased to be the common inheritance of gentes or tribes, and, in consequence of the institution of private property in land, the ancient communistic institutions crumbled away. Gradually and slowly the conception of individualism, brought forth by the changed economic conditions, crept into the mind of man, until it became the ruling moral idea in the economic life of civilized mankind. It became an immense

moral force with stupendous practical results. It is thought by students of sociology, at least by some, that it has nearly spent its career, that its effects are no longer beneficial, nay, that it has even become a hindrance to the further development of the human race. I believe this to be so, but will not discuss the point in this chapter. If it should be so, all our institutions, built upon the basis of individualism, will follow a change of that basis. Be that as it may, it is, at any rate, noticeable that the present form of the family, instituted for the purpose of facilitating the creation of families, fails to accomplish this purpose any longer. Changes will take place, or else the theory of evolution is altogether wrong. I care not to enter into speculation as to the direction these changes will take, but think it better to leave this to the moral conscience and the prudence and wisdom of a future generation.

What I wished to make clear is, that the family is a social institution first, and a moral institution afterwards; that its form never has been and never will be permanent; that in common with all forms in nature and society, it is subject to changes in the course of evolution. And I further wished to demonstrate that in the evolution of social forms and institutions, the mode of production of the necessaries of life, or in a broader sense, the economic structure of society, is of paramount influence; that necessity and usefulness create moral conceptions, and that the moral sense of man has the constant tendency to put itself in harmony with what is recognized as being useful and necessary for the welfare of human society and individual happiness. Social institutions no sooner show signs of a retrogression of their usefulness and of decay, than a revolution of the

moral sentiment in reference to them begins to manifest itself, and their moral value is questioned. The power of evolution is irresistible, and experience teaches us that its course in the production of forms has always been from the lower to the higher. Therefore, we may confidently expect that, whatever form the family will in some future time assume, it will stand on a higher plane than the present. It will be in perfect harmony with the future economic organization of society, as was the group family with the communism of poverty, or the patriarchal family with pastoral conditions, or as the monogamous family is with modern economic conditions, and it will be supported by moral views superior to ours.

IV.

Divorce.

For the past few years newspapers and clergymen were complaining of the steady increase of divorce with more or less consternation and dismay. According to American fashion, relief was proposed through legislation, directed, not against the cause of the evil, but against the evil itself. I do not recollect of having read in any periodical, or having heard from any preacher, an intellectual discussion of the subject, going back to the sources from which the evil springs, and being based on patient and impartial investigation and study of the problem. If a physician, called to a patient, would tell him: "It is wrong to be sick. I forbid you to be sick, and if you will insist on feeling sick, I will keep you in a continuous state of suffering," he would act on the same general principles on which the virtuous and enraged editors and ministers act who recommend nothing else but more strenuous and stringent laws against divorce.

Once in a while an especially wise individual makes the startling discovery that there could be no divorces if there were no marriages, and recommends stringent and strenuous laws against reckless marriages as a sure and never failing remedy.

A quite humorous contribution, but meant in all seriousness, toward the efforts to solve the divorce problem was sometime ago furnished by the governor of Iowa, who caused the introduction of a bill in the legisla-

ture of that state for the establishment of a school of matrimony. It was reported in the newspapers that unlike legislators of other states, those of Iowa were not content to sit down and guess at the trouble. They started out to investigate. The result was astonishing even to those who believed they had made a study of the problem. The difficulty, it was found, did not lie in any of the expected directions. It was the result, not of waywardness on the part of either husband or wife, or yet of an untoward loosening of the ties, but of a general incompatibility on the part of the young couples seeking marriage. A girl and a man fall in love at first sight, and without considering their adaptability to one another, and without understanding the responsibilities of marriage, rush away to the altar.

According to the newspapers it was deduced from the records of the divorce courts that young men, without the means of support, have within the past few years been hurrying into matrimony, and leading miserable lives from that time on. The number of young men was only exceeded by that of young women who, ignorant of cooking and general housework, became the wives of men not financially able to support them at ease.

This is undoubtedly a true and correct statement. The amusing part is in the proposed remedy, in the bill which authorizes the establishment of a state school of matrimony with a state director and five thousand instructors, distributed among the numerous townships. According to the provisions of the bill it became necessary for those wishing to marry to take a prescribed course in the college of matrimony and pass a strict examination entitling them to a diploma before the neces-

sary marriage license could be obtained. The course of study was left to the director, but it was known from the expressed opinion of the governor, that the curriculum was to contain a course in cooking. The governor evidently believed in the saying, "The way to a man's heart is through his stomach." From the foregoing true and correct statement it is, however, to be supposed that the students were to receive instruction in avoiding or preventing love at first sight, in the knowledge of true love, so as to be able to clearly distinguish it from mere fancied love, and in sure ways to overcome financial difficulties. After having achieved an efficiency in these branches, the young men and young women were to receive a diploma, which evidenced their fitness for marriage, and then if they did marry, they were destined to be happy ever afterwards.

The bill should have been passed, if for no other reason but to introduce a new theme into romances and novels. The struggles of lovers with hard-hearted fathers and mothers who, for this and for that reason, refuse their consent, have become somewhat stale in fiction. Here would have been, however, a new element of obstruction which would have awakened new interest in love stories.

When the human mind stands helpless before a condition, rather than acknowledge its helplessness, it breeds evil and nonsense. Most certainly, there is a very effective way to prevent divorces; the law might simply refuse them. Granting that the foundation for many a divorce is already laid at the time of marriage, the number of divorces may certainly be diminished by making marriage more difficult and thereby reducing the number of marriages. But the question arises whether,

as a consequence, the quantity of happiness among the people will not decrease, rather than increase; whether the moral status of society will not rather become lower than higher, and whether or not evils will result, compared with which the evil of numerous divorces will be quite insignificant. For, divorce or no divorce, few marriages, or many marriages, man is made of flesh and bone, red, warm blood runs through his veins, and the sexual instinct cannot be suppressed by legislation, nor can love, respect and happiness be commanded by law.

When, many years ago, I entered into the practice of law, I made it, in a sort of moral enthusiasm, a rule, when a party wished to employ me for the purpose of getting a divorce, to try to effect a reconciliation. In several cases I succeeded, or thought, at least, that I had succeeded, when, to my utter dismay, I found afterwards that the parties had employed other lawyers and were divorced. It set me to thinking, and I came to the conclusion that there is far greater responsibility in playing providence than in acceding to the wishes of clients. And finally experience taught me that the resolution and the process of divorce, in ninety-nine out of a hundred cases, produce so much heart-rending agony that people would not resort to it, if in their misery they could find relief somewhere else.

I am not in possession of any comparative statistics, but I am willing to admit that the number of divorces in America is considerably larger than in Europe. To ascribe it to a lower state of morality, or a want of religious sentiment, or a lower degree of consciousness of duty, would be a great error. I believe that in intellectual and moral qualities, Americans compare favorably with any other nation. I would rather ascribe it

to the superior democratical sentiment prevailing in the American people, so that the influence of caste-prejudice is smaller, that women are less willing to suffer brutalities from husbands, and have a higher regard for themselves; reasons which I consider anything but deplorable.

Marriage is, by American law, considered a civil contract and up to the sixth century it was not in the Christian world held to be anything else. Prior to that time it was not considered that there was any religious element in it, church and clergy had nothing to do with it, and the scriptures contain nothing which stamps it with a religious character. There was then no necessity for the law to declare marriage a civil contract, because it had never been thought to be anything else. Beginning, however, in the sixth century, the church found it convenient, or necessary for its purposes, to force into marriage the element of religion, and in the seventh century it was by the council of Trent declared a sacrament. Prior to the sixth century the clergy had nothing whatever to do with tying the marriage knot. More than a thousand years afterward, government again commenced to consider marriage a civil contract only, and to disregard the religious element, artificially infused into it by the church. Many if not most of the European governments are in advance of us in this respect and recognize only solemnization of marriage before a civil officer, without taking any knowledge whatsoever of religious ceremonies or solemnization by a minister, leaving that altogether to the sentiment or conscience of the parties.

It is a general maxim of law that a contract, voluntarily entered into, may also be voluntarily dissolved by the parties to it. It may, however, be admitted at once,

that so far as the dissolution of the marriage contract is concerned, the economic conditions of to-day, the guarding of property interests, and the protection of the wife and the children, make the interference of the law in many cases a necessity. But farther than considering the material interests of the parties neither courts nor lawmakers should go. Moral or religious scruples against divorce generally should not weigh upon them. These are matters of conscience entirely foreign to the nature of a valid civil contract, and entirely within the province of individual judgment. Those who conscientiously believe that there is a religious element in marriage and divorce and those who consider marriage a civil contract pure and simple shall be equally free to act according to their belief and conscience. In an age of religious freedom government and law should have absolutely nothing to do with that side of the question, and should not consider the voice of the minister of a particle of more importance than that of any other citizen. It certainly is the privilege of the minister to judge the matter from his particular religious standpoint, but it is not the privilege of the State to adopt the minister's judgment simply because it is a minister's judgment. I am sorry to be compelled to state that I am unable to find in all the history of the world a single instance where the State put itself under the influence of Church and clergy, and where freedom and happiness did not suffer in consequence thereof; whereas the instances where Church and clergy have sacrificed freedom and happiness of the people to their doctrines are only too numerous.

Moral sentiment and law allow only monogamous marriages. So far, so good. As there can be no abso-

lute freedom of contract, it is right and proper to guard the interests of society by proper legislation in not allowing persons not considered of discretion, such as minors, insane persons, and idiots and also persons within certain degrees of blood relationship to enter into the contract of marriage. But, provided persons are within the law, what possible interest can the state or society have in the conclusion or dissolution of the contract of marriage? Of what difference can it be to the state or society whether A is married to B, or to C, or to D, and of what benefit or injury can it be to the State or society whether A and B remain in a state of marriage or not? Of course, it is of interest to the community that the divorced wife and her children be properly supported by the husband and father and do not become a burden on the community. But if the husband and father has property, the court can enforce such support, if he has no property but has a conscience, he will support them of his own free will, as well as he can, and if he has neither property nor conscience, the law is powerless with or without divorce. Any punishment meted out to a conscienceless husband and father will not buy a morsel of bread for the abandoned family. What rational ground then exists for the state to interfere, except so far as it is necessary for it to become the arbiter between the parties in reference to matters of property and the custody of their children, if they are unable to agree upon these points?

Certainly, as no contract can be dissolved without the consent of all the parties to it, so it is right and proper that the marriage contract cannot be dissolved by either one of the parties without the consent of the other, and that only the law can do it upon proof of a

breach of its conditions. But by what shall the law be guided? Shall it be guided by the doctrines of a religious body? Or by a standard of morals set up by one or more churches and generally based on religious doctrines? Or shall the law-maker advance his own personal religious doctrines or moral views? I am of the opinion that if the state has no material interest in the matter, only humane considerations and the interests and welfare of the parties concerned, should prevail.

Granted that the marriage-bond is sacred, whether considered so in a religious, poetical or sentimental sense, it seems to me that with the loss of mutual love, affection and respect, all sanctity of the marriage-tie is gone. With love and esteem the marriage state is paradise and bliss, without them it is torture and barren of anything that is good. Love and esteem, however, cannot be made to appear and disappear at will. What is more humane, to compel husband and wife who have ceased to love and respect each other, to continue in a state of marriage, in which case the want of love must necessarily grow into hatred, or to allow them to separate? What kind of morality must necessarily result from a union which is no longer based on those affections the existence of which alone justifies marriage and lifts the attraction between human beings of different sex so far above animal instinct? Those, who in consequence of their social position, are accustomed to the rules of conduct of polite society take care not to show the world their actual state of feeling, and use their trained power of self-control to suppress passionate outbreaks of anger, at least in the presence of others, especially their children. But their whole life is one of hypocrisy and sham, no amount of care can

prevent the children from feeling instinctively the absence of affection between their parents, and there is in such a family a general void of sunshine and happiness. But among those who do not move in social circles where one learns self-control in one's conduct, such a condition is very likely to lead to acts of brutality. But in either case it is the wife who suffers most. Being the weaker of the two, and being, from the nature of her sex, less in a condition to seek outside of the family compensation for what the family refuses her, her life is one of misery. In a family like that, the home is permeated by an atmosphere of impurity, and nothing can contribute more to the happiness of all the members of the family than a clean and honest separation, making possible for the husband as well as for the wife a clean and honest life. Can the moral status of society lose thereby? Is it not enough that social prejudices and financial considerations prevent frequently a separation, why should the law, and why should doctrinaires compel people to continue in a life of sham and hypocrisy, ending frequently in public scandal?

Apropos of public scandal: Publicity in the administration of justice is such a great and important principle that it is quite difficult to draw the line where exceptions should be allowed. But is it necessary and can it be good for the moral status of society that in actions for divorce the domestic affairs of a family, every infidelity, every brutality, every transgression, every error and every indiscretion, every trouble and every suffering be laid bare before the world? Is it necessary to make the persons concerned objects of shame, ridicule and scandal? Could not, at least, the newspapers adopt different ethics and restrain themselves in the publication

of complaints for divorce and the evidence given in divorce trials? If the law should be powerless in this instance, should it not be possible for a sense of decency, delicacy and kind consideration to manifest itself among journalists and readers alike?

I confess I am unable to see what society profits or what public morals gain by not permitting parties who are unhappily married and wish to dissolve their union, to do it quietly and decently by a method as simple as that of marriage instead of compelling them to ventilate their troubles before the eyes of the public and make their marital relations and domestic affairs a subject of common gossip to the disgust of every decent person and the pleasure only of the scandal-monger. If they were able to agree between themselves in all matters concerning them, where is the advantage to society and morality of disregarding the delicacy of feeling of the parties, of outraging their sensibilities and of forcing them to either confess or be convicted of some act of brutality, meanness or impropriety before allowing them to do what they consider necessary for their happiness and from which nobody else suffers, or which is nobody else's concern? Whatever one may think of Hester Prynne, standing on the pillory with her babe in her arms, she certainly is an object of pity; but the sanctimonious officials who put her there, and the gossips staring at her and wagging their tongues, are absolutely repulsive.

What moral right has society to intrude as judge between husband and wife where they do not need a judge? Why should society in the form of law and justice meddle with the private affairs of parties who do not seek an arbiter between them? Is there anyone

good and holy enough to force upon another his own views of goodness?

It is sad enough that frequently parties cannot, for economic or other reasons, agree upon a settlement of their affairs and must call for it upon the Court. But where such is not the case, I ask in the name of morality, in the name of propriety, in the name of practical utility, in the name of anything that is just, good and noble, with what justification the private affairs of parties are made a public concern, and why we should, in this advanced and enlightened age of democratical sentiment and civil and religious liberty, put people who wish to dissolve an unhappy marriage-bond upon the pillory of a public trial?

We hear so many declamations against rash and hasty marriages. But they seem to me to be coming from persons who have forgotten that there was a time when they were young themselves and that it is the privilege of youth to love ardently, passionately and unreasonably. It will be difficult to find young lovers in whose mind a doubt of the everlastingness of their love could be raised. They think they know each other thoroughly, but are, of course, mistaken; for perfect knowledge of each other is impossible without the close personal union of marriage and the community of duties and interests of the family. Love would not be love were it always reflecting, investigating, hesitating, examining. Besides, certain characteristics in man or woman may be awakened into life only under certain circumstances such as sickness, misfortune or business reverses, and a woman's character may be entirely changed by motherhood, so that the discovery of not being well mated, always comes, and generally cannot but come, too late.

The charge of hasty and rash marriage is, in this respect at least, unreasonable and unjust, if not silly.

More justice and reason seems to be in the charge that young people rush into marriage without seriously considering the ability of supporting a family. But are they really so much to be blamed even for this? Is it altogether their fault? Is not day after day, in speech and print, the lie pounded into the young man that by industry and economy every man may if not exactly become rich, at least get along comfortably? Will you blame the young man if he believes it, if he, knowing himself to be industrious and economical, trusts to those who preach daily of the excellence of our economic institutions, of the possibilities which they offer, of the many opportunities only waiting for somebody to make use of them, and, confident of his own good intentions and his ability, charges himself with the burden of providing for the woman he loves and with the responsibilities of fatherhood? Really, who stands higher morally, the young man who thus courageously enters into the struggle or the one who does not consider an income of three, four, or five thousand dollars sufficient for the support of a family, and therefore remains unmarried, thereby condemning some young woman to maidenhood for life?

It seems to me that nobody has a right to complain of rash and ill-advised marriage, but everybody should treat with commiseration those who have chosen unfortunately. One should never judge another solely from one's own standpoint, but should try to imagine one's self in the place of the other. An old German proverb says: To understand everything means to forgive everything.

Undoubtedly cases are not rare, in which young women marry without much love, and principally for the reason that they have become weary of the struggle for a livelihood. There is ample temptation for her to do worse, but she marries. Sometimes persons of good sense and quiet and even temper get along quite well even under such circumstances. The woman has certainly never told her husband that she did not love him; in all probability she professed to love him. Then if the marriage should turn out unfortunate, the moralist will say, she deceived him and does not deserve any better. Yet, I candidly say that, in view of the bitterness of a lone woman's struggle for life, I could not cast the first stone on her and compel her to drag her chains all through her life, not to speak of the other party to the contract.

It is one of the every day assertions of doctrinaires that the knowledge of the facility with which divorces can be had, is the cause of many a reckless rush into marriage, and that if divorce were attended with greater difficulty, people would be more careful in marrying. This is an astonishingly absurd reasoning, based neither upon logic nor experience. If ever there is a time in life when the thought of divorce is farthest from man, it is at the time of marriage. It would be a difficult task, indeed, to find a single individual who was prevented from marrying by the fear only that he, or she, might afterwards meet serious obstacles in procuring, or even find it impossible to procure, a divorce. Likewise will it be anything but an easy matter to find a married person who treated his marriage affairs lightly because of the thought that divorce offers a remedy against the ills of marriage. As a general rule when people marry they

have the honest intention to marry for life and their feeling is not such that room is left for the thought of separation.

Be the ordinary logic that facility of the dissolution of marriage will result in an increase of dissolutions, and preventive measures in a decrease, good or bad, it is at most mere conjecture, not proved by any facts, while the contrary conclusion is just as logical, but sustained by actual conditions besides. If it is pointed out that in certain states of the Union where the law facilitates divorces, they are also quite numerous, it must be seen that this fact proves nothing, because there is a rush to such states from parties desiring divorce and residing in states where they find it difficult to obtain it. However, it stands to reason, and a study of ordinary life proves it, that where a union difficult or impossible of dissolution, is formed, it will result in perfect relaxation of all efforts to maintain it. There is an immense difference between the conduct of lovers and the conduct of spouses. The one is characterized by the strife for possession, the other by security of possession; the one by activeness, the other by passiveness, expressing themselves respectively, in tireless attention and careless nonchalance. Upon the other hand, there is a natural probability that if the marriage-tie could be easily dissolved, there would be an unceasing endeavor to keep alive the holy flame of love once existing, and the blissful state of wooing would never come to an end. I am firmly of the opinion that the best means to accomplish a reduction in the number of divorces, is to make divorce very easy. If history teaches anything, it is that freedom is far more productive of happiness and good morals than restraint and coercion, and that the straight-jacket

is the worst adapted instrument for the creation of sound ethics.

It is well known that the French law did not allow divorce until a short time ago and Montaigne, the great Frenchman, says: "We have thought to make our marriage-tie stronger by taking away all means of dissolving it, but the more we have tightened the constraint, so much the more have we relaxed and detracted from the bond of will and affection."

V. C. Scott says in his book, "The Silken East," the following:

"Burma, as in many other things, is in advance of more reputedly civilized countries in the status it accords to its women. The infant marriage and shutting up in walled houses, the polygamy, the harems, the social punishment of widows, the denial of spiritual rights which prevail in India are unknown in Burma. Here women marry when they are of age and after they have seen somewhat of the world. They marry, for the most part, whomsoever they will and from love. They are not handed over as chattels to a man whom they know not, but are courted and won. The married women's property act has in effect been established for centuries in Burma. In this country, where the women earn so much, the woman's earnings are her own. Divorce is easily obtained, but seldom asked for. The lightness of the marriage laws, the readiness of the Burmese women to enter into an easy alliance, shock the virtue of the strenuous foreigner, but within her ideals she is a perfectly proper, modest and well mannered woman.

"She has failings. Who has not? Her practice of chewing betel is inelegant and destructive to her teeth;

her voice is apt under the pressure of adversity to be shrill; her keen business faculties detract a trifle from the romance in which, as in a halo, all women are enveloped; in old age she is very ugly, and even in youth her nose is stumpy, her lips a little thick, her cheek bones high and heavy — but these are Caucasian objections.

"In the eyes of the young men of the land the Burmese girl is a peerless creature, and her influence over their hearts and their passions is immense. What is more, few men in Burma ever undertake anything of magnitude without first seeking the able counsel of their wives."

H. Fielding who has lived in Burma for a number of years, tells us that if a Burmese girl marries, she keeps her name, nothing indicating that she is married. She retains her own property, the husband acquiring no right to it, nor to what she herself earns or inherits. What they earn together is their common property. He further tells us that in Burma marriage can be quite easily dissolved. The pair appears before the village-elder and asks to be divorced. A record is made of it, and then both are free. Each of them keeps his separate property, and the property earned by common effort is divided between them. Yet, in spite of the simplicity and facility of divorce, divorces are extremely rare and in the villages and among the better classes unusual and exceptional. The reason for the small number of divorces is, according to Mr. Fielding, the ease with which divorce can be obtained, having the effect that husband and wife treat each other at all times with great courtesy and much consideration.

The only class, in which divorces are frequent, are according to the same author, the not quite unobjec-

tionable followers and hangers-on to the British administration, such as clerks, policemen, etc. "It is horrifying," adds Mr. Fielding, "to see what a demoralizing effect we have on all people coming in touch with us."

This remark is quite significant. We are in the habit of considering savages, barbarians, or peoples in a somewhat lower stage of culture than our own, with contempt, and rejoice over the fact that the place of our birth was somewhere on the Mississippi, the Rhine, or the Thames and not on the Niger or Senegal. Yet, it sometimes seems to me that, in many things, half civilized people, barbarians and even savages are superior to us in morals, that the everlasting, all-absorbing hunt for wealth kills fine sentiment; that business, as carried on in the modern world, spoils character; and that modern economics have a demoralizing effect on the conscience. Should it be possible that what is good for the Burmese might not be good for the European or the American, and that freedom becomes dangerous to morality in proportion to the growth of civilization? Should it be possible that the ethics of personal relations must suffer with the increase of wealth, the growth of the power of production and the extension of commerce, and that freedom in personal relations is incompatible with the economic structure of modern society? It seems so, perhaps it is so. War is destructive of morals, and our economic condition is that of bellum omnium contra omnes, (war of all against all). Business is business, that is the excuse which one hears every day for doing of what one feels ashamed, just as war is war is the excuse for barbarities and cuelties against which the feeling of humanity revolts.

The problem of divorce is an economic problem, as

all our social problems are. A final solution of it is impossible under the prevailing economic system. It is only possible under an economic system which would make wife and children economically independent of husband and father. But as such a system would certainly produce a new form of the family, the divorce problem would then, perhaps, no longer be a problem. The rights and customs of divorce have been different under different forms of the family, and as the latter corresponded with different economic systems, so did, of course, also the former. In the Syndiasmian family divorce lay in the pleasure of either party, under the patriarchal form of the family, as evidenced by the ancient Hebrew law, divorce lay in the pleasure of the husband, and it was a long time after the advent of the monogamous family, until the rights of the wife in reference to divorce became equal to those of the husband, and until the wife had as much right to demand chastity of the husband, as the husband had to demand it of the wife. It being impossible to foretell the future form of the family, it is equally impossible to foretell the manner of the solution of the divorce problem. I am convinced, however, that it will not consist in greater and severer legal restraint, because such has never proven to be an effective means of reform and betterment of conditions, much less of the improvement of morals. Whenever moral doctrines, as expressed by law, custom or prejudice, come into conflict with the material or intellectual needs of man and his desire for happiness morality will suffer as long as the conflict lasts.

Considering that the future form of the family will necessarily be the result of a slow and gradual process of evolution, it is not impossible that more liberal prac-

tices in respect to divorce will mark one of the early stages of this process. And surely, in proportion to the growth of the possibilities of self-support for women, and their sense of independence, there will be a change in the views in reference to divorce from the orthodox to the liberal.

I am willing to admit without any further investigation that the number of divorces in proportion to the number of marriages is increasing. But this increase is neither cause for astonishment nor for dismay. Indeed, I think it would be quite remarkable if it were otherwise, and while the fact in itself may be regrettable, it is perhaps, after all, a sign of progress. It is the unavoidable consequence of an economic condition which draws women in constantly increasing numbers into the economic life of the nation, daily opens for them more fields for economic activity, and produces in women a steadily growing feeling of independence and ability to provide for themselves. As a result thereof considerably fewer of them are willing to bear the burden and torture of unhappy marriage, and the number of women who feel themselves strong enough to insist upon their natural right of happiness is daily growing. Under former modes of production and economic conditions, the only career which was open for a woman who had not shelter and support in the home of the parent or husband, was that of a domestic servant, or servant to the person of the employer. Such services are to most American women so distasteful that they understand without explanation why, when no other alternative existed, unhappily married women, no matter how great their misery was, bore their misfortune patiently and submissively. But conditions are different now. Our social

and economic arrangements compel millions of women to seek a livelihood for themselves, no matter with what difficulties they meet. Success is the hope of most of them, and it is absolutely useless to fight against the logical consequences of the self-reliance resulting therefrom. Any artificial restraints directed against the natural consequences of existing conditions, must necessarily result in evil.

The evolution of economics will produce new forms of social institutions, and moral views compatible with the new forms. But even while the old views prevail we need not be governed by doctrines, which, as we can clearly see, are no longer in harmony with existing conditions, nor is it prudent to force a religious element into mere social or personal relations. Divorce, although always an individual problem, would not be a social problem at all, if it were not made one by superstition, bigotry and intolerance. There is a remarkable inconsistency between the treatment of marriage and that of divorce by society. The first, although being the far more important, is treated with much less care and consideration. That society has an interest in marriage need not be questioned. For from marriage springs the future human being, and although our knowledge of the laws of heredity is very limited, yet we know that it is an active and influential force in the modeling of man. Divorce, however, possesses no creative force. If society has any interest at all in it, it is infinitely small, and I believe that the increase in the number of divorces is, to a certain extent, and irrespective of the causes for which it is sought, a sign of a gradual emancipation of the thought, that others always know better what is good for a person than that person himself.

The time will surely come when, for hygienic as well as for moral reasons, two persons, irrespective of sex will not sleep in one room, much less in one bed; when the same degree of modesty will prevail between husband and wife as between strangers of opposite sex, so that charms and beauty will not lose their effect by force of habit. The time will surely come, when husband and wife will be as desirous of pleasing and appearing beautiful to each other, as if they were still trying to win each other; when the wife will dress well even for her husband alone, and when no husband will return from his work to his home begrimed with the dust and dirt of the workshop, thereby offending the aesthetic sense of his wife. The time will come when married life will be a life of continuous courtship, without which it is absolutely senseless to expect the strength of love between husband and wife to remain unimpaired during their whole life. The time will come when the family home will be a sanctuary of cleanliness of soul, mind and body, and contentment and happiness not be undermined by care and crime-breeding uncertainty of existence or lust of gold. Then there will be fewer divorces.

It is needless to say that such a condition is impossible while the present economic system prevails. A system which throws every one upon his own individual resources, making as a rule the possession of some wealth the condition sine qua non for the acquisition of more wealth, creating at the same time extreme poverty alongside of extreme wealth, and making the poverty of one class the source of wealth of the other, compelling the one to produce the other's wealth, is absolutely incapable of producing general happiness

and an ideal state of morality. It is really a question what is more demoralizing, great wealth or great poverty. Perhaps great wealth creates more frivolity, and great poverty more vulgarity, but both are equally destructive of good morals and the happiness of famliy life, and equally productive of causes for divorce. But far more demoralizing and destructive of real happiness than either wealth or poverty, is the system which makes the manipulator of wealth rich and the creator of it poor, the system which makes gain and accumulation of wealth almost the sole object of life. We may be sure that wherever we find symptoms of evil in modern society, the original cause of it is most always to be found in this system.

V.

Prostitution.

"The Social Evil" is the title of a book published under the direction of "The Committee of Fifteen," appointed in the fall of 1900 by the chamber of commerce of the city of New York. It commences with the following lines: "Prostitution is a phenomenon coextensive with civilized society. Barbarous and semi-barbarous peoples have at times been free from it. The ancient Germans, we are told, tolerated no prostitution in their midst; and there are said to be Siberian and African tribes to-day of which the same thing is true. But no sooner has a people attained a moderate degree of civilization than this social curse has fallen upon it; nor has any race reached a point of moral elevation where this form of vice has disappeared. . . ." "Like the pauper, the prostitute is a creature of civilization, and like the pauper, will continue to thrust her undesirable presence upon society."

While this is true in the main, yet it must be accepted with some modification. For it is not civilization per se that is the mother of prostitution, but the economic conditions as they have developed in connection with civilization. It would be sad indeed, if we were forced to conclude that civilization will never be able to cast from it that terrible companion. Fortunately, civilization is not dependent on the continued existence of the prevailing economic system, and we may reasonably entertain

the hope that some future time will witness the death of prostitution.

It is certain that religious prostitution, that is prostitution as a religious rite, as it was practiced by the Assyrians, Babylonians and other semitic nations, even among the ancient Hebrews, is not known to have prevailed in an earlier period than that of the upper status of barbarism, or in the beginning of civilization. Yet, when and how it originated, we do not know. From an economic standpoint, however, there is nothing in it akin to modern prostitution.

We are informed by ancient writers that in primitive Rome and Egypt girls sold their favors prior to marriage in order to procure a dowry, and that this practice was not considered dishonorable. (In Japan a similar custom is still prevalent.) In this case the purpose is proof that it took place in an advanced state of cultural progress, for in earlier stages women were not required to have a dowry, the husband rather paying for his wife. It was quite late in the progress of civilization, when prostitution became a vocation and its followers social outcasts.

Even if we did not know quite well that the sense of modesty and the obligation of chastity as a moral conception are the product of the evolution of the human race, and almost unknown in the lowest stages of savagery, we could not for a moment seek the reason for the absence of prostitution among savages and barbarians in their higher state of morality. Although we are apt to misconstrue many of their customs, it would be absurd to ascribe to them a moral sense so much higher developed than that of civilization, that it would exclude the possibility of prostitution.

There can be no question about the moral sentiment in reference to prostitution. Through all the centuries of its existence moral sentiment has become more and more inimical to it without being able to expurgate it. Consequently there must be a force in human society stronger than the moral force. Undoubtedly there are cases of perversity and uncontrolableness of natural impulses, but such cases are not numerous enough to account for the fearful extent of prostitution. Such cases excepted, I doubt whether a single prostitute can be found, who would not a thousand times prefer a life of decency and respectability to a life of shame, if she were not prevented by the adversity of economic conditions.

It is in the difference of the economic conditions where we have to search for the reason of the absence of prostitution among savages and barbarians and its presence in civilization. There was no place for it in a society which had no economic classes; it cannot exist where there are no rich and no poor. The tribal relations and the gentile organization with its communistic arrangements offered no soil for the growth of that detestable institution. Nor would the form of the family existing then permit of its appearance. The soil was prepared for it with the introduction of private ownership in land with all its economic and social consequences.

Mr. Alvin S. Johnson, assistant professor of economics at Columbia University the author of the aforementioned book, who has carefully investigated the subject says: "In the first place there is a large class of women who may be said to have been trained for prostitution from earliest childhood. Foundlings and orphans

and the offspring of the miserably poor, they grow up in wretched tenements, contaminated by constant familiarity with vice in its lowest forms. Without training, moral or mental, they remain ignorant and disagreeable, slovenly and uncouth, good for nothing in the social organism. When half matured, they fall the willing victims of their male associates, and inevitably drift into prostitution."

"Another form is closely connected with the appearance of women in industry. In many cities there are great classes of women without any resources excepting their earnings as needle-women, day workers, domestics or factory hands. These earnings are often so small as barely to suffice for the urgent needs of the day. A season of non-employment presents them with the alternative of starvation or prostitution. These form the 'occasional prostitutes,' who, according to Blaschko (an eminent German physician and writer on this subject) far outnumber all others in the city of Berlin. When employment is again to be had, they withdraw from the life of shame, if its irregularities have not incapacitated them for honorable labor."

"A third class, one which is more or less typical of American prostitution, is made up of those who cannot be said to be driven into prostitution either by absolute want or by exceptionally pernicious surroundings. They may be employed at living wages, but the prospect of continuing from year to year with no change from tedious and irksome labor creates discontent and eventually rebellion. They, too, are impregnated with the view that individual happiness is the end of life, and their lives bring them no happiness and promise them none. The circumstances of city life make it possible for them

to experiment with immorality without losing such social standing, as they may have, and thus many of them drift gradually into professional prostitution."

The prostitute is the helpless victim of modern economic conditions, not industry alone. Among the hundreds of thousands of saleswomen and typewriters there are comparatively few who receive a compensation sufficient for their support. Fortunate are those of them who have parents, or other relatives with whom they can live. I know of a large retail house, whose proprietor in several cases, when the girl asking a situation, said that she could not live on the wages offered, answered with the cynical question: "Have you no male friend to help you out?"

Undoubtedly there is, as Mr. Johnson says, a large class of women, growing up in contaminating, wretched surroundings, in poverty and vice. Poverty, however, is the crime of society, a crime for which no individual in particular can be held responsible. Our economic system produces poverty with absolute certainty. There may always be reasons why poverty strikes certain persons, reasons which by no means, always make the person blameless, but as a general rule, the reasons are beyond individual control, and if it is not the one person, that remains poor, it will be another. Without the presence of a poor class the wage system could not exist and the existence of poverty is the inevitable consequence of an economic system in which millions are compelled to compete with each other for employment bringing not more than a bare living. With equally unerring certainty, however, poverty breeds vice and crime.

Equally of an economic character as the reasons are

which operate on women so as to cause them to offer themselves in prostitution, are those which create the "demand." "A great part of the population of a modern city," says Mr. Johnston, "consists of young men who have drifted thither from the country and small towns, attracted by the greater opportunities of rising in social life and by the greater degree of personal comfort that the city offers. As a rule, the income that a young man earns, while sufficient to secure a fair degree of comfort for himself, does not suffice for founding a family. As his income increases, his standard of personal comfort rises, accordingly he postpones marriage until a date in the indefinite future, or abandons expectation of it altogether. His interests center almost wholly in himself. He is responsible to no one but himself. The pleasures that he may obtain from day to day become the chief end of his life. It is not unnatural, then, that the strongest native impulse of man should find expression in the only way open to it — indulgence in vice..... The problem of masculine vice, it will be seen, is an integral part of that infinitely complex problem, the "Social Question."

Having discussed this phase of sexual relation in the chapter on the family, I need not discuss it again. But a few words in reference to the drifting of young men from the country and small towns into the larger cities are in place here. The rapid growth of the cities and the gradual depopulation of the country is a modern phenomenon. We meet with this shifting of population in all civilized countries which have an extensive industry. The young men do not drift into the cities, they are driven there. Industrial and commercial establishments locate in large cities, which offer to them many

advantages, especially facilities of transportation. Modern industry requires the concentration of a large army of workingmen and workingwomen at one point, so that periodical discharge and re-employment create no embarrassment. At the same time the use of modern agricultural implements and machinery is constantly increasing, and in proportion to its increase the number of human hands required for agricultural work grows smaller. Undoubtedly the opportunities of social life and the greater degree of personal comfort, as well as the pleasures which the city offers, are a strong attraction, but not strong enough to depopulate the country in the measure in which it is depopulated. It is lack of opportunity of employment which is the cause of the steady pilgrimage of the rural population toward the city. It is an economic cause pure and simple; the growth of the urban population and the consequential decrease of the rural population are the direct effect of modern industrialism. The factories locate in or near the large cities, the merchant, the banker, the insurance company, and so forth, follow, and after them comes the great throng of employment seekers, many of whom remain unemployed even in the most prosperous times, although the personnel of the unemployed constantly changes.

To describe the moral effect of this massing together of hundreds of thousands of people in a comparatively small area is hardly necessary. In the country and the small town everybody knows everybody else, everybody is under the observation of his neighbor and under the influence of his neighbor's opinion. In the large city the individual disappears in the mass, one frequently does not know one's next door neighbors; one does not

look after the private life of even one's close friends, and a few minutes' ride brings one to parts of a city where one is as much a stranger as in another part of the world. Thus, moral transgression may be easily concealed and prostitution immensely facilitated. But all of this is merely secondary. The primary cause of prostitution is in the economic system. Newspapers may write against it, clergymen may preach against it, sociologists and physicians may point out its dangers to society and public health, lawmakers and police officials may unite their efforts in attempts to regulate or suppress it, it will all be in vain as long as our present economic system lasts. Because an economic system which results in a condition of extreme wealth and extreme poverty side by side, in a condition of extreme precariousness of existence for millions of people, especially women, and in a condition which produces a steady decrease of the number of marriages by reason of positive or relative inability to support a family, is bound to produce prostitution. Even if the death penalty were meted out for it, that could no more prevent prostitution than in the time of queen Elizabeth the hanging and branding of vagabonds could prevent vagabondage. And just as in the middle ages vagabondage, as produced by feudal institutions was the prolific source of prostitution, so it is in our times the cheerless, uncertain and generally hopeless condition of the wage workers, as produced by modern economic institutions.

A discussion of the effects of prostitution, or of laws and police measures by which its obtrusiveness and its dangers may be lessened, is foreign to the objects of this book. The New York Committee of Fifteen recommends the treatment of prostitution as a sin, not as

a crime, and as an outline of a policy toward minimizing its evil submits the following:

"First, strenuous efforts to prevent in the tenement houses the overcrowding which is the prolific source of sexual immorality. The attempts to provide better housing for the poor, praiseworthy and deserving of recognition as they are, have as yet produced but a feeble impression upon existing conditions, and are but the bare beginnings of a work which should be enlarged and continued with unflagging vigor and devotion. If we wish to abate the social evil, we must attack it at its source.

Secondly, the furnishing, by public provision or private munificence, of purer and more elevating forms of amusement to supplant the attractions of the low dance halls, theaters and other similar places of entertainment that only serve to stimulate sensuality and to debase the taste. The pleasures of the people need to be looked after far more earnestly than has been the case hitherto.

I may add in this connection that I have frequently wondered why self-respecting women do not raise an effective protest against the grossly indelicate and offensive pictures which are posted by a certain class of theaters. They serve a mean purpose and are an insult to every decent woman.

Thirdly, whatever can be done to improve the material conditions of the wage earning women, will be directly in line with the purpose which is here kept in view. It is a sad and humiliating admission to make, at the opening of the twentieth century, in one of the greatest centers of civilization in the world, that in numerous instances, it is not passion, or corrupt inclination

but the force of actual physical want, that impels young women to go along the road to ruin."

Although the committee makes these recommendations especially for the city of New York, they are equally good for any other city, and perhaps include everything that can be done in the way of melioration and reform, as long as the banishment of the evil is an impossibility.

VI.

The State.

To us who live in the twentieth century, nothing will appear more simple and natural than the existence of the state, so much so that few of us can imagine that there ever was a time in which such an institution did not exist. Much less are they able to apprehend the possibility of the ending of this institution. To them social and civil order has ever appeared in the form of state government, they are unable to conceive of any other order, and the absence of state government is in their minds equivalent to anarchy. To the student of history and ethnography, however, the state is not more than one form in the evolution of the organization of human society. It had a beginning and may have an end. The student easily comprehends that at some future time the State may be supplanted by another and probably higher and better form of organization.

The State is an agglomeration of human individuals, located and domiciled within a certain territory, under laws and regulations having force only within that territory, irrespective of the personal relations of those individuals. It owes its birth to the growth of the institution of private ownership in land, and the increase of chattel property and private property interests in general, the protection of which became its principal function. The ancient gentile organization, based upon personal relations only, was efficient enough for the pro-

tection of persons, but was too feeble for the protection of property interests which at the beginning of civilization had become vast, numerous and complicated. It must by no means be supposed that the State supplanted the ancient personal organization at a given moment in a perfected condition. On the contrary, it grew up by degrees. It took centuries of wrestling and battling with the evils of the time until the solution of the, what we might call social problem, was found in the creation of political government, founded upon territory. In all probability the solution of our own social problem will likewise not be the result of a sudden discovery or invention, but rather of continued successive application of many remedies with more or less incomplete effect.

The transition from an organization founded upon person to an organization founded upon territory, was too great a revolution, as to have by any possibility taken place all at once. One of the steps leading up to the creation of the state was the recognition of the economic classes by the law, making them political classes by distributing among them in different proportions the powers of government.

The ancient purely democratic institutions had disappeared long before the creation of the state. With the introduction of private ownership in land and of slavery complete democracy became an impossibility. Grecian democracy, which we hear so exultingly praised by historians, was really no democracy in the modern sense of the word, because it embraced only part of the people. Those who did the work of the nation did not belong to the "demos," that is the people, but were property. So it was with the "populus romanus." Slaves and those belonging to subjected tribes or nations be-

came no part of the ruling tribe and were accorded no civil rights in the state for a long time.

The state started out with political classes already existing, their creation was a step preparatory to its own creation. The economic class is not like the political class the manifestation of the human will, it is the creature of conditions. Whenever and wherever the economic conditions are of such a nature that they create differences of wealth, those possessing great wealth grow into power and influence by the mere operation of conditions, whereafter by the mere effect of human nature, they use their power and influence toward preserving the institutions from which they derive both wealth and power. They shape legislation in their own favor and create political classes by recognizing the economic classes. The economic class is the fundamental basis of the political class. Whenever an economic class receives governmental prerogatives by legislation, it becomes a political class.

In England, the political classes were called states, in France états, in Germany Stände. "The lay part of his majesty's subjects, or such as are not comprehended under the denomination of clergy, may be divided," says Blackstone, "into three distinct states, the civil, the military, and the maritime. The civil state consists of the nobility and the commonalty. The nobility consists of dukes, marquesses, earls, viscounts and barons," the commonalty of knights of the garter (and some other kinds of knights), esquires, yeomen, tradesmen and so forth.

Already in the mythical time of Theseus, long before the establishment of the Athenian state, the Athenians were divided into three classes, the Eupatridae or "well

born," the Geomori or husbandmen and the Demiurgi or artisans, with the rights and powers of each well defined. But under Solon a new division was made, not according to callings, but according to property owned. The people were divided into four classes according to the measure of their wealth; each class was invested with certain powers, and upon each were imposed certain obligations. Of these four classes, those only belonging to the first were eligible to the high offices, the others performed different grades of military service, and were eligible to minor offices. Military services in those times were considered more of a privilege than a duty, only freemen being allowed to bear arms. To the first class, called "Pentakosiomedimnoi" (500-measure-men) belonged those who harvested at least five hundred measures (medimnoi) of barley or a quantity of oil or wine of the same value, which was estimated equal to a taxing capital of six thousand drachms. To the second class belonged those harvesting from three hundred to five hundred measures of barley, considered equivalent to a capital of thirty-six hundred drachms; they were called Hippeis (knights, horsemen). The third class, the Zeugitai, harvested from a hundred and fifty to three hundred measures of barley and possessed a team of mules; eighteen hundred drachms was considered the value of their possessions; the fourth class, the Thetes had a yield of less than one hundred and fifty measures. The division into districts of the Athenian territory followed soon after by the legislation of Cleisthenes.

Rome entered upon its state career in a quite similar manner. By the legislation, known as that of Servius Tullius in the sixth century before Christ, and very soon

after the legislation of Solon in Attica, the people were divided into five classes, and the city was divided into districts for governmental purposes. The division into classes was made according to the value of their property, and each class was possessed of a certain number of votes in the popular assembly. The people voted by centuries, each century having one vote. The number of centuries, of which there were altogether one hundred and ninety-three, was arbitrarily fixed for each class, without regard to the actual number of members, and it was so arranged that the wealthiest class had the largest number of centuries and a majority of all the votes.

The first class consisted of those who had a fortune of one hundred thousand aces, equal to about sixteen hundred dollars, and formed, together with eighteen centuries of equites, or heavily armed horsemen, ninety-eight centuries; they had that many votes out of one hundred and ninety-three. The second class, with a fortune of seventy-five thousand aces, counted twenty centuries; the third, to which belonged those with a fortune of fifty thousand aces, counted also twenty centuries; the fifth with twelve thousand five hundred aces was divided into thirty centuries. All these centuries had to serve in war and provide for their own armaments, which were according to the class of different character. To the second class belonged also two centuries of artisans; namely, sword-smiths and carpenters, and to the fourth class belonged two centuries of horn-blowers and trumpeters. The rest of the people, called proletarians (possessors of children), all of them together formed one century, had consequently only one

vote in the popular assembly, and neither paid taxes, nor served in war.

The figures show that fortunes were small, compared with those of our times, and the valuations according to the yield in barley, oil or wine are instructive in reference to what the principal occupations were.

In a certain sense new legislation is always the recognition of already existing conditions. It is not to be supposed that either the legislation of Solon, or that of Servius Tullius had been possible, if wealth had not already had gradually and steadily gained for its owners so much power and influence that the new order did not materially change the prevalent conditions, but only gave legal sanction to the more subtle effect of conditions, and brought order into chaos. At any rate, we are not able to learn, either from history or tradition, that at the time of this legislation there was any violent opposition to it, which would, in all probability, have been the case, if the power and influence of the wealthy classes had not already existed without such legislation. Probably the idea of "noblesse oblige" had already then entered into the minds of the legislators, wherefore expensive duties were imposed on the new political classes, and the military duties were assigned to them with regard to the costliness of the outfit. In Greece, for instance, the second class had to serve as cavalry, the third as heavily armed infantry, while the fourth had to bear light arms.

The economic classes existed and obtained political prerogatives, in Greece as well as in Rome, prior to the creation of the state, thereby being transformed into political classes, and the state based its governmental arrangements on their existence. More than two thousand

years later it discovered that, for the use of the power and influence of wealth, the political class was of no necessity at all, and that a wealthy economic class may be powerful and influential enough to rule a country without legal privileges.

Although prior to the institution of private ownership in land, and the use of agricultural products as articles of trade and commerce, there were persons of greater influence than others, and, perhaps possessing certain privileges, these privileges never extended so far as to give those persons a greater share in the fruits of labor or war. They gave honor and influence but not wealth. And although even then theoretically elective positions of chiefs or leaders in war remained very often as a matter of custom in one family, yet, such favorable positions were generally the result of personal service and distinction, and so long as there was a community of material interests, and therefore, private fortunes could not be accumulated, no conditions existed which could produce classes. Such conditions arose after the establishment of private ownership in land.

The political classes once established, did, of course, everything in their power for the purpose of securing themselves in their commanding position. A French adage says: l'appetit vient en mangeant. The more privileges they had, the more they wanted. They owed their position to wealth, and they soon found that to maintain themselves in it and to increase their privileges they required more wealth. Consequently they did what was quite natural for them to do, they used their privileges to enrich themselves. They made wars of conquest, subjected whole nations, appropriated their land and made the people their slaves. Land and slaves

were the principal property in the ancient world, and also the principal means of production. Possession of land and slaves gave power. History teaches us that in all times those who possessed most of the things which at the time formed the wealth of the country, constituted the ruling class.

In slavery times when slaves formed the principal kind of property, the slave holders were the ruling class. In the middle ages when land was the principal kind of property, the land possessing class, the feudal lords, were the ruling class; and in our times the capitalists are the ruling class, because of the power of the capital which they possess.

In the beginning the power was exercised under the forms of democracy. Greece as well as Rome entered statehood as democracies. This assertion may seem contrary to Roman history, but history has in all probability made a mistake by calling the Greek basileus and the Roman rex kings. They surely were no kings in the modern sense of the word. Although it is not quite clear what their functions were, their powers were certainly very limited. The basileus and the rex were chiefs in war and performed, probably, judicial and clerical functions besides. I have no doubt that their offices were very much like that of the Hebrew shofet, which is translated with judge, a translation which seems to me arbitrary and misleading. For what we learn of the judges in the scriptures points much more to military than to judicial functions. There is no more justification for translating names of offices than there is for translating names of persons. By giving an ancient office a modern name, we impart to it a modern character which it did not have. The modern concep-

tion of king is quite different from even the ancient German and Anglo-Saxon conception of it. The old Saxon word for it was cuning, and the Anglo-Saxon cyng. Its derivation is from the Saxon cunni, meaning family, or house in a personal sense. The Saxon cunni was probably the same institution as the Roman gens or the Grecian genos, so that presumably, the cyng was not more than the chief of a cunni, or gens. From "Historia Franconium" (history of the Franks) by Gregory, bishop of Tours, we learn that even as late as in the sixth century the Franconian kings were powerless in almost everything without the assent of the assembly of the free Franks. We are told of king Chilperich that he once claimed from the booty of war a vessel, taken from a church, for himself for the purpose of returning it to the church, whereupon a common warrior stepped from the ranks, told the king that he could have no more than what fell to him by lot and smashed the vessel with his battle ax. The king was helpless, but later on took his revenge.

Gradually the forms of democracy were cast aside and monarchical institutions were firmly established. More and more, legislation was directed toward keeping the masses of the people in poverty and making them believe that the little they had, they owed to the good will and generosity of the upper classes. The evolution of the principle of class-government, coupled with the institution of slavery culminated in Rome politically in Caesarism, and economically in the creation of latifundia, or immense landed estates, in the hands of a comparatively small class. The mass of the people consisted partly of slaves and partly of absolutely property-

less citizens and non-producing free proletarians maintained at public cost.

Somewhat similar was the course of development in Russia where Caesarism exists to this day, but is gradually undermined by the growth of modern industry, the workingmen being the most rebellious of the Tsar's subjects.

Under the frightful conditions growing up under Roman Caesarism, slave labor soon proved not productive enough and with the fall of the Roman empire and the rise of German power came the creation of the feudal state in which theoretically all the land belonged to the king, who was at the top of the feudal ladder, while at the foot of it there was the great mass of landless and propertyless workers.

Far up into the middle ages land-hunger was one of the characteristics of the privileged classes, because land was still the principal kind of property. It was as late as in the fifteenth century that in England the enclosure of the commons began. Up to that time there were still many lands in the kingdom held in common and used for agriculture and pasturage, upon which thousands and thousands made their living. Bacon in his "Henry VIII" says: "Enclosures at that time began to be more frequent, whereby arable land which could not be manured without people and families was turned into pasture, which was easily rid by a few herdsmen; and the tenancies for years, lives, and at will, whereupon much of the yeomanry lived, were turned into demesnes."

"Therefore," says Thomas More in the preface to his Utopia, "that one covetous and insatiable cormorant and very plague of his native country may compass

about and enclose many thousands acres of ground together within one pale or hedge, the husbandmen be thrust out of their own, or else by coveyn and fraud, or by violent oppression, they be put besides it, or by wrongs and injustices they be so worried that they be compelled to sell all; by one means therefore, or by other, either by hook or by crook, they must needs depart away poor, silly, wretched souls, men, women, husbands, wives, fatherless children, widows, woeful mothers with their young babes, and their whole household, small in substance, and much in number, as husbandry requireth many hands. All their household stuff, which is worth very little, they be constrained to sell for a thing of naught. And when they have wandered about till that be spent, what can they than else do but steal, and then justly, pardy, be hanged or else go about a begging? And yet then, also, they be cast into prisons as vagabonds, because they go about and work not; whom no man will set a work though they never so willingly proffer themselves thereto. For one shepherd or herdman is enough to eat up that ground with cattle to the occupying whereof about husbandry many hands were requisite."

Thus did the ruling classes in England steal even the land of their own people, in a time when agriculture was the principal pursuit, and then flogged, imprisoned, branded and hanged vagabonds and beggars.

Although history does not disclose any violent opposition against the establishment of privileged classes, yet sometime after their establishment the inevitable and endless class-struggles began and continued in different forms, as economic conditions changed, up to and within our own time. There were periods when they

culminated in open rebellion, violent insurrection or great revolution. The slave-revolt under Spartacus and the frequent violent outbreaks between patricians and plebeians in Rome, the great uprisings of the peasants in the middle ages almost everywhere in Europe, the insurrections under Wat Tyler, Jack Cade and Robert Kett in England, the revolution of 1789 in France, etc., are specimens of the culminations of the everlasting class-struggles.

The progress of the world and the growth of civilization marked the development of a new economic class, that of the craftsmen. The artisan gained in importance as wealth, luxury and comfort increased. In the growing cities they gradually became a power and, by acquiring prerogatives and privileges, a distinct political class, which grew in wealth and influence, as the cities freed themselves from the power of the feudal lords. It was not yet the time when a purely economic class could rule without privileges. For, the methods of production were still too simple. The work was done by handicraft, the tools were few, simple and easily accessible, and the principal means of production was the producer's skill. Gradually, however, conditions changed. First there came a change in the immediate object of production.

Originally, the object of production was home-consumption. In earlier times the producer consumed his own product, and an exchange took place only when the fruits of one's toil exceeded the producer's own needs. Man produced what he needed for himself. This mode of production was in course of time so thoroughly revolutionized that the producer of to-day does not produce that which he needs, but that which he does not need

himself. The modern producer produces what he cannot consume himself. He produces for sale and buys with the proceeds what he intends to consume. He seldom knows the consumer of his product and does not personally come in contact with him. The craftsman and artisan of the middle ages did not produce for their own consumption either, but they produced directly for the consumer, whom they knew and who was their customer.

As early as in the fourteenth century we find production for the purpose of exchange and commerce; goods were even carried from one country into the other. It sounds quite strange when we read to-day that England sold wool, hides and grain to the wealthy cities of Flanders, and took wine, oil, spices and certain manufactured goods in exchange for them. The ships of the great Mediterranean republics often found their way to English ports. These republics established overland routes between India and Europe and carried the products of one continent to the other. The exchange of goods received an immense impetus by the remarkable discoveries of the fifteenth century; in 1492 that of the West Indies, in 1497 that of Newfoundland and Florida, in the same year that of the ocean way around the Cape of Good Hope, in 1499 that of Brazil. Then followed in the early part of the sixteenth century the conquests of Cuba, Mexico and Peru, during which it became quite doubtful who were the real savages, the conquerors or the vanquished, for the conduct of the civilized Christian Spaniards was certainly more savage and barbaric than that of the heathenish aborigines. Very often it seems to me that even to this day the savage nature of man is still slumbering in civilized man, and is awakened and

drawn from its recess by the lust for gold. Modern civilization falls into hysterics at the sight of individual misfortune or great accidental calamity, and at the same time goes into man-killing wars of conquest, starts colonies in murderous climates, treats their original inhabitants with cruel barbarism, sends soldiers there to be either slain or killed by malaria; and does it merely for the purpose of extending trade and making large profits. All of which would be, of course, impossible, if there were not a propertyless class, ready at all times to do the work of the property holding class, no matter of what nature it is, and if the mode of production was not such that it produces and constantly reproduces such a poor class.

The building of better ships and the discovery of the advantages which lay in the division of labor was followed by a slow and gradual, but steady, growth of industry and commerce. Great wealth was accumulated, and history has preserved the names of some great commercial houses, such as the Welsers and the Fuggers in Augsburg, who possessed fabulous riches. But then came the era of great inventions, the utilization of forces of nature, hitherto unknown, the wonderful progress of chemistry, the facilitation of commerce by new means of transportation, and industry and commerce took on proportions which threw everything that existed before into insignificance.

This stupendous growth and expansion had a remarkable effect on the classes. It produced that purely economic class which to-day rules over all civilized countries, and abolished or rendered insignificant the political or privileged classes. It was a simple economic process. It was the necessary and unavoidable effect

of the separation of the producer from the means of production. The invention of the steam engine marked the final outgoing of the artisan's shop and the firm establishment of the factory system, a process which had already begun with the introduction of systematic division of labor. The means, or say tools, of production grew more expensive from day to day; it was not any longer within the possibilities of everybody to procure them, and the great mass of the producers became wage-workers. In proportion as capital grew, it needed more freedom for its undertakings, and it brushed aside with a powerful hand all legal restraints and restrictions. Class privileges had become a hindrance to the operations of capital. It needed as workers men and women free in the sale of their labor force. It therefore invented, and raised to a great moral principle, the doctrine of free trade, meaning perfect freedom of trade, the Manchester theory of "laissez faire, laissez aller." It said to the government: "Hands off from my operations," and forced the government to protect it in its freedom of operation, violating without any scruples its own principles by the institution of protective and even prohibitive tariff-duties where it suited its purposes.

When the philosophy of the second half of the eighteenth century promulgated "les droits de l'homme," the inalienable rights of man, as they were called in the American declaration of independence, it had not discovered a new moral principle, but stated in the form of a moral rule what had become the economic necessity of the time. It was not the great moral principle of the right of a nation to legislate for itself that started the American revolution, but it was the practical eco-

nomic principle of no taxation without representation which did it.

In the French revolution as well as in the American, it was the "bourgeoisie," the possessing class, that was the revolutionary element. The revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were all "bourgeois" revolutions, having for their objects the abolition of the prerogatives of the privileged classes, the "states," the "états," the "stände." There existed as yet no economic class which ruled without legal privileges. The signers of the declaration of independence honestly believed that the extinction of political classes was all that was needed to establish "liberty, equality and fraternity," and that a republican form of government was perfectly sufficient to establish a permanent era of general happiness. The power and influence of purely economic classes was unknown to them; it was not thought that a class could rule the state without being by the law especially empowered to do so. The mode of philosophy in those times was entirely deductive, and the greatest thinkers believed in the truth and power of a priori principles. They could see no reason why, if all men were declared free and equal and a constitutional and legal edifice was erected upon that proposition, all men should not really be free and equal and enjoy the fruits of freedom and equality as established in constitutional maxims and legal formulae. The power of wealth was for them so completely concealed behind the easily observable power of class-privilege, the economic class was so completely veiled by the privileged class, and the belief that the elimination of legal class-privileges was bound of necessity to be followed by the acme of freedom was so strong, that they surrounded the con-

stitution of the newly created Union with almost unconquerable guards.

It is almost needless to say that the freedom which a Thomas Jefferson and a Patrick Henry had in their minds, and which they felt sure of creating, does not to-day exist. If they had been told that in consequence of, and under the protection of the freedom established by them, a class would grow up which, without titles and privileges, would rule the country by sheer force of wealth and economic conditions, and that the class, suffering under this rule, would find in the constitution of the United States, built upon those principles of freedom, an obstacle in their struggle for bettering their condition; if they had been told that their maxims of liberty, as laid down in the constitution, would, in some future time, receive an interpretation which through theories of property and contract rights, would handicap a lower class in its struggle for freedom, they would not have comprehended it, and if they had, would not have found means to prevent it. Yet, such is the case to-day, and the class which rules by sheer force of wealth, without titles and privileges, exists, not only in this country, but in all civilized countries. It rules whether the form of government is republican or monarchical, whether titles exist or not, whether political classes still retain a shadow of their former prerogatives or not. Where this class exists, kingly power has been so reduced that the principal difference between a modern monarchy and a modern republic is only this, that in the one the office of the chief of the nation is hereditary, in the other elective. As a matter of principle I certainly prefer the republican form of government to the monarchical. My sentiment, indeed, is thoroughly republican, but I do not

believe, as many seem to believe, that republican forms alone are sufficient to guarantee any degree of liberty. Our republican forms did not prevent us from maintaining through a whole century of our independence the institution of slavery, nor do they prevent us to-day from establishing imperial government over foreign peoples. In the republic of France titles are still existing and the middle and South American republics are mere parodies on republicanism. It was not different in ancient times. The democratical institutions of Greece and its republican forms of government, as well as those of primitive Rome, formed no obstacle to the maintenance of slavery. The laws of Draco in the ancient republic of Attica were said to have been written with blood, the republic of Venice had a government as despotic as one can be imagined and that of Genoa was thoroughly aristocratic. Upon the other hand, as to the peoples' rights and liberty, there is very little material difference between the constitutional monarchies of Europe and the modern republics. The German emperor cannot veto any law passed by the Reichstag and the Bundesrath, but the president of the United States may veto any law passed by Congress. The king of England, after having appointed his council and government, can neither appoint nor remove a civil officer, whereas the president of the United States has the immense prerogative of appointing and removing an army of civil officers. If one considers the enormous influence hidden in this prerogative, it is not too much to say that the president of the United States wields a greater power than most of the European monarchs. On paper, kings, perhaps, possess greater rights in reference to war and peace, whereas the constitution of the United

States lays the power of declaring war exclusively into the hands of Congress. But declarations of war have somewhat gone out of fashion. Wars are, in our days, commenced without declaration, which follows afterwards as a mere matter of form and our president, being the commander-in-chief of the army and navy, as kings and emperors are, has the practical power of making war without waiting for a declaration of war from Congress. Did not the American government participate in the Boxer war in China only a few years ago without ever asking the permission of Congress? Were not, under President Harrison, American marines landed in Honolulu and the country taken possession of without even the knowledge of Congress? The German, the English and the Italian press criticize the government as freely as the American press, only the king's person is protected against insult by severe laws. True, the president is, in this respect, at a disadvantage; the American citizen has the privilege of saying nasty things of the president. This privilege, however, seems to me to be of very doubtful value, and one of which well bred people are not apt to make use anyway.

Gibbon begins the third chapter of his "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire" as follows: "The obvious definition of a monarchy seems to be that of a state in which a single person by whatever name he may be designated, is entrusted with the execution of the laws, the management of the revenue and the command of the army." It seems to me that this definition fits the United States not less than any modern constitutional monarchy.

Further on in the same chapter the great historian says: "The consul or the tribune might have reigned

in peace. The title of the king had armed the Romans against his life. Augustus was sensible that mankind is governed by names."

The distinguishing feature of modern self-government is not the republican but the parliamentary form, including the right of budget, the right of holding the purse-string, the right of taxation and the right of appropriation. This right is held to-day by the people in constitutional monarchies as well as in republics. It is the people's right par excellence, without which all other rights would be of no value whatever. It is the right, the absence of which marks in our days absolutism or despotism as a form of government. Whatever prerogatives the crown may have, as long as the use of them depends on the willingness or unwillingness of the people to bear the expense and to tax themselves with it, the real power, theoretically, is in the hands of the people. The right to grant or refuse taxes and appropriations is of an economic character and is, therefore, entirely in consonance with the character of the economic class which to-day rules the world and presides over the destinies of nations. Even governments like the Russian must bow before it and concede to it at least so much as giving an account of its resources and expenditures, for otherwise it could not borrow a cent. Inability to borrow, however, would be a very serious matter in an age in which state-debts have grown to be permanent institutions. Whatever differences there may be between constitutional monarchies and republics in minor matters, and in matters of form, in this material point they are alike. The absence of political freedom in a people is principally marked by the power of the government to tax the people at will and to use its

resources without accounting for them to the people. It was taxation without representation which caused the American colonies to free themselves from English rule, but the Englishman, who is as liberty-loving as the American, is loyal to the crown. The German government cannot borrow a cent, nobody will loan it a cent, it can spend nothing without the consent of the Reichstag, and compared with this power of the people's representatives, all other matters in which republics may differ from monarchies appear to be mere trifles. Even the hereditary right of the nobility of some European monarchies, as for instance Great Britain and Prussia, to occupy the seats in the upper houses of their legislative bodies, is unable to check the will of those holding the keys to the coffers of the nation.

But the compulsory military service! Is not that an institution, violating every principle of liberty? Perhaps it is, but it is not a distinguishing feature between monarchism and republicanism. Monarchical England has no compulsory military service, and republican France has. And who knows, but we would have it in the United States also, if, instead of forming one great nation, covering almost the whole continent, we formed a half-dozen or dozen nations, each inhabiting a part of our territory, and all being jealous of each other. It is generally acknowledged that municipal government in the European constitutional monarchies is better and more honest than in our republic, that there is less corruption and that politics is cleaner; and as there is no reason to believe that the European is more honest than the American, the reason must be somewhere in our governmental system.

The modern bourgeoisie, a purely economic class

without constitutional prerogatives and legal privileges, possessing the wealth of the nations, manipulating it in industry, commerce and transportation, exploiting physical and intellectual human labor force and the forces of nature as well as the treasures stored up in the bosom of our planet, makes history and shapes the destinies of nations, and, queer enough, does it all in the name of freedom. In those times when land was the chief source of wealth and power, dynasties and powerful families indulged in warfare for the purpose of absorbing the lands of other nations. To-day dynastic wars have almost become an impossibility, because more is to be gained by trading with a nation than by robbing it of its land. The question of the open door has become of greater importance than the question of whose domains a country shall form a part.

The bourgeois class, composed of merchants, manufacturers, bankers, capitalists, etc., the tiers etat, the third estate, as it was called in ante-revolution times of France, has in numerous revolutions in different countries overthrown feudalistic institutions and has become the ruling class of our time. It is sufficient for the purposes of this book to state that it rules in republics and monarchies alike, without entering into a discussion of the psychological and political process of the growth of its power and influence, interesting as the subject might be. A few facts, however, I will mention, too obvious to need any explanation. First, that parliamentarism, coupled even with universal suffrage (women are not yet counted), has not been able to prevent this class from exercising an almost exclusive influence on elections, appointments, legislation, administration of justice and the policy of the government, the large mass of the

people, so far, having consciously or unconsciously submitted to the will of that class. Second, that a ruling class cannot exist without a ruled class, and that, although there are isolated cases of poor workingmen acquiring, under specially fortunate circumstances, great wealth, and thereby rising out of their class, the present mode of production and distribution could not exist without a large class of propertyless men and women, dependent for work and a living upon the class possessing the instruments of labor. Third, that our law takes no knowledge of the existence of economic classes, because such classes have no legal prerogatives; that in the eyes of the law all citizens are free and equal; that legal theories prevail over actual conditions; that the theories of law are out of harmony with actual relations; and that, therefore, freedom and equality are only legal fictions.

The reason for this is that economic conditions change more rapidly than legal and political institutions, the latter following only very slowly the continuous evolution of economics, and adjusting themselves only by degrees and in long intervals to economic changes, often, as history teaches, not without violent convulsions in human society. There can be no question that unrestrained competition produced many evils, yet one would in vain seek for any deep impressions of these evils upon our laws or even upon the tendency of new legislation, except in efforts to suppress child labor.

Legislation of the last century is all based upon the theory that competition is an unmixed blessing. Although it has been quite evident for some time that the tendency of economic evolution is toward its elimination, legislation fails to see in the uninterrupted and irresistible

growth of concentration and combination in commerce and industry a general social movement. It insists upon proceeding on the old theory of the necessity and usefulness of competition, and instead of adjusting itself to the new conditions, it attempts to oppose them and to preserve institutions beyond which the development of economic conditions has advanced.

As a consequence thereof we are witnesses to the peculiar phenomenon that under legal maxims of freedom and equality, conditions are defended and upheld which practically destroy freedom and equality, because these maxims owe their existence to economic conditions no longer prevalent. When the constitution of this country was formed, a century and a quarter ago, America was an agricultural country. There were no steam engines, no gas engines, no electric motors; there were no locomotives, no railroads, no steamships, no street cars. Mills and factories, such as now fill our country, existed nowhere. We exported some natural products and imported most articles of industry. What a tremendous change within not much more than a century! If the framers of our constitution would rise from their graves, they would not know the face of the country in which they were born, lived and died. Considering the different economic positions of employer and employed, it appears almost impossible to frame any law affecting both equally. Yet, when any legislative attempt is made to remedy a condition recognized as injurious to the freedom of action of the *employee,* the remedy, in the nature of things, injuriously affecting the *employer's* freedom of action, is rejected by the courts as class legislation, or as violating the freedom of contract. That is to say, the *law* is not allowed to

interfere with the freedom of action in order to leave undisturbed the interference of *conditions* with the freedom of action. An anomaly which necessarily must result from the disharmony between legal theories and practical conditions.

Of course, efforts are constantly made toward the adjustment of both, and numerous are the propositions to counteract the influence of wealth and the power of the ruling economic class. Some of them have been practically tried, as for instance popular legislation by initiative and referendum and depreciation of money, the first being a purely political, the other a purely economic measure. The intitiative and the referendum prevail, although in a somewhat limited measure, in the Swiss republic. The institution may have its merits, but it seems to me that in the present economic order it cannot be made effective. In Switzerland, at least, where the general economic order and the relation between the classes are the same as in every other country with extensive industries, they have not resulted in any substantial changes. Nor could they; for cause and effect cannot be reversed. The social question is not how to do things, but what to do. The mode of legislation is a means, not an end. Purely political measures may be very effective against the power of *political* classes, but not of purely *economic* classes, and can therefore be of much importance only where political rights are not equal to all. There have of late been signs that the people of Switzerland are growing weary of the referendum.

Depreciation of money, or more properly speaking, of coins, as well as the substitution of money-tokens for real money has, as history shows, been frequently re-

sorted to, and has sometimes been of benefit in temporarily bridging over exceptional conditions, especially in times of war, as, for instance, during the American war for independence and the French revolution of 1798. But history does not record the fact that it ever had any lasting beneficial effect on the economic organization of society, or that it ever permanently bettered the condition of the class that needed betterment most. Although a purely economic measure, it does not seem to me to follow the trend of evolution and to be one that would by logical economic necessity come in course of time anyway.

While these two measures have been practically tried, there are other propositions which have never had a practical test. There is the theory of the single tax, whose followers believe that an exclusive land-tax would bring about a condition akin to public ownership of land and thereby revolutionize the entire economic system. Without intending to discuss extensively the merits or demerits of the theories of Henry George, I cannot suppress a few thoughts in reference to it. It would be remarkable, indeed, if a simple fiscal measure, such as taxing only land and nothing else, no matter how high or low the tax-rate may be, should have the effect of completely revolutionizing the complete system of industry, commerce and finance of the present time. I do not believe that even Mr. George's brilliancy of style will ever convince the masses of the people that the power and influence of capital can be broken by freeing it from taxation. Presuming even, though I do not believe it, that the single tax would practically result in the abolition of private ownership in land, leaving, as Mr. George puts it, only the shell to the owner and taking

from him the kernel, I am unable to see that such far-reaching changes in our economic conditions would thereby be produced, as Mr. George thinks there would. It requires the imaginative mind of Henry George to believe that exploitation can be materially affected in the industrial and commercial world by any means which leaves the system of buying labor for its market price and producing and exchanging for profit intact.

I do not recollect whether the word profit can be found at all in Mr. George's book, but I do know that in his theory profit is no special category of income. He still adheres to the ancient and musty theory of wages of superintendence, and treats profit as a species of wages, so that when he speaks of wages, he does not mean merely the price of hired labor, but also the profit of the merchant and manufacturer, the $100,000 or $150,000 salary of the president of a life insurance company, the fee of a corporation lawyer; in fact, everything except interest and rent. An economic theory which fails to recognize profit as one of the pillars on which the prevailing system rests, and fails to distinguish between the wages of the day laborer, the salary of a corporation president and the surplus of a merchant or manufacturer hardly deserves serious consideration.

If at any time, anywhere, the conditions should be ripe for the abolition of private ownership in land, it will in all probability be done in a much more direct way than that of the single tax.

Whether the doctrines of the so-called philosophic anarchists, who advocate the abolition of all authority, but have not yet been able to devise means for the conduct of their own meetings without putting some kind

of authority into the hands of some person, are more worthy of attention, I will leave to those who are familiar with them.

Municipal ownership, or, as it is called in Great Britain, municipal socialism, is sometimes recommended as a reform movement for the betterment of general economic conditions. Its effects in this respect are, however, overestimated. It has been in practice in Germany for many years without any visible effect on general economic conditions. Municipal socialism is a misnomer, for it is at the present time not socialistic, neither in inception nor purpose, but merely a business method. The character of municipal or state ownership depends altogether on the character of the state and its ruling class, and this is in present times anything but socialistic. As a business method it may have many advantages, as a general reform movement it is of little value.

The most radical, and, at the same time, the most rational movement, is unquestionably modern socialism, based upon the theories of Karl Marx, who, with his acute, critical mind, has produced a description of modern economic conditions and relations, the analytical force of which has not been surpassed by anything that has been written on the subject before or since. Marx distinguishes between labor force and labor, the latter being the result of the application of the former. What the employer buys is labor force and what he pays for it is, if the laborer is not to suffer actual want, what, considering the standard of living and the necessity of maintaining a family for the preservation of the class, is necessary for the reproduction of the labor force expended. As this requires an amount of labor far below the amount actually performed, the laborer pro-

duces surplus values which become the property of the employer and are accumulated for the formation of wealth and capital. In other words, wealth is composed of the difference between the price of labor force and the result of labor performed. A man's labor force is a physical quantity which does not change much; but labor itself, the form in which labor force is applied, is subject to variation in kind and effectiveness and has grown in productiveness with the perfection of the instruments of labor.

These, however, the laborer does not possess. Without them he cannot make use of his labor force. He is, therefore, compelled to sell his labor force to the owner of the instruments of labor at a price which is influenced comparatively little by the normal result of its application.

Modern socialism, therefore, advocates the nationalization or socialization of production by abolishing private ownership of the instruments of production. This would necessarily result in the abolition of the wage system and lead to a distribution of the products among the producers, after having made provision for the needs of government, the aged, the sick and other dependents and those who in science or art perform beneficial, though not materially or physically productive, labor.

It is part of the socialistic philosophy that, by an unavoidable process of evolution, socialism will become the basis of the economic structure of society, as certain as individualism is its basis now. The transformation will, according to that philosophy, be gradual, although it is possible that great upheavals and revolutions will be a part of the evolutionary process. Believing that the working class must create its own freedom and fur-

ther believing the attainment of political power for the accomplishment of their purposes to be a condition sine qua non, socialists everywhere effect political organizations, using the ballot as a means of accomplishing their object. The socialistic movement has become world-wide, and there is hardly any civilized country in which it is without organization. It has a very extensive literature and a large number of newspapers and periodicals. Very fanciful pictures of socialistic conditions have been drawn by Edward Bellamy in his "Looking Backward," and by William Morris in his "News From Nowhere." While scientists, politicians and statesmen advocating socialism are careful to refrain from pictorial descriptions of future conditions, and confine themselves to statements and explications of theories, it is, of course, the privilege of the novelist and the poet to be descriptive and fanciful.

A not inconsiderable faction of the Socialists under the leadership of Jaurés in France and Bernstein in Germany, impressed by the uncertainty of the future, attach more importance to the movement itself than to the theories and probabilities of its final outcome, considering the latter of secondary value only.

Perhaps it may be of interest to the reader to learn the opinions of two such eminent American scholars as the Reverend Dr. Lyman Abbott, one of the foremost pulpit orators of America, and Mr. Lewis H. Morgan, the great scientist whom I have so frequently mentioned in this book. Mr. Abbott in a lecture on "Industrial Evolution," which I attended a number of years ago, expressed himself about as follows: "The first condition of labor is slavery. The capitalist, in this stage, owns the laborer, and, therefore, owns all the products

of the labor. The second condition is feudalism, in which system the capitalist owns the land and the laborer is an attachment to the land. The capitalist, in other words, has a lien on the laborer. The third stage in the evolution is the present wage system. The capitalist now owns the tools, and the laborer, having no tools of his own, must needs work at the command of the capitalist owner of the tools. Personally, however, the laborer is free. The wages system, or capitalist system, is a gain over feudalism, as feudalism is a gain over slavery. To-day is better than yesterday, but may not to-morrow be better than to-day? The remedy will lie in the establishment of a "democracy" of industry, which will be the fourth stage of evolution, toward which we are rapidly tending. The men who toil shall own the tools in this new era. The evolution of government corresponds with the evolution of industry. Through the paternal stage, we are now in the individualistic, and are tending toward the fraternal."

Mr. Morgan closes one of the chapters in his "Ancient Society" with the following words: "Since the advent of civilization the outgrowth of property has been so immense, its forms so diversified, its uses so expanding and its management so intelligent in the interests of its owners, that it has become on the part of the people, an unmanageable power. The human mind stands bewildered in the presence of its own creation. The time will come, nevertheless, when human intelligence will rise to the mastery over property, and define the relations of the state to the property it protects, as well as the obligations and the limtis of the rights of its owners. The interests of society are paramount to individual interests, and the two must be brought into just

and harmonious relation. A mere property career is not the final destiny of mankind, if progress is to be the law of the future as it has been of the past. The time which has passed away since civilization began is but a fragment of the past duration of man's existence, and but a fragment of the ages yet to come. The dissolution of society bids fair to become the termination of a career of which property is the end and aim, because such a career contains the elements of self-destruction. Democracy of government, brotherhood in society, equality in rights and privileges, and universal education, foreshadow the next higher plane of society to which experience, intelligence and knowledge are steadily tending. It will be a revival, in a higher form, of the liberty, equality and fraternity of the ancient gentes."

What I want to make clear is the point that political and social institutions are the results of economic institutions, or more particularly, the results of the prevalent general modes of production and the economic structures created by them at different times, and that, therefore, the principal point of attack for reform movements must be the economic institutions. The means of attack may be of a political character, but the aim must be of an economic nature. And in order not to be misunderstood, I will add that under economic institutions I do not understand individual enterprises, or any number of them, but that which is part of, or equivalent to, a system, as, for instance, the institution of working for wages, or the institution of selling for profit, etc.

Although the evolutionary force in society is continually active, and never for a moment ceases to be, yet man is its instrument, and social movement its form of

action. We cannot quietly wait until changes come by themselves. They have to be made by man. The social edifice has been erected by man. Judging from the history of the past, it seems to be one of the most difficult tasks of man to understand and clearly see the trend of evolution in his own time. Whether men are blinded by ignorance or selfishness, I care not to investigate, but it almost seems to me to be the tragic fate of human society that it must take up or, at least, consider every erroneous, nay even impossible, proposition, and give a practical test to many of them, before adopting a measure of real curative force. It seems to me also, judging from history, that society is not able to leap from one extreme into the other, and that there must always be middle or transition periods. So it is quite probable that the constantly proceeding concentration of capital, industry and commerce, the formation of trusts, syndicates and other economic associations for the purpose of avoiding competition, the clearly visible tendency in the development of our economics to eliminate competition, are signs of a period of transition from the system of competition to some other system, the exact outlines of which have not yet appeared. Be that as it may, the world will not stand still, and those who are young enough may, perhaps, be witnesses of remarkable changes in the not very distant future. Of whatever nature these changes may be, of one thing we may be sure: The world will never go backward; it will never give up any of the cultural achievements of the past, but will increase them rather and build on them. It will never give up any of the acquired facilities of production, and never lower the general standard of life.

A new system which will stand on a higher plane

than the present will gradually grow and augment man's comfort, happiness and freedom. It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine any form of government which could be better adapted to our economic system of profit and wages than the state as constituted at present. It is, indeed, so well adapted to it, it is so closely linked to it, that it is unable to battle successfully with its evils. No personal ties, no personal relations are recognized in the affairs of government and the economic life of the people. The only relation in which man stands to the state is that of either citizen or subject. Economically speaking, everybody is left to himself, and the weaker to the mercy of the stronger. Freedom of will is, by legislation and in the administration of justice presupposed, but as a matter of fact does not exist. Violence and deceit are the only forces recognized as being able to affect the freedom of contract; human feeling, human affection, physical suffering, needs, wants, habits and passions are forces unknown to the law of contract, because they are of an emotional and intellectual character, and therefore intangible. The government of the modern state takes the attitude of the umpire at a prize fight, insisting on fair play between the fighters and strict observation of the rules of fighting. The freedom of capital is almost perfect.

Such a form of government, be it monarchical or republican, does not appeal to the highest and noblest sentiments of which man is capable. It almost seems that the modern republic has progressed more rapidly in the elimination of all relations between the person and the government than the modern monarchy. For, what we like to call paternalism: rules and regulations frequently of a petty nature, which seem to us vexatious,

usually flow from a desire to check the individual's reckless disregard of the interests, feelings and sentiments of others.

There are already strong indications everywhere of the gradual abandonment of the doctrine of laisser faire. The principle of non-interference of the state in economic matters is quite frequently violated and can hardly be maintained very much longer. In European countries, especially in Germany, laws in reference to fair competition, hours of labor, the condition of working places and factories, state insurance of laborers against old age, sickness and accident are enforced without constitutional scruples. In the United States efforts in that direction are repeatedly made. So far, however, most legislation of this kind has been declared unconstitutional. Yet the Supreme Court of Montana recently declared constitutional a law making the eight-hour workday compulsory for mines, and Colorado amended its constitution to make possible the enactment of such a law; but efforts toward its enactment have so far failed. At all events it seems to me that the tendency toward abandoning the doctrine of non-interference and the let-alone policy is growing in strength, which means that there is a tendency toward forcing the state to pay more attention to personal relations and individual conditions than heretofore. If this tendency should become powerful, it must, in course of time, materially affect the functions of the state and its relation to the citizens.

From its inception to this day, the state has been, and still is, a class-institution. It could not and cannot be anything else. It owes its creation to the existence of classes, it will last as long as classes exist and will disappear whenever they cease to exist. Even Plato and

Aristoteles, who lived and wrote only a little more than two centuries after the advent of state-government in Greece, were unable to conceive of the possibility of civilized existence without the state, and equally unable to conceive of a state without classes. All recollections of the great power of the gentile organization seem to have had vanished. In the opinions of these great thinkers man could exist only in and through the state; to them the highest moral duty of man was to serve the state. Aristoteles was even unable to imagine a state without slaves, whose moral duty and greatest virtue was to obey.

The class has been the result of a productive power which, although originally small, furnished more than what was absolutely needed for subsistence. When labor commenced to furnish a surplus over what was necessary for the worker's subsistence, society divided itself into classes, one of which did all the work, while the other lived on its surplus. The necessity of class-institutions, and the state as the only possible embodiment of social order, were defended by statesmen and philosophers from the time of Plato up to the twentieth century. But while the ancients had good grounds for their philosophy, none exist in modern times. The productive power of their society was small; that of ours is immense. It is, perhaps, quite true that, as Buckle argues, civilization would have been impossible without the existence of unproductive classes, and that when production is so small that everybody has to employ almost all his time in the production of the necessities of life, an intellectual class can only exist, if it is permitted to live on the surplus produced by others. But it is needless to explain that that reasoning is not applicable to our era

of unlimited power of production; and then—intellectual and unproductive are not necessarily the same.

The class, and with it the state, owe the possibility of their creation to the comparative poverty of society at the time of their creation. They are unseparable and have become inconsistent with the condition of wealth into which society has grown. Sooner or later they will both disappear. They will be abolished, not from a simple conviction that their existence is contrary to justice and equality, or from any other ethical reason, nor from the simple desire to abolish them, but by the force of economic conditions.

Naturally the question will be asked: What will take their place? Morgan, that most eminent and close observer of human and social progress, and wise interpreter of ancient institutions, thinks that there will be a revival in higher form of the ancient gentes. Maybe he is right. Maybe some new and happier form may be found. We can never be positively certain about the future. But be this as it may, we may be sure that society will find a form of order and government compatible with a general enjoyment of its immense wealth, compatible with a more universally beneficial use of its unlimited productive force and compatible with its constantly growing democratical sentiment.

The exact outlines of this form are, I repeat, not distinctly visible yet. And although it is quite apparent that it will be the result of continuous social and economic struggles, which in their nature are class struggles, it cannot even be predicted with any degree of certainty what forms these struggles may yet assume. We can only hope and wish that modern parliamenta-

rism may be able to reduce violent and convulsive movements to a minimum. That it cannot prevent them altogether, we have had ample proof. For there is one class that has little, if anything, to lose and everything to gain, and another that has far more to lose than to gain in the settlement of the great social conflicts. So far very little, if any, ability has manifested itself to settle the conflict between justice and evolution on one side and personal or class interest on the other with intelligence and good will and in a spirit of love and kindness. The indications rather point to the contrary.

The world, as it is, is governed by motives of selfishness, not from choice, nor from natural inclination, but from force of conditions. The individual, however charitably and philanthropically inclined, is powerless to direct the course of class-movements in opposition to the interests of the class. Upon the other hand, there are many instances of cruelty and tyranny of men, naturally kind and humane, but actuated by certain conceptions of right and wrong and firmly believing in the justice, righteousness and necessity of their course. I do not know of any instance in the history of the human race where any concessions in the direction of greater rights or greater freedom of the masses have voluntarily been granted by the rulers to the ruled, although not infrequently concessions made some time after the defeat of revolutionary movements had the appearance of being voluntary. During the whole course of human history there was no establishment of liberty, or greater rights of the lower classes, or better conditions of the masses, except as the result of never-resting class struggles. In asserting this, the wish is not father of the

thought; for I greatly wish that it were different. But history is history, and we must take the facts as it records them.

Much has been accomplished toward the settlement of modern social conflicts in a manner free from physical violence in Australia and New Zealand by the organization of labor parties and the use of parliamentary methods. To some extent this looks encouraging. But it should not be overlooked that those countries, compared with America and Europe are industrially poorly developed and that most of their population is concentrated in cities. The socialistic tendency of their legislation is easily recognizable, but what it will lead to in the end cannot yet be seen.

However, speaking generally, the fact that the forms of the future economic structure and political government can only be surmised but not definitely predicted. need not be a matter of grave concern. We may safely act on probabilities, and no harm can come from treating as positive what, as long as man has only human powers, can, at best, be only probable. The thinker and student requires not more than a scientifically deduced probability. The masses, however, need definite hope, a definite goal, a definite ideal. The higher that ideal, the nobler and loftier the sentiments created by it. The masses need an aim, an object, true enough to appeal to their intellect, beautiful enough to appeal to their longings and great enough to satisfy their yearnings for a complete enjoyment of the gifts of nature and the blessings of culture and civilization. Where such an ideal is wanting, or where no attempts are made toward its realization and the struggle for better conditions is

confined merely to present possibilities, violent outbreaks are almost unavoidable. Political economy, as officially taught, contains nothing that is apt to create such an ideal, and its few sentimental generalities are more a sign of utter hopelessness and helplessness than of hope.

VII.

The Modern Economic System.

It is said of the tutor of king Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, the celebrated chancellor Oxenstierna, that he once said to his pupil: "My son, you have no idea with how little good sense and reason the world is governed." Indeed, it seems that the world is oftener governed by follies and absurdities than by wise and prudent measures. But I believe that the world cannot always be governed by follies, absurdities and inconsistencies, certainly not by the same ones.

As far as economics are concerned, absurdities and inconsistencies arise by development. That is to say, institutions which, in their beginning, appear quite sensible, nay, even necessary, breed in course of time absurdities by unforeseen and unintended effects. Whenever these absurdities appear, it is a sure sign that the prevailing economic system is reaching its climax, that it has become inconsistent with the best interests of society, and that the end of its career is approaching. I think, therefore, that a statement of some of the absurdities, inconsistencies and peculiarities of the modern economic system will be quite instructive.

This system is, in one sense, based upon the principle of freedom of contract. But in giving effect to this principle, freedom is considered from a political and not from an economic standpoint, although most contracts are of an economic character. The contract of a minor,

for instance, be he ever so intelligent, is invalid, but the contract of a hungry man is valid. A man contracting under threats of violence is considered to act under duress, but the man who accepts a very dangerous, or very loathsome, or very ill-paying employment, because of his fear that he may find no other employment, and would be in danger of starving, if he refused it, is considered in law a free agent. Considering the condition of the average employee, it is quite clear that his freedom of contract is nothing but a legal fiction. Yet, it is upon this legal fiction that courts have repeatedly set aside as unconstitutional legislative enactments for the abolition of certain abuses in the treatment of workingmen, as for instance the truck system. The law, based upon, or rather being the fruit of, our economic system, presupposes a freedom of will, where there is no freedom of choice—a palpable impossibility. Or it assumes the freedom of choice on the part of the working classes—a palpable error.

The inability of our jurists to distinguish between man as a citizen, that is, as a political being, and man as an individual, that is, as a natural being, has led to another anomaly, namely, the legal fiction of equality. Ignoring economic inequalities, and accepting political equality as an existing fact, they insist upon legislation which affects all classes equally. This, however, is impossible. If the legislator legislates in favor of the laborer by limiting the hours of labor, or prescribing certain rules of payment of wages, the courts, under the fiction of civil equality and protection of the rights of contract and property, declare such laws to be class-legislation and, therefore, unconstitutional.

Obviously, only such legislation is judicially declared

to be class-legislation which affects the interests of the ruling class unfavorably. Laws rendering illegal contracts for the payment of wages in anything else but money, or in longer than certain periods, have been declared unconstitutional as class-legislation and because they rob the laborer of his freedom to contract as he pleases for the sale of his labor, which is his property. Does this principle not apply to the money lender as well as to the laborer? Do usury laws not violate the freedom of contract? Why is the money lender's freedom of contract not protected? Simply because usury laws—which now have the sanctity of age—are of feudal origin and served to protect the ruling class.

But how can theories of property be applied to labor force? By another fiction: the fiction that labor is property, for the sale of which the laborer who sells it must be as free to contract as for the sale of any other property. But labor-force lacks all the elements of property. The seller cannot divest himself, nor be dispossessed of it, without either suicide or homicide. It exists and dies with the laborer himself. What property rights could the purchaser of labor assert, if he should pay for it in advance and the seller should refuse to work? Labor cannot be replevied, it cannot be taken on execution, it cannot be attached, it does not go into the hands of the administrator, nor descends to heirs. It is inseparable from man, it is man himself. Labor can only be property, if the laborer himself is property. Consequently only slave labor can be property, but not wage labor.

Thus to prevent legislation favorable to the laborer, courts pretend to protect the laborer's fictitious liberty and protect it by impregnating wage labor with the characteristics of slave labor.

Can anything be more absurd?

Legal fictions have taken the place of class-privileges of former times and they preserve economic inequality with equal effect. Theoretically, that is politically, we all have the same right to become rich, but how could the wage system be maintained without a poor class? In practice, the conditions are those of a lottery, in which everyone taking a chance may win, but in which the gains of the winners are made up of the losses of the losers.

There is a conflict between theory and practice. Economic conditions make the exercise of political freedom and equality, principally in matters of contract, impossible to a certain class of citizens. Whether a right does not exist, or cannot practically be used, the effect is the same. But how do our jurists get out of the dilemma? By the fiction that, if one does what he would prefer not to do, were he not by circumstances compelled to do it, his action is nevertheless that of his own free will. They insist upon the existence of equality and the absence of classes, because the law grants no privileges.

It is one of the characteristics of our economic system that, working only through the effect of conditions and not through express legal enactments, its modus operandi is so difficult to understand. The relations of the slave to his master and of the serf to his lord, are so simple and transparent that their effect can be comprehended without trouble. The relation of the wage-worker, however, who apparently receives for his work all that it seems to be worth, and yet remains poor, while the purchaser of his labor is in a condition to grow rich and frequently does grow rich, is quite a complicated

matter which requires a great deal of study for its understanding. Hence the difficulty of comprehending the source of the capitalist's power and the slowness of movements for economic reforms.

References to such movements are frequently brushed aside with a wave of the hand and the careless remark that there have been always rich and poor, and that there always will be such. Of course, it is unnecessary to say that the fact that a thing was, is no proof that it will be. The poverty of the laborer of former periods was the direct result of the force of law and only the indirect result of the force of conditions, while his poverty at present is the direct result of the force of conditions and only the indirect result of the force of law.

Wealth is created by production. This requires no explanation. But the distribution of wealth is not regulated by production but by the manipulation of the products, which in itself creates nothing. If I have lumber of the value of five dollars and make out of that lumber a table worth twenty dollars, I have by my labor produced a value of fifteen dollars. The general stock of products, the wealth existing, has been increased by so much. Now, if somebody gives me twenty dollars for the table and afterwards sells it for twenty-five dollars, no new wealth has been produced by that process; there are neither more tables in the world, nor more money; yet somebody has five dollars more than he had before. The table may be sold a second time and bring thirty dollars, and again somebody has five dollars more than he had before, although there are neither more tables nor more money in the world. Of course, I know that a pseudo science explains that value is added to the table by bringing it nearer to the consumer, but this is

merely an excuse for a system which adds to price without adding to value and confounds both. The table is always the same table, and no number of sales can eliminate the fact that exchange creates nothing and that only production creates wealth. Yet, a large class of people grow wealthy merely by exchange, and it is the special characteristic of modern industry that it produces merely for the purpose of exchange. The earliest mode of production was home production coupled with home consumption; slaves and serfs produced what was immediately consumed at home. Later on, the immediate object of production was consumption by somebody else but the producer; if I needed a coat, I went to the tailor and had one made; if I needed a pair of shoes, the cobbler made them for me, and I wore them; but the object of modern production is exchange, or as it is called, trade and commerce. Between the producer and the consumer there is a great distance; they do not know each other, they do not see each other. Between them is the manipulator of the product. The products are merchandise before they become articles of consumption. The result of this special characteristic of modern production is overproduction where there is want, and overpopulation where there is a natural possibility of supporting a much larger population.

The extent of the United States, the general resources and the natural wealth of the country could probably support a population ten or more times as large as it is now. Comparing the population of the United States with that of Europe, in respect of density, this assertion is perfectly justified. Yet the physician complains that there are too many physicians, the lawyer that there are too many lawyers, the merchant

that there are too many merchants, the laborer that there ar too many laborers, and so forth. It seems as if there were too many everywhere, and as if the absurd Malthusian theory that the earth cannot produce enough for its growing population were actually true. And that in an age in which the productive power of man exceeds many times his power of consumption! Upon the other hand, the population of Ireland has within not much more than a hundred years declined about one-half without improving the situation and making an end of the seeming condition of overpopulation.

There is scarcely a branch of industry in which from time to time a condition of the market does not appear which is ascribed to overproduction. Has there been a change in the natural condition of men? Do they eat less, do they drink less, do they wear less? Has their natural power of consumption decreased? Not at all. Overproduction has no reference whatever either to the number of human beings in existence, nor to their needs or their natural power of consumption; it has reference only to an artificially created condition, in which people have not the means wherewith to buy what they need. The *natural* power of consumption has remained the same, but the *economic* power of consumption is not the same. Both are so different from each other that there may be a condition of overproduction in a thing of which millions are sorely in need and suffer for the want of it.

Considered in the abstract, such a condition is absurd. In former periods overproduction would have been the source of joy; it would have meant luxury, plentifulness. In our times it is the source of want and misery.

If, speaking in the language of the religiously orthodox, God should take it in his mind to punish the wheat-

growers of Russia, Hungary and Argentina by letting it rain too much, and curtailing their portion of sunshine, blessing at the same time the American farmers with enormous crops, the latter will kneel in prayer and thank God for his great kindness. But if God should be equally kind to all the wheat-growers of the world, the American farmer, instead of thanking God for his kindness, will raise the cry of ruin and advocate the free coinage of silver. Of course, two hundred bushels of wheat go in their feeding capacity just twice as far as one hundred bushels, and represent twice as much actual wealth, but the farmer does not consider actual wealth, but wealth as expressed in dollars and cents; to him wheat is not an article of consumption, but an article of trade, and over-abundant crops may result in such a falling of the price that they make him actually poorer. His wheat is growing on the field, but his wealth is made on that mysterious thing which is called the market. Absurd as it sounds, it is nevertheless true, that in modern industry it is practically sought to create wealth by restraining its production. For the producer produces what he does not need or use for himself, and his product is only of value to him in proportion as it brings him dollars and cents. So it comes that our industrial system results in underproduction compared with the *natural* power of consumption, and in overproduction, compared with the *economic* power of consumption, all of which is a poverty and misery creating absurd condition, most detrimental to the welfare of the masses of the people.

Everybody is aware of the wonderful growth of the power of production in modern times. It is so stupendous that it baffles description. In some instances production by machinery is more than a hundred times as

effective as production by hand. The productive power of our generation is practically unlimited. I cannot but think that if there were in existence an individual endowed with authority of directing all production and distribution, and being perfectly just to all, he would see to it that there is enough produced of everything, and that it is distributed so, that every person could live in comfort. As far as our productive power is concerned, that would be perfectly possible without being stingy in the allotment of time for leisure and recreation. I cannot help thinking that if the economic affairs of the world were directed by one will, guided by reason and justice, the wonderful growth of the power of production by the invention of mechanical contrivances would have resulted in less labor and more comfort for each and would have become a blessing for all mankind, elevating them physically, morally and intellectually. Instead of this, what do we behold?

First, that the hours of labor are as long, or nearly as long, as they were before the invention of machinery. John Stuart Mill says somewhere that he doubts that by the invention of machinery a single hour of labor was saved to anyone.

Secondly, that we have among us probably as many paupers as the world ever had, and that among the masses of the people there is perhaps as much want and misery as there ever was.

There is no doubt but that workingmen to-day enjoy many comforts which were not within their reach a century and more ago, but food, clothing and shelter were as necessary to them then as they are now. Yet with a productive power infinitely small compared with that of the present generation, without the aid of almost any

machinery, the working classes produced not only the necessaries of life for themselves, but also for those who produced nothing. They produced, as they do to-day, all articles of luxury for the rich and the privileged classes; they built their palaces, wove their velvets and silks, carved their costly furniture and erected churches and other public edifices of remarkable beauty and grandeur. Reasoning backward, from the fact that in spite of our enormous power of production, we do not produce enough for the comfort of all, we are almost unable to understand how that was possible, and how production at that time did not fall far short of the immediate wants of the people. If sumptuary laws would not prove the contrary, one would feel inclined to believe that poverty, want and misery were the lot of almost the whole working population. But such was not the case, and if we could believe in the truth of all the romantic stories of former times, human happiness was rather more general than it is now. Be that, however, as it may, it is positively certain that the comfort and the welfare of the masses have grown in infinitely smaller proportions than the power of production.

If, prior to the age of machinery, it was possible for every worker to produce by mere handicraft a surplus over and above the necessaries of life for himself and his family, we can form some judgment as to how large that surplus must be to-day without going into intricate calculations.

I do not care to examine carefully and in detail the causes which make necessary the production of such an enormous surplus; that would require a complete analysis of our economic system; but it would be a mistake to believe that it all goes into the pockets of the factory-

owners, although much of it travels that way. The larger part of it, I believe, must serve to support a numerous non-productive class which appeared in the wake of competition and manufacturing for the purpose of trade. I have reference to the immense number of middlemen and go-betweens, to all those who do not sell their own goods or the products of their own establishments. Only a few hundred years ago, when mechanics and artisans simply executed the orders of their consuming customers, and commerce was small and of modest extent, there was in the economic world very little, if any, room for traders, agents, drummers, brokers, commissioners, solicitors and so forth, all of whom consume necessaries of life without producing any.

It is a queer world in which we live. In our younger years, when our senses are strong and vigorous, when our souls yearn for the enjoyment of life, and our hearts are receptive of all that nature and civilization offers, we must forego many comforts and pleasures and suppress many desires, because life, health and economic existence are equally uncertain, and we must, if such is possible, lay by, economize, save. If we are fortunate and succeed, and are, as the years go by, able to accumulate a competence, we grow old in the meantime, and lose the physical and mental vigor to fully enjoy life. Our economic and social arrangements rob the majority of the civilized human beings of a full realization of the pleasures of life in the age which alone permits their full realization, and later, in the age in which it would be economically possible, nature forbids it. As far as individual happiness is concerned, it is a question whether the tramp who looks with contempt on all that civilization offers is not happier than the decent and respectable

member of society, and whether civilization has increased the amount of happiness in the world. Fortunately, we have good reasons to believe in the progressive power of civilization, leading to a different and better future.

When the young man enters the business world and commences his career, he is admonished to save. From the standpoint of private economy, the advice is certainly good, but from a politico-economic standpoint it is simply nonsense. Can anything be saved? Is not everything in the world, no matter how lasting it is, destroyed in the end, if not by use, then by the ravages of nature? To save is an entirely negative proposition. If I save the money for a pair of shoes, it does not mean that I save five dollars from destruction, because the five dollars which I would expend for the shoes would still continue their existence, but it means the nonproduction of a pair of shoes. Nothing is saved in reality, but production is restrained. While it is commonly believed that saving creates wealth, as a matter of fact, it prevents the creation of wealth. Accumulation of wealth and production of wealth are two different things; the latter is possible without the former, but the former is not possible without the latter. Our economic system has produced such a remarkable conflict between private economy and political economy that the individual can almost do nothing to benefit himself without injury to the body politic.

Defenders of our economic system not unfrequently advance the theory of the survival of the fittest. The theory is not as modest as that of the theologian who believes that God has put everyone into his proper place, but as applied it is just as comfortable and convenient. Since the appearance of Darwin's epoch-making book on

"The Origin of Species," the words evolution and survival of the fittest are in everybody's mouth, but by no means fully understood by everybody. There is certainly a great difference between the struggle for existence in nature and the struggle for existence in society, and it is, to say the least, an unsettled question whether the theory of the survival of the fittest is equally applicable to both. Granted, however, for argument's sake, that it is, and that economic success is the measure of fitness, what would follow? That the fittest in human society is the one who can make the most money, the one who possesses, in the highest degree, those faculties which make possible the accumulation of a fortune. We would be forced to conclude that the man is so much fitter as a social being as he can gather wealth, and that, as things are going under our economic arrangements, and not to speak of men of letters, science or art, the man who can make a table out of raw wood is less fit, and, consequently, a less useful member of society, than the one who can sell it with a profit. Yet, I must confess that I am of the opinion that if those who have the particular faculty of selling tables at a profit should not survive, one might have tables nevertheless; but if those who can make tables should fail to survive, I am at a loss to see how we should get them.

According to the Darwinian theory, faculties, characteristics, talents and aptitudes grow in strength by their use in the struggle for existence. If we reflect for a moment what particular qualifications and proficiencies are necessary for making money, how seldom it is that men of great minds and genius, students and men of great learning succeed in making money, how much better the chances of the reckless and inconsiderate are

than those of the careful, timid and noble-minded, it would be, indeed, quite a peculiar kind of society in which the money-making persons are the fittest and will therefore survive the others.

It is very often asserted that genius and talent will always succeed in the end, even if they have to overcome many obstacles. This is said without much knowledge and thought. The fact that genius and talent succeed in some cases under adverse conditions is no proof that they succeed in all cases. The world does not mention those who fail under adverse conditions, and history learns not of them. If it were not so, we would probably have knowledge of more geniuses and more talents. Genius and talent are natural gifts, and nature is lavish. More than ten generations have come and gone since the birth of Shakespeare. Averaging each generation at fifty millions of English speaking people, more than five hundred millions have come into the world and gone from it since that time. I do not and cannot believe that nature, so profuse in its creations, should have created the genius of a Shakespeare only once among five hundred millions of human beings, not to speak of those who lived before Shakespeare, nor those who will live after us. I am far more inclined to believe that nature has created many Shakespeares but that economic and social conditions did not allow them to grow and develop.

Has any one ever been able to count those geniuses and talents that went under in the struggle for daily bread, those who had to give up their ideals and sacrifice their ambitions, because they first needed a livelihood? Has any one ever been able to count those children born in poverty, but gifted by nature with genius or talent, and never receiving the education necessary for

its development, either because the parents on account of their poverty could not afford it, or in their ignorance, generally also the result of poverty, were unable to discover genius or talent? Genius and talent need freedom from care for their development. Even those gifted with an inventive genius succeed only if the result of their genius can be readily transformed into money by capitalists, and even then it is generally the capitalist who gets the lion's share.

Privileged classes and their governments have always taken pride in fostering and protecting arts and science, and have given many a chance to the development of discovered geniuses or talents. But "noblesse" does not "oblige" the economic class pure and simple. It leaves everything to private or business enterprise. The richest government in the world, that of the United States, has not to this day thought of establishing an institution like the universities of Germany where men of science are given the opportunity of free research. The average American university professor is still not more than a teacher of things known already, forced to use all his time in endless routine work.

I am not at all inclined to show things in their most extreme consequences, nor to use any extravagant language. Yet when labor leaders sometimes say that the condition of the modern wage-worker is worse than slavery, I must admit that in one particular respect this is undoubtedly true. The slave was fed, sheltered and clothed. Supposing even that the ordinary common laborer is employed all the year round, he can hardly do more than that for himself. But the slave had his price, and the wage-worker has not. I am told that in slavery times, in the Southern States, an able-bodied, young

healthy negro cost as much as a thousand dollars. Representing thus a considerable amount of capital invested, his owner had good cause to keep him healthy and strong, at all events as much cause as the owner of a valuable horse has to take good care of the animal. Such considerations do not exist in modern industry. The large modern factory employs hands which have to perform a certain amount of labor; if they cannot do it, the employer has no further use for them. The modern laborer is only paid while he works, and no personal relations of any kind exist between employer and employee; most frequently they do not even know each other. In case of sickness, old age, decrepitude etc., the workingman is left to his own resources, which in many cases simply mean charity. There has never been an economic system, in which naked materialism governed all relations so completely as the modern.

Some time ago it was reported in the newspapers that certain railroads had issued an order not only to employ nobody above the age of forty-five, but even to discharge such who were above that age and were in their positions only a certain time. While this was done openly, and therefore appeared in a measure startling, yet it is a fact that it is generally very difficult for persons of advanced age to find employment, because it is of more advantage to employ persons of full strength and vigor. It is a cruelty forced upon employers who have personally no wish at all to be cruel. This cruel effect of our economic conditions becomes more apparent when we reflect how difficult it has gradually become to start a business of one's own without capital, and how the amount of capital necessary has constantly grown. I believe that the majority of our rich business men who

started thirty or forty years ago with small means, could not repeat the operation to-day. Statistics show that, in proportion to the growth of population, the number of independent owners of business-establishments is decreasing, while the number of employees is correspondingly increasing, a fact which, of necessity, must unfavorably influence sturdiness and manliness of civil character.

Whether insanity is increasing in consequence of our economic conditions, as is frequently stated, or whether this increase is only apparent in consequence of our more humane treatment of the insane, and bringing them together in large public institutions, I will not investigate, but that modern industrial conditions very badly affect the physical condition of the workers, and have a physically degenerating effect is subject to statistical proof. English statistics of some fifty years ago show that the average duration of life in England was thirty-four and one third years. In manufacturing cities, however, it was different. In Leeds the average duration of life was twenty-one, in Manchester twenty, in Liverpool seventeen years. Belgian statistics show that in the city of Brussels the yearly death rate is one out of fifty among the very wealthy, one out of twenty-seven among small businessmen and mechanics and one out of fourteen among day laborers. The French stastician Villerme showed some forty years ago that about one-half of the children of spinners and weavers in the city of Milhouse die before they reach the second year of age. (These figures are taken from Ferdinand Lassalle's Frankfort speech.) German and Swiss statistics show similar results, and who can doubt that American statistics, if there were any of this character, would be of

the same kind? I recollect that during the great strike of the Anthracite miners of Pennsylvania in 1903, the government sent officers into the mining districts to recruit men for the navy. Their efforts, however, proved futile, because, as they reported, the miners, having for years been underfed, were not physically fit for service in the navy.

European military statistics show that in order to complete the annual recruiting lists, it became necessary to constantly reduce the required size of the men. Prior to the great revolution it was in France 165 centimeters, it was gradually reduced until in 1870 it was only 154, a decrease of the normal height of the human body of eleven centimeters within one century. In Saxony, in 1780, the required height was 178 centimeters, in 1862 it was only 155.

Three years ago, the newspapers contained the following dispatch: London, March 10th, (1903). The annual report of the inspector general of the British army, which has just been issued, confirms many previous statements that the physique of the British working class is deteriorating. The report says that one subject which causes anxiety for the future as regards recruiting is the gradual deterioration of the physique of the working classes, from which the bulk of recruits must always be drawn. When it is remembered that the recruiters are instructed not to submit candidates for enlistment for medical examination unless they can be reasonably expected to pass as fit, one cannot but be struck by the percentage, namely, 32.22 considered by the medical officers unfit for service. In reports from all the manufacturing districts stress is invariably laid upon the number of men medically rejected.

About a year ago the newspapers contained the following:

"Berlin, March 4 (1905).—It is learned from reliable sources that this year's conscription in Berlin and vicinity showed remarkably unfavorable results, inasmuch as a large percentage of the young recruits is physically incapable of military service."

Newspapers recently informed their readers that a Japanese statesman made in an interview the statement that Japan, knowing that war with Russia would sooner or later become inevitable, preferred to fight now, because it was feared that the development of modern industry might produce such physical degeneration that the country could not then successfully cope with Russia.

No commentary could add to the impressiveness of these figures and statements.

The history of civilization is one of continued saving of human labor force in the production of the necessaries of life, so much so that civilization and saving of human labor force are almost synonymous. So far, however, the result of it has not been less work, but more effective work and creation of more wealth. But the time will come when the practical result will be less work and more leisure. We will have not only more but also better machinery than now. The era of machinery has only commenced. The time will come when all heavy and all loathsome work will be done by automatic machinery and all unpleasant and obnoxious features of labor will disappear. This will result in an improvement of the human race and will go far toward the removal of the physical and intellectual distinctions between the different classes of society. For it cannot be denied that continuous heavy physical work has a

brutalizing effect, that continuous dirty work kills the aesthetic sense, and that the monotony of modern factory labor produces dullness of mind and lack of ambition. For all we know, there may still be natural forces of which we know nothing and which we may yet discover. The science of electricity is still in its infancy, and the time will come when the triumph of human intellect over the forces of nature will be so complete that comparatively little physical labor will be necessary, and the performance of the little that will be will be a pleasure.

But while progress in production ran all the time in the direction of saving human labor force, the development of distribution ran in the opposite direction. The history of distribution is, at least for the last hundred or two hundred years, a history of an enormous *waste* of human labor force. It is one of the characteristics of the competitive system that it costs sometimes more to sell an article than to make it. Speaking generally, production is in the end governed by consumption. Things are ultimately bought because they are needed, not because they are offered for sale. Yet, in consequence of the distance between producer and consumer, and principally in consequence of competition, an enormous quantity of human energy is employed in the efforts to sell. The result of these efforts, however, is neither a general increase of consumption nor a general increase of production, for what is sold by one remains unsold by another. A number of competing shoe manufacturers, for instance, may send out ever so many salesmen, there is not, as a result of their efforts, a single pair of shoes more consumed. Every increase of

the sales of one manufacturer must necessarily result in a corresponding decrease of the sales of the other.

An enormous amount of human labor force is practically wasted in printing, lithographing, painting, posting, and so forth, for no other purpose but advertising. Wasted, because the products of that labor add nothing to human comfort and the stock of national wealth, while those engaged in that work must, for their practical subsistence, draw on the stock of necessaries of life produced by others. Yet, so absurd is our economic system that this waste is considered a boon because it is a source of employment.

This waste has been so immense that reaction was bound to follow. It came in the shape of combinations, generally called trusts. Of course, those who combined acted not from motives of political economy, but from motives of private economy. Business men are not in the habit of studying and consulting political economy. They are not philosophers, but judge from experience and from the effect of economic causes on their private interests. The trust was created because competition had become ruinous. It had developed to a degree where, instead of being beneficial, it became injurious. The elements of self-destruction in the system commenced to operate. The competitive system commenced to become enimical to the best interests of capital and entered the first stage of its collapse. For a long time considered the life of trade, it is now feared that it may become the death of trade.

What the trust will lead to is, for the present, hidden in the future. It may develop into a system of its own, lasting for some time. It may be only the first stage of an entirely new economic system, beginning to

develop. In neither case will it be permanent. It is absolutely impossible that society will suffer the permanency of an institution which invests a comparatively small number of private corporations and a still smaller number of gigantic combinations, with the power of controlling the production, the exchange and the transportation of the necessaries of life. It is impossible that society will forever suffer an economic institution to, honestly or corruptly, shape legislation and influence the administration of justice in the interest of the few that possess and manipulate the wealth of the country, and to rob the masses of the people of every shred of independence by making ninety-nine out of a hundred the hired servants of the remaining one. The best interests of human society will not grant the private trust a very long existence. Its reign is, perhaps, preparing the advent of a new economic order of society, and all efforts to destroy it merely for the purpose of maintaining or re-establishing the reign of competition will prove futile. Some future generation may, perhaps, recognize in it the beginning of the gradual application of the principle of association as the basis of the economic structure of society.

Two things, I believe, may be taken for certain. One is the fact that competition, as a system, is in its death-struggle, and the other is the continuance of the process of combination in industry, commerce and transportation. Combinations may fail, combination will go on. At the same time, democratical sentiment, the feeling of self-esteem and the confidence in their own power will grow among the masses of the people. They thirst more for information and read more than they ever did. I believe some future generation will deal with the com-

binations in a method different from ours. It will, probably, not waste time and energy in fruitless attempts to destroy what evolution has produced, but will try to apply it to the use and benefit of the nation. It will fully understand the immense value of combination as an instrument for the saving of human labor force and increasing the productiveness of its application. Human society will not lose and sacrifice this effect, but will make it subservient to the interests of the whole nation.

VIII.

Conclusion.

Knowledge of the past, based upon contemporaneous testimony, reaches back some fifty or sixty centuries. Based upon surmise and conjecture, resting on circumstantial evidence, it looks back upon, perhaps, many hundreds of thousands of years. When man sprang into existence, he was, probably, not much superior, if superior at all, to the highest developed animals of which we know. To-day, the lowest savages are in possession of articulate language, some sort of social organization, and some sort of moral feeling. Innumerable centuries must have passed before man reached even the stage of the savages existing to-day. Equally innumerable were the centuries of savagery and barbarism, except where savages and barbarians came into contact with civilization. Civilization has advanced rapidly within the historic period, and the rapidity of the advance constantly increased as the velocity of the falling stone increases the nearer it approaches the earth. It took man longer, and it cost, perhaps, much more mental effort to invent the bow and arrow than it now requires to invent the most complicated machine.

Human history is a history of continued uninterrupted progress. To say that any civilization ever declined and disappeared is false. When nations perished, their civilization was not lost, but was taken up and continued by other nations. When the Roman empire fell,

civilization did not perish. What was best in Graeco-Roman civilization had already been adopted by the Germans. And during all times the human race has steadily improved, intellectually, morally and, in some respects, undoubtedly, also physically.

There is no stronger instinct in either man or animal than that of self-preservation. All other instincts, and, as far as man is concerned, all thought and action are subservient to it. There is one thing that man must have in all stages of culture from the lowest to the highest, and that is the necessaries of life for his subsistence. Different as they may be in different stages of culture, the first natural impulse goes toward obtaining them, and the first effort of thought and action is directed toward that end. The manner of finding and acquiring, and, later on, the manner of producing the necessaries of life has shaped human sentiment, has brought forth the moral sense and created moral laws, has undoubtedly influenced the development of mythologies, creeds and gods and has developed and given form to social and political institutions. Considering the term necessaries of life in the broad sense of civilization, including its comforts and even its luxuries, no moral precept and no institution antagonistic to the prevailing manner of producing them can last. As we find in the history of man, step by step, one change after the other in the mode of production, so we find, step by step, corresponding changes in moral and political laws, in social and political institutions. These changes display an uninterrupted tendency of the latter to set themselves in harmony with the former. If to-day we were to follow all the precepts and commands of the bible, our whole industrial, commercial and credit system would become

impossible. We could have no private property in land, we could take no interest on loans or debts, could keep neither pledge nor mortgage in possession and would not be allowed to suffer any one to become a pauper. Upon the other hand, the moral sentiments expressed in the Old Testament would not prevent us from keeping slaves, nor the men from being bigamists or polygamists. I believe to have good reason for assuming that Christ's opinion that it were easier for a camel to go through a needle's ear than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven does not much trouble the conscience of any millionaire, nor hinder any one from striving to become one. If we had continued to look upon women with the same sort of moral feeling as the apostles and fathers of the church did, the men would still thank God every day for not having created them women, and the latter would still be in the most abject condition.

No conquering nation has ever felt moral scruples to make the inhabitants of another country captives and slaves, or to take and use its land, and modern moral sentiment does not practically interfere with the conduct of bloody wars for the expansion of trade.

Economic motives are at the bottom of all of it. Economic motives govern the actions of men and nations to-day as they ever did. Evolution effected gradually, and from time to time, great changes in economic conditions and in the motives and sentiments springing from them. There is not the slightest reason to believe that present economic conditions and present moral views and social and political institutions will henceforth remain unchanged. That they will change in the future is as certain as that they have changed in the past. The uncertainty is only in the manner and the result of the

change. Upon this point opinions may and will differ. But it is not necessary to guess blindly, for evolution works along the line of progress and knows no retrogression. We may be sure that there will be no return to former methods; we may be sure that in the future, as heretofore, production will use the most effective methods available, and that the use of machinery will be still more extended. The use of machinery will, as it does now, make necessary the working together of many, the concentration of production at central points. There can be no return to the shop which was replaced by the factory. Human power of production will continue to grow, and the time will come when human society will not allow production to be retarded by artificial means in the interest of the owners of the instruments of production. Production will be carried on in the most economical way and human energy and labor force will not be treated as a commercial commodity and wasted in the interest of a part of society, but, being inseparable from man, will be treated as part of him. It is not probable that this can be achieved by letting production and distribution remain private business. The probability rather is that they will have to be made a public affair. Society has an interest in the welfare of its members; so much is already acknowledged to-day. After a while society will clearly see that the welfare of its members can best be extended and preserved by the most extensive use of its power of production and that such use is impossible under the prevailing economic system. Then will come a time of experimenting, and out of these experiments, perhaps only after many mistakes and failures, a new economic system will arise. Nor will it come without severe class-struggles.

The lower economic class will, as the lower classes have always done, use all its energy in bettering its condition and will strive to rise to the level of the class above, while the ruling economic class will defend its position with the same energy and the same assurance of rights as political classes ever defended theirs. They will insist upon being let alone with a pertinacity equal to that of the political classes which insisted upon their God-given privileges. From an historical standpoint, far above party and class-interests, the often heard talk of harmony between capital and labor, as generally understood, is merely an illusion. Through the whole history of the human race, since the beginning of the institution of private property, we witness the everlasting struggles between the different classes of society. Modern civilization can make an effort to eliminate from these struggles acts of brutality and barbarism, but nothing can prevent or end them except the creation of an economic system, which makes the existence of classes impossible.

The large majority of men are timid and afraid lest they may flee from known evils to greater unknown evils. But we need not feel any terror of the future and may examine all propositions for reforms and changes in our institutions with calm consideration. For through all the centuries of the past, with all their innovations and changes, the condition of human society has gradually and constantly improved, and the human race has grown better. There is no reason to be afraid of the future, certainly not from the standpoint of humanity at large. Even not from the standpoint of individual man. For after all, human life is but temporary and we are beyond those superstitions which caused the

burial of a dead man's horses and servants and symbols of treasure along with him for use in the other world. After all, every human being has only one body to shelter, one body to clothe, one stomach to fill. And if one has what is necessary to live comfortably, and to satisfy one's intellectual and aesthetic tastes, it is enough for material happiness. Whatever goes beyond that can only serve the vulgar desire of ostentation. All that is necessary to add for the purpose of making happiness complete, in so far as access to physical things can do that, is, beside the certainty of having so much, the certainty that those whom we love and whom we leave behind will enjoy the same material happiness. Compared with the enormous fortunes and incomes of the favored few, it takes very little to satisfy all reasonable demands for well-being and comfort, and it cannot be disputed that in our times the productive power of man and nature together is fully adequate to their satisfaction. From a general social and human standpoint the accumulation of great fortunes becomes absurd and useless, being able only to gratify the lust of power and ostentation.

It is urged sometimes in defense of our present system that wealth is the powerful incentive to human effort, and that without this incentive human talent and intellect would be without an object for which to manifest themselves. I do not believe it. While I admit that man needs an incentive, an object for his efforts, I cannot admit that there can be no other incentive but wealth. Perhaps under the present system of production and distribution, under present social and political arrangements, it may be impossible to find a stronger, nay even another incentive. But every economic sys-

tem and the social arrangements growing out of it, create their own incentives, their own ambitions, their own intellectual and moral sentiments. To the ancient Grecian a laudation or a wreath in the Olympic games was as much an incentive for putting forth his best efforts as money is to modern man. Men have given up their lives for the sake of liberty, men have sacrificed their lives for their country. In neither case could they themselves enjoy the fruits of their action. Is there any reason why the good of society, and indirectly that of oneself, may not be an equally strong incentive? If our economic system has so shaped our minds and interests that we cannot think of any other incentive but wealth, it does not necessarily follow that there can be no other incentive under other and different conditions.

I am firmly of the opinion that our economic system is not favorable to the highest development of the human race. Granted that it was the logical consequence of what was before, granted that it contributed immensely to the development of the race to its present point, and that it was a necessary stage in the progress of civilization, I think it has reached its highest point of usefulness and must give way to a better system, if civilization is to progress as it has progressed heretofore. The future system must grow out of the present system. It must be the logical sequence of it. It cannot be invented, it must grow and develop. A prevailing system, especially one as complex as ours, cannot be suddenly destroyed and immediately replaced by another entirely new and complete. It will be the result of gradual adjustment. While it is quite natural for the sociologist or the economist to construct in his mind such a new system, he should be careful not to build his castle

in the air, but on the firm ground of existing institutions, and consider the possibilities and probabilities of evolution.

The average man is conservative and has always misgivings about proposed changes and reforms. He is always afraid of their non-adaptability to human nature. As a rule, however, this fear is groundless. Man is as much, if not more, the creature of his surroundings than his surroundings are the creature of his mind and will. If we attempt to retrace all social and economic changes and man's adjustment to them to the beginning, we find that the natural surroundings eixsted before man came into them, and that man had to arrange his mode of living according to them. The observation of evil effects of these surroundings impelled him to improve them, and as they grew better, they also improved him and created in him new needs and new desires, made another man of him. Better conditions gave him new inspirations and infused him with new moral ideas. So will it also be in the future. Men will adjust themselves to their surroundings and a better economic system will create the type of men suited to it in intellectual, physical and moral capacity. I have no fault to find with those who believe that God infused man from the start with moral sentiments and moral ideas, and that human institutions were the result of these sentiments and ideas, but I am of a different opinion. At any rate, I cannot see, if it was God who has implanted man with moral ideas, why he should have planted into man different moral ideas at different times.

As every economic system creates moral ideas fitting it, so it gives birth to crimes peculiarly its own. Under our system of economics nine-tenths of all crimes known

are crimes against property, or such as have for their object the gain of property. Our laws mention many a crime of which other laws, for instance the Mosaic law, knew nothing.

It will, in all probability, be one of the characteristics of the future economic system that labor force and the instruments of labor are nearer together than they are now. At present the man using his physical labor force and the man owning the instruments of labor are different persons. It follows as an unavoidable result that the former is dependent upon the latter, that he must sell him his labor force for a market price, and that both belong to different classes of society. Under the effect of a new economic system, which brings labor force and instruments of labor nearer together, conditions of extreme wealth and extreme poverty will disappear and the state or government will not be dominated over by an economic class. There can be no real freedom, nor real political equality, until there are no more economic classes. Where there is general economic independence no economic class will find tools for the execution of its will among those who form the government, and the government being then not only in name, but in fact the representative of all the citizens, and not as now of a class only, will have to assume functions which political science, shaped by class-interests, would not allow it to assume at present.

The conception of liberty will, in all probability, be quite different from what it is now, and the ethical views of the time may carry governmental protection farther than merely against violence and fraud. There is no positive liberty. It is always relative. The consciousness of liberty depends on the harmony between individ-

ual needs and desires and the possibility of their satisfaction. But neither individual needs and desires, nor the possibility of their satisfaction, are always the same.

The highest civilization and the highest moral conception can only be worked out in a condition of economic independence. Of course, not that individual independence which has the dependence of another for its footstool, but the economic independence of all, which can only be had under a government capable of securing it and instituted to that end.

The state, as constituted at present, would be incapable of securing such independence, even if it existed. Although we still witness the accumulation and increase of immense fortunes, we may nevertheless be sure that the moment will come when disintegration will set in and the process of equalization will commence. Society will erect a new economic structure, and sooner or later create a political edifice in harmony with it and adapted to its mode of production and distribution.

The new mode of production and distribution will not only produce a higher form of government, but also a higher form of the family. The highest form of the family can only evolve under economic conditions which make husband and wife economically independent of each other, so that no considerations of an economic nature will enter into the holiest and most intimate relation between two human beings. The more one delves into the novelistic and dramatic literature of our times, the more one becomes convinced that the marriage problem is one of the deepest felt problems of the present age. True, those plots and narratives are all invented, but they are nevertheless the reflex of actual life. These narrations of mistakes, changes of feeling, incompatibil-

ity of temper or sentiment, describing the woe and misery following, speak a most pathetic language and sound like a cry of longing for happier forms of marriage and like a wail of despair of finding them. But, they are sure to come some time under another economic system.

In the second volume of his "Sociology," Herbert Spencer says: "In primitive phases while permanent monogamy was developing, union in the name of the law—that is, originally, the act of purchase—was accounted the essential part of the marriage, and union in the name of affection was not essential. In the present day union in the name of the law is considered the most important, and union by affection the less important. A time will come when union by affection will be considered the most important, and union in the name of the law the least important, and men will hold in reprobation those conjugal unions in which union by affection is dissolved."

While Herbert Spencer is ethnologically and historically in error, because marriage by purchase and monogamy, even in its beginnings, did not exist contemporaneously, his philosophy is quite true.

I doubt that there is anything more destructive of good will and affection in marriage than the consicousness of possession and the difficulty or impossibility of separation. The efforts of the parties toward winning each other by presenting themselves from their best sides, make room for an abandonment and carelessness in dress and appearance, and a want of politeness in manner and mutual intercourse, which, as between husband and wife, have become almost proverbial and a prolific source of jests in humerous periodicals. They would in good society not be tolerated even between

strangers. Yet all this could be different, for there is no man who may not fascinate some woman, nor is there a woman, be she ever so homely, who may not look charming in the eyes of some man; and there are few between whom the feeling of love and affection may not be preserved for life, if it were as carefully cultivated after marriage as it was before marriage.

The best medicine against social ills is freedom. Granting that society must guard against abuse of it, it remains true, nevertheless, that with the advancement of civilization and the exaltation of ethical conceptions, sentiment and conscience must more and more take the place of police orders and penal laws and restrictions. I feel satisfied that even to-day the majority of men would neither commit larceny nor murder, even if they were not forbidden and punished by law. The want of economic freedom and independence makes cowards of us all and hypocrites of many of us. Men have suppressed their best thoughts for fear of economic injury, and others have shammed beliefs and opinions for the same reason. That has happened in the sphere of politics, in the sphere of religion and in the sphere of philosophy and science. The freedom of speech is given to us by the law, but it is chained by economic considerations, by the fears which economic conditions produce, and by the feeling of the necessity to do for the sake of business or position what one would not do for the sake of conscience.

It may be that in the activities of this world, each sex has its proper sphere. But I have always considered it an assumption on the part of men to attempt to determine for themselves the proper sphere of women. In so far as they have done it, they have betrayed noth-

ing but selfishness. Although they do not object to the employment of women as wage-workers in shops, offices and stores, there are a good many vocations out of which they seek to keep her by proclaiming those vocations to be peculiarly within the sphere of men. Most men still entertain the opinion that the proper sphere of woman is nowhere but within the home, and that the only mission of woman upon this earth is to please and comfort man, provided he is her husband. It does not suit their taste to see women striving more and more for independence and interesting themselves in matters of public concern. Her right to higher education and learning was only grudgingly acknowledged, and there are still universities, on both sides of the Atlantic, which close their doors to women. But nothing is more tabooed, nothing considered less within the sphere of women than politics. There, still, is little chance in the United States for giving women the right of suffrage outside of the few states in which it was granted to them, probably for local purposes and principally, I suppose, because it was thought to be of advantage to the temperance cause. Yet women pay the same taxes on property, if they have any, as men; they are subject to the same criminal laws and to the same civil laws; and, if they stand alone, must find their support without any aid from the state. Is it just, then, to give them no voice in rating taxation or in making the laws? Taxation without representation was one of the causes for which the American colonies rebelled against England. Are not our women taxed without representation? And considering stamp duties, import duties and the shifting effect of taxes, are not all those women who must make a living for themselves taxed, even if they pay no

direct property tax? Are they not compelled to obey laws made by others for them? Is this not gross injustice?

One of the many silly reasons given for it is this, that men should have the superior right of legislation because on them also involves the duty of defending the country in time of war. True, quite true, but it is to be hoped that in course of time there will be no more wars. Yet I think this special duty of men is offset by a special function of women, namely, that of giving birth to the future generation. It is a question where there is more pain and suffering and more heroism, on the battle-field or in child-bed. It is a question whether death reaps a richer harvest on the battle-field or in child-bed. Because in the one case the sufferings are spread out, and in the other they are concentrated, in time and space, so that the sensation of horror in both cases is not the same, we have no opportunity to make comparisons. There is, however, no question that the function of bringing forth life is more useful to society than that of taking life, no matter for what purpose. And there is neither hope nor fear that child-bearing will ever come to an end.

The reasons most generally stated, why women should not be in politics, as not being their proper sphere, are of a sentimental nature and reflect sorely and sadly on our political life. It is, however, not worth the trouble to investigate whether politics would corrupt women, or women would purify politics. First, because sentimental reasons do not weigh heavily in the development of social institutions and political rights, and secondly, it is greatly to be doubted that these are true reasons. I believe that the cowardice of men, their

fear of being overawed by woman, has much to do with it. Men feel in their private and family life the power which women have over them and fear that power in public life. They fear it because they do not understand the cause of it.

It sounds, perhaps, paradoxical to say that between persons of unequal strength, bound together by ties of duty or affection, the weaker is practically the stronger, but it is true. The power of woman over man under our social and economic condition has its source in her weakness and dependence, and is for that reason an ignoble power. A woman may with impunity commit against a man offenses which would meet with violent resentment, if they came from a man. The economic dependence of woman robs man of his freedom of action, unless he is devoid of all feeling. The economic and social dependence of woman stirs his chivalrous nature; he knows and feels that the woman needs him, and he submits when otherwise he would not. By parity of reasoning it appears plain that with the growth of the economic and social independence of women, man would also become freer and more independent. A chivalrous nature is always apt to become the slave of the weak. Daughters are far more apt to rule a household than sons, because the latter can easier care for themselves than the former and may with less scruples be told to go. A baby can make all the members of a household its slaves. It is a slavery which can be abolished only in two ways: either the stronger must become brutal or the weaker must become stronger. Is it necessary to point out the better and more civilized way?

And yet, I am frank enough to say that I do not set much expectation on female suffrage under present con-

ditions. To be sure, if its introduction would depend on my vote, I would without a moment's hesitation cast it in its favor as a matter of justice. But I would do it with the conviction that it would, for the present, not materially further the cause of women. Our political fights are class-fights. The lack of consciousness that they are does not change the fact. The absence of privileged classes conceals it, and the economic classes and their struggles are not generally understood. However, as the comprehension of our economic system grows, the political class-fight will become more pronounced. I am well aware of the fact that such words as class-struggles, class-fights, etc., have an odious sound in the ears of many, but it is of no use to shut our eyes to facts, nor is anything gained by self-deception. If one fails to discover in the early history of our country the economic class-struggle, such failure is pardonable; but if one fails to discover it in the political struggles of the last fifty years, in the everlasting tariff-wrangles, in the rise and fall of greenbackism and populism, in the candidacy of Bryan and the advocacy of the free coinage of silver, in the candidacy of Hearst as the friend of the "small man," in the slow, but steady, growth of the socialist party, in the attempt of legislation against the trusts, in the efforts of labor organizations to obtain favorable legislation, he is stricken with almost unpardonable blindness.

Now, while the political struggles bear the character of class-struggles, the women as such form no particular economic class. Their interests are identical with those of their fathers or their husbands, and they would generally vote like these. For a long time to come the participation of women in politics would probably not influ-

ence legislation, because it would not change the proportional strength of political parties.

But it may have a great intellectual influence. It may teach women the importance and bearing of economic questions, it may broaden their minds, they will become interested in affairs to which they have heretofore not paid any attention, they will become closer observers, will learn to understand the world better, will not waste, as they do now, their energy in small and insignificant matters, as for instance the political temperance movement, will become more tolerant and will learn that freedom is a far better educator than coercion and restraint.

We hear it said that women are not fit for politics and matters of public concern, because they are generally influenced more by sentiment than by reason. I do not care to dispute that they are more subject to sentiment and emotion than men. It would, indeed, be astonishing if the difference in physical condition and natural functions were not associated with psychic differences; but are we quite sure that it might not be better for human society if its affairs were conducted with a little less reason and a little more sentiment? And may not the overbalancing power of sentiment over reason in woman be more or less the product of her social status, which made the use of the one more practicable to her than the other? It is quite true that women have so far distinguished themselves more in the realm of sentiment than in that of reason; that is to say, more in art than in science; but this also may be ascribed to the social status of woman. That woman, however, is capable of distinguishing herself in science has been proved in several instances. How could they be numerous

when for centuries all the higher institutions of learning were closed to her? Be this, however, as it may, and granted that each sex has its own proper sphere of functions in the social body, I state it as my opinion that woman should be given the opportunity to find her proper sphere and to work out her own salvation on a basis of social and civil equality with men. And I am furthermore of the opinion that wherever woman can accomplish something good and beneficial, she is in her proper sphere. Woman should have a chance of working out her destiny unhampered by legal restrictions and social prejudices.

I have traced the status of woman, the form of the family, and the form of social and political government through the different stages of human progress and have attempted to show their intimate connection with the economic conditions as they appeared and disappeared and affected the social and political institutions.

The prevalence of general poverty in the primitive state of mankind resulted quite naturally in communistic relations between those who by marriage or descent belonged together. The fact that the labor of each individual scarcely sufficed for his or her own subsistence created necessarily a sentiment of equality. Social organization rested altogether on personal relations. The form of the family was one best adapted to communism of poverty. When the stage of agriculture was reached and women performed the most important labor, they acquired superior power and influence, which led to the establishment of the matriarchate and corresponding changes in the form of the family. The patriarchal family seems to have been particularly adapted to the needs of pastoral peoples. With the growth of the effi-

ciency of human labor, the participation of women in providing subsistence became less necessary; men performed it alone and woman lost her power and influence. The growth of productive power enabled the individual to produce more than what was necessary for his own subsistence and the institution of slavery appeared. In a society in which human beings were degraded to the condition of property, it was quite natural that the weak were subjected by the strong, that ethical views developed which permitted it, and that the condition of women grew more abject and subordinate than ever. Private property in land was established, and classes developed which acquired privileges and power. The growth of property interests made necessary an institution for their protection. The ancient gentile organization proved to be inefficient for the protection of private property and the political state appeared. The communistic institutions of old decayed, existence became uncertain and precarious, large families were difficult to support and monogamy became the prevailing form of the family. The fact that property consisted principally of land and slaves led to wars of conquest and Caesarism, and after the fall of Rome and the rise of German power, land still being the principal means of production, feudalism and serfdom appeared. Neither production by slaves nor production by serfs gave woman an opportunity to become an economic factor, and her social status remained low, as it did also under the guild system. Trade and commerce gradually expanded, better tools were invented, the advantages of division of labor became understood, the factory system was introduced, legal restraints in trade and commerce were abolished and the era of free trade and unfettered

competition began. The bourgeois class grew in power and influence. Then came the era of great inventions and modern industrialism which democratized the world and made the purely economic class of business men the ruling class in all civilized countries, monarchies as well as republics. Modern industrialism drew women into the whirl of economic affairs and she began to become an economic factor again. Her social status improved and the law granted her many rights of person and property which she had not before. The modern movement for the emancipation of women entered upon the stage. The deleterious influence of the competitive system on the family disclosed itself in a decrease of the number of marriages and an increase in the number of divorces, evincing a growing unsatisfactory condition of family relations. The efforts towards checking divorce by legal restraint and the pathetic cry in literature for more satisfactory family relations are the reflex of the struggle going on in human society. At the same time we witness a growth of the power of capital, a growth of the concentration of its forces, a growth of the dissatisfaction of the masses of the people with existing economic conditions, a growth of the bitterness and intensity of the fight between capital and labor, a growth of the democratical sentiment in the masses of the people and a growth of the dissatisfaction with the use of the power of the state and the administration of justice. Society is in travail and the birth of new forms of economic and social institutions is imminent.

The division of times past into different periods is altogether arbitrary. The future historian may let civilization begin at a much later period than the historian of our times. He may refuse to record pauperism,

prostitution, child labor, woman wage-labor, economic classes, military institutions and wars as attributes of civilization, and may put us down as barbarians. However, the institutions and conditions of all times have a historical right to be. Not only do they come one after the other, but all that succeeds comes as the necessary fruit and consequence of that which precedes.

So far, the world has seen four great general systems of production, each with its own special form of government, having passed slowly and by degrees from one into the other.

First, in archaic times, the system of communism of poverty. It created the gentile system of government, a perfectly democratical organization, based on personal relation.

Second, in ancient times, the system of slavery with private ownership of land. It created political government, based on territory and property, culminating in despotism and Caesarism.

Third, in mediaeval times, the system of serfdom in agriculture, and the system of guilds in industry. The corresponding form of government was feudalistic, aristocratic and autocratic.

Fourth, in modern times, the system of free competition with its capitalistic features. It created modern parliamentarism with more or less extended rights of suffrage in republics and constitutional monarchies.

The fifth? That is the problem. It may be already in the stage of its inception. What will it look like? Will it be, as Morgan believes, a return to the ancient gentes in a higher form? Will it be, as Mr. Abbott thinks, an industrial democracy, whatever that may mean? Will it be socialistic or individualistic in char-

acter? It would certainly be absurd to believe that our social and political system is the highest which the human race is able to evolve. So far, there is no unanimity of answer, neither in the world of science nor in the world of business, nor in the world of labor. It would be idle to deny that the answer is oftener dictated by interest and social position than by logic and reason. But it seems to me that there is a decided tendency toward socialism, not only in the views prevailing among the laboring classes, but also in the world of literature and economic science. Indeed, if we consider that the present conditions are the result of the uninterrupted application of the principle of individualism through centuries, it is difficult, if not impossible, to see how the future application of this principle can ameliorate, much less bring about a substantial change of conditions. What else can Abbott's industrial democracy or Morgan's return to the ancient gentes mean but socialism in some form? Political economy, as it is officially taught, sees the evils clearly enough, but is absolutely unable to discover a remedy within the beaten path of individualism.

Nor is this possible. For, so long as instruments of labor are in the hands of one class only, and the other class must sell to it their labor force and must do it under the power and influence of competition for employment, any material change of general conditions seems impossible. Effects can never be changed while causes remain the same. Nothing even proves this better than occasional individual cases of luck and success.

The fear of socialism is gradually waning; the dire predictions in case the world should turn socialistic do not find as ready believers as formerly; people think

more for themselves, and to-day a well respected citizen may advocate socialism without fear of losing caste. More people study it than ever did before, and there can be no question that the number of those who are unable to find another avenue of escape from the evils of our economic arrangements but socialism is slowly, but steadily, increasing.

It seems to be a very plain proposition. If the evils under which we suffer result from the fact that the instruments of labor are beyond the control of those who perform the work on and with them, the remedy is in giving them the control. But as a change of control from one class to the other would not destroy the classes themselves, but would only result in a change of their personnel, it is difficult to see what else remains but putting the instruments of production within the control of all people in their organized capacity, and that is the state.

It is said, however, of socialism that it offers no incentive to effort, that it would destroy individuality and that it is visionary.

Of the first charge I have already spoken in this chapter. As to the second I have shown that our present economic order is not favorable at all to the development of genius and talent. It does not seem to me that the counting room, the stock exchange and the "market," or the work for a mere living in the darkness of the mine or the dusty and smoky factory, or the endless and unremunerative toil of women and children create ideal individualities.

The third objection deserves no consideration at all. It is easy enough to brush projects and propositions for the future aside with a shrug of the shoulder as vision-

ary. It has always been done and requires very little wisdom. Undoubtedly the guild-master looked upon every proposition to free the trades from all restraints as perfectly visionary, and if only a hundred years ago one would have pictured present conditions as the necessary consequences of unchecked competition, he would have been called a dreamer.

Whether it is visionary or not cannot be determined by the present generation of mankind. Final judgment must be passed by a generation of the near or distant future. But suppose the doctrine of socialism is false? Was not the doctrine of the declaration of independence that all men are born free and equal and that they were endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights also false? Yet, it has filled the people with the hope, inspiration and enthusiasm necessary to bring the struggle for independence to a successful end.

Every bit of freedom, every approach to equality, every extension of political and civil rights was the result of social strife and revolution. They were social, not natural, creations. The error consisted in stating as a fact what was a mere ethical conception. If the socialistic idea should also be not more than an ethical conception, it may nevertheless result in immense changes for the benefit of mankind.

Be this, however, as it may, evolution will take its course regardless of objections and the result will be a system of economics and government which will mark a higher plane of culture, perhaps a civilization grand and noble beyond our dreams and a greater and more equally distributed amount of happiness for humanity.

If we look backward and compare what was with what is, if we study the progress the world has made

century after century without halt or rest, we can discover no ground upon which to base any doubt that the future will be as much superior to the present as the present is to the past.

Look backward, my dear reader, and when you have beheld everything which the power of your mental vision enables you to behold, then turn around and look forward with courage and confidence toward a future worthy of your best efforts and endeavors in behalf of struggling humanity's hopes and aspirations.

Human society will not permit an economic system which makes one class of the people produce all the wealth of another class to last forever. Nor will human society permit the permanence of a form of government which takes no notice of man as a natural being, but treats him only as a political being, makes the protection of property in all its ramifications its highest function and leaves man unprotected against its power. Human intelligence, impelled by necessity and popular will and impulse, will find means to direct the gigantic mass of wealth produced day after day by toiling humanity into other channels than those running into the coffers of comparatively few individuals and will gradually devise and create a form of government adapted to their new economic forms. By and by man will understand that labor and production are not the object and purpose of life, but only means to support it. Gradually the human mind will be educated to a higher perception of the value and dignity of man. All this will be accomplished, not by the good will and kind sentiment of some individuals, useful as they may be, but by the ever-present, steady, invincible movement and pressure from the lower strata of society towards the upper, using these

words in an economic and political sense. This movement has constituted the element of the organic life of human society since economic classes have begun to exist; without it society would be doomed to decay and death. It has always been stronger than the powers that were; it will be stronger than the powers that are. Nobody can remain a neutral observer of this movement; one must take part in it consciously or unconsciously, be it as merchant or banker, manufacturer or laborer, employer or employee, citizen or subject, and must, according to position, understanding or conscience, assist or resist it.

The social struggles which constitute this movement must, from the mere fact of their existence and from their very nature as class-struggles, result in changes for the better; and although it is one of the shortcomings of man that his vision is not powerful enough to penetrate the veil which forever has hidden the future from the human eye, yet man will continue to plan for the future and create ideals toward the realization of which he will unceasingly strive. He will derive inspiration and strength from them in his struggles and efforts; and his confidence in the results of his hopes and endeavors, based upon science, logic and experience, reveals to him the future in its general outlines, at least.

THE END.